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One of the most controversial labor policy issues is whether strikers 
should be eligible for government transfer payments, such as unemploy 
ment compensation, public assistance, and food stamps. Under current 
policies, strikers after an extended waiting period, are eligible for 
unemployment compensation in two states (New York and Rhode Island) 
and can collect unemployment benefits in many other states under cer 
tain conditions (e.g., if a strike does not result in the employer shutting 
down operations). Railroad workers engaged in a lawful strike are also 
eligible for unemployment compensation under the federal Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act. Needy strikers may also be eligible for 
cash grants and other forms of public assistance made available by state 
and county governments.
Consider the following cases:
  In July 1971, about 38,000 workers employed by the New York 
Telephone Company went on strike. Under New York's unemployment 
insurance law, these workers were allowed to collect unemployment 
benefits after they had been on strike for eight weeks. Before the strike 
was settled in February 1972, the strikers had collected $49 million 
in benefits. The New York Telephone Company financed most of these 
benefits through payroll taxes the company subsequently paid to the state.
  In 1972, 166 workers went on strike against the Dow Chemical 
Company's Bay City, Michigan plant. Michigan's unemployment in 
surance law allows strikers to collect unemployment benefits if the 
strikers obtain, and are then laid off from, "bona fide interim jobs." 
Most of the Dow strikers obtained temporary jobs with "friendly" 
employers who, after a few days, laid off the strikers. The strikers then 
applied for, and collected, unemployment benefits for the duration of 
their strike. Michigan, like New York, raised Dow's unemployment 
insurance taxes to cover the cost of the strikers' benefits.
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  During the winter of 1977-78, about 160,000 members of the United 
Mine Workers (UMW) staged a strike against the Bituminous Coal 
Operators Association. As the strike dragged on through January and 
February, thousands of miners applied for and received food stamps. 
In West Virginia, for example, 35,000 miners collected $18 million 
in food stamps. 1 In Pennsylvania, nearly 12,000 miners received food 
stamps and 2,700 received other forms of public assistance. 2 In 1981, 
the UMW once again struck the coal operators, and once again thousands 
of miners qualified for food stamps and public assistance.
  In August 1981, 12,000 air traffic controllers launched a nation 
wide strike against their employer, the Federal Aviation Administra 
tion. President Ronald Reagan ordered the striking controllers to return 
to their jobs. When they refused to do so, the president discharged the 
controllers for conducting an illegal strike against the federal govern 
ment. Subsequently, many controllers applied for unemployment com 
pensation. Although many states denied the controllers' claims for 
benefits, several allowed them to collect.
  At midnight on July 31, 1986, the collective bargaining agreement 
between the United Steel Workers union and the USX (formerly the 
United States Steel Corporation) expired. In the face of the failure to 
negotiate a new contract, USX shut down its plants across the country 
and declared a lockout. Some states ruled that the unemployed steel- 
workers were ineligible for unemployment benefits because of their par 
ticipation in a labor dispute. Other states, however, allowed workers to 
collect benefits because of the lockout. In particular, nearly 800 steel- 
workers in Illinois and 7,500 steelworkers in Pennsylvania were allowed 
to collect unemployment compensation during their dispute with USX.
These are not isolated cases. Although comprehensive data on the 
use of public aid in strikes are lacking, it would be an easy task, using 
accounts in newspapers and periodicals as well as administrative and 
court decisions, to cite dozens of other examples. Indeed, Thieblot and 
Cowin, in a book published in 1972, predicted that the cost of public 
aid to strikers would exceed $300 million in 1973. Although that figure 
was probably an overestimate, it is known that in 1980 strikers receiv 
ed $30 million in food stamps and $5 million under the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U) program.
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Unfortunately, no one knows the total cost of unemployment benefits 
received by workers involved in labor disputes.
But the cost of public aid to strikers is only one issue of concern to 
policymakers and citizens. Clearly, public aid to strikers also provides 
benefits, not only to the strikers themselves but also to their families 
and, indirectly at least, to the communities in which the strikers live. 
Many strikers' families suffer great hardship during prolonged strikes, 
and the benefits associated with the alleviation of that hardship may 
be worth more than the costs. Moreover, an entire community may suffer 
as a result of a protracted strike (especially when the strikers constitute 
a significant proportion of the community's workforce), and subsidiz 
ing strikers with public funds may do much to bolster the community's 
welfare. Providing public subsidies to strikers, then, may serve an en 
tirely suitable public interest.
The extension and liberalization of various welfare programs during 
the 1960s laid the foundation for the increasing use of transfer payments 
by strikers in the 1970s. This development did not go unnoticed by the 
business community. Business interests and their allies increasingly decried 
the use of tax dollars to subsidize strikers. For example, in 1978 Richard 
L. Lesher, then president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said:
our members consider it highly inappropriate that taxpayers 
should subsidize strikers. Such subsidies are even more in 
comprehensible when beneficiaries are continuing their strike 
outside the law. ... In fact, our members continue to believe 
that taxpayers should not be required to subsidize strikers 
in any event, since their decision to cease working is volun 
tary. We believe public assistance should be available only 
to those who are out of work through no fault of their own.
In supporting the 1981 legislation that made strikers ineligible for 
food stamps, Senator Jesse Helms (Rep., N.C.), a long-time opponent 
of public aid for strikers, said,
any worker who walks off the job to go on strike has given 
up the income from that job of his own volition. A person 
making such a choice, and participating in a strike, must bear 
the consequence of his decisions without assistance from the 
taxpayers. 3
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On the other hand, unions and their allies have defended the use of 
transfer payments in strikes as a fair and even necessary use of public 
funds. In 1975, the late George Meany, then president of the AFL-CIO, 
said, "It is our position that welfare benefits should be available to 
citizens who are demonstrably in need without regard for the cause of 
that need. "4 When the Carter administration threatened to cut off food 
stamp assistance to striking coal miners in 1978, Meany said the threat 
was an "outrage, especially for an administration dedicated to protect 
ing and preserving human rights. . . . This attempt to force the miners 
to agree to an unacceptable contract by starving their wives and children 
is a vindictive act." 5
In the congressional debate over the retention of striker eligibility 
for food stamps in 1981, Senator Carl Levin (Dem., MI) said,
Elimination of striker participation in the food stamp pro 
gram will pose hardship for the poorest of strikers. . . . The 
labor laws of this country protect the right to strike. The 
workers who choose to exercise this right should not be 
singled out for denial of food stamp benefits if they other 
wise qualify under the Act and program regulation. 6
While the debate over the use of government transfer payments in 
labor disputes continues, that debate is often characterized by rhetorical 
appeals to the emotions rather than analysis of hard evidence. In the 
hope that a more informed debate can lead to better policy, this book 
seeks to present a few pieces of hard evidence. The book is organized 
around the following questions.
(1) What are our current practices, where do they come from, and 
what is their rationale?
(2) Does the provision of government transfers to strikers affect 
strike activity?
(3) What is the proper policy?
Our answers to those questions are summarized as follows.
What are our current practices, where do they come from, and what 
is their rationale?
Chapters 2 through 4 address this issue. Chapters 2 and 3 examine 
unemployment insurance, and chapter 4 examines public assistance.
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To write these chapters we not only searched through libraries, but 
also talked to experts in the field. We interviewed representatives of 
the AFL-CIO, the National Association of Manufacturers, and U.S. 
Department of Labor. We sent a survey to the employment security 
agency in each state (and conducted follow-up telephone calls) in order 
to obtain information on state policies and court cases. In each of these 
efforts we sought views on whether and how specific provisions of 
government transfer programs influence strike activity.
This inquiry leads us to conclude that there is considerable confu 
sion surrounding the issue of striker eligibility for unemployment in 
surance benefits. First, it should be recognized that the Social Security 
Act of 1935, which established the unemployment insurance system, 
gives the states the authority to establish the rules governing claimant 
eligibility for unemployment benefits (provided the states meet certain 
minimum federal standards). Therefore, each state can determine 
whether, and under what conditions, workers unemployed because of 
a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. 7 Federal tolerance 
of state autonomy on this issue, reinforced by several key Supreme Court 
decisions, results in considerable diversity in the unemployment in 
surance eligibility rules that affect strikers.
It is widely believed, even by those with knowledge of the subject, 
that only two states, New York and Rhode Island, routinely permit 
strikers to collect unemployment benefits. Although it is true that these 
two states do allow strikers to collect benefits (in New York after an 
eight-week waiting period and in Rhode Island after a seven-week 
period), it is also true that a majority of other states allow workers 
unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect unemployment benefits 
under certain conditions. Moreover, in these states the workers are eligi 
ble to collect benefits after the normal waiting period (usually one week), 
or virtually from the outset of a strike. While the relevant state UI pro 
visions .take many forms, the following are particularly important.
(1) In 1984, 27 states had a "stoppage-of-work" provision, whereby 
strikers collect unemployment benefits if their employer continues to 
operate at or near normal operating levels during the course of the labor 
dispute. In a sense, this provision provides insurance against a failed
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strike; if the strike fails to shut down the employer, then unemploy 
ment insurance benefits are available to the strikers.
(2) In 1984, 21 states qualified claimants for benefits if the labor 
dispute is caused by an employer lockout. For example, in the dispute 
between the USW and the USX Corporation in 1986-87, cited earlier, 
the union instructed a large number of its Pennsylvania members to report 
to work after the expiration of the national contract. When the corporation 
turned the workers away from the locked gates of its Pennsylvania steel 
mills, it became a near certainty that the state would allow the 
steel workers to collect unemployment insurance benefits.
(3) In 1984, 44 states had an "innocent bystander" provision whereby 
workers obtain unemployment insurance benefits if they are unemployed 
because of a labor dispute but are not participating in, financing, or 
directly interested in the dispute. Typically, innocent bystanders are 
employed at the struck establishment, but are not members of either 
the union or the bargaining unit that is on strike.
Of course, these rules interact. Some states have none of the provi 
sions, others have one or two, while still others have all three. Interesting 
ly, New York popularly regarded as a state with liberal policies on 
the use of unemployment benefits in labor disputes has none of the 
three policies. A New York worker engaged in a labor dispute receives 
no unemployment insurance benefits during the first eight weeks of the 
strike, irrespective of whether he is a participant or an innocent 
bystander, and irrespective of whether the employer continues to operate 
or has locked strikers out. Of course, after the eight-week waiting period, 
the New Yorker receives full UI benefits. In contrast, Rhode Island 
uses a stoppage-of-work rule. Thus in Rhode Island, a striker can col 
lect benefits after a one-week waiting period if his employer does con 
tinue to operate during a strike and can collect benefits after a seven- 
week waiting period if his employer does not continue to operate dur 
ing a strike.
It should be clear from this brief preview that the rules governing 
the payment of unemployment benefits in labor disputes are complex 
and diverse. The variation in the rules across states means that strikers 
who are otherwise identical may be eligible to collect benefits in one 
state but not in another. Some states, particularly those with work-
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stoppage, lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, e.g., Georgia, 
Maryland, West Virginia, are relatively liberal in qualifying workers 
for benefits. Other states, particularly those without work-stoppage, 
lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, e.g., Alabama and North 
Carolina, are quite strict. By providing a thorough understanding of 
the "rules of the game," chapters 2 and 3 lay the foundation for our 
subsequent empirical analyses of the effect of variation in the rules on 
strike activity.
Chapter 4 deals with the eligibility of strikers for AFDC-U benefits, 
food stamps, and general assistance. For nearly 20 years, opponents 
of federal assistance to strikers had struggled to remove striker eligibility 
for AFDC-U and food stamps from the law, but without success. When 
Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, however, the stage was set 
for Congress to enact a package of sweeping budget cuts. On July 31, 
1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), 
which cut federal expenditures by $35 billion. The Act brought about 
major policy changes in many domestic programs, including AFDC, 
Medicaid, food stamps, job training, and others. 8 Elimination of striker 
eligibility for AFDC-U and food stamps were only two of the many 
policy changes incorporated in the OBRA.
Because Congress eliminated striker eligibility for AFDC-U and food 
stamps in 1981, the material covered in chapter 4 is primarily historical 
in nature. Yet the issue of whether strikers should be eligible for welfare 
benefits continues to be relevant, particularly because in 1986 a federal 
district court ruled that the provision in the 1981 law that denies food 
stamps to the families of strikers violates due process and interferes 
with the striker's First Amendment right of freedom of association. 9 
Although the Supreme Court reversed this decision in 1988, thereby 
ending legal challenges to the OBRA, the issue will continue to be the 
subject of congressional debate on public policy. 10 But in deciding on 
which transfer policies, if any, should be used in labor disputes, it is 
necessary to understand how the federal welfare system operated in the 
1960s and 1970s, when strikers could qualify for assistance. Moreover, 
because the data gathered for our empirical analysis cover the period 
1960-75, we are able to make an assessment of the effect of striker
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eligibility for AFDC-U and food stamps on the frequency and duration 
of strikes.
Until 1961, the AFDC program targeted families with children where 
the father was absent and the mother did not work. In 1961 Congress 
extended coverage under the program to dependent children in 
households with an unemployed father. States were given the option 
of deciding whether to participate in the AFDC-U program and by 1967, 
21 had decided to do so. 11 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the pay 
ment of AFDC-U benefits to strikers remained a contentious issue, with 
controversy centering upon whether a striker fell within the definition 
of an unemployed parent. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Batterton 
v. Frances, ruled that this definitional decision should be left to the states. 
Thus, the issue of whether states participating in the AFDC-U program 
could deny benefits to strikers' families was finally settled. By 1980, 
of the 26 states participating in the AFDC-U programs, 8 had chosen 
to deny benefits to strikers.
AFDC-U benefits were never an important source of income sup 
port for strikers. This is in part because, as noted above, many states 
either did not have an AFDC-U program or denied benefits to strikers. 
In addition, even if a participating state did permit strikers to collect 
benefits, a striker could only qualify if he met the same federal and 
state eligibility requirements imposed on all other applicants for 
assistance. The most salient requirements were that he was unemployed 
for at least 30 days, that he have a dependent child, that he could 
demonstrate financial need under his state's resource and income tests, 
and that he did not receive unemployment insurance benefits. In com 
bination, these requirements always seriously limited the number of 
strikers eligible for AFDC-U. For example, since the average strike 
in the United States lasts about three weeks, the 30-day waiting period 
by itself prevented most strikers from ever becoming eligible for AFDC-U 
benefits.
Food stamps were a somewhat different story. The food stamp pro 
gram is funded entirely by the federal government but is administered 
jointly by the federal government and the states under uniform federal 
standards. It is clear that during the 1960s and 1970s many more strikers 
qualified for food stamps than for AFDC-U. First, unlike the AFDC-U
Setting the Stage 9
program, all states participated in the food stamp program. Second, 
there is no waiting period for food stamp benefits. Third, the resource 
and income tests used to qualify applicants for food stamps have been 
more liberal than those used in most state AFDC programs. Fourth, 
after 1970 the Food Stamp Act specifically provided that otherwise eligi 
ble strikers would not-be disqualified from receiving food stamps.
Strikers may also benefit from the General Assistance program. 
General Assistance is distinguished from AFDC-U and food stamps by 
an absence of federal involvement. It is funded and administered by 
state and local governments; in some states eligibility rules differ from 
county to county. Since it is a very old program, there are instances 
where strikers have received General Assistance throughout the 20th 
century. Indeed, since the program was not touched by the 1981 OBRA 
legislation, strikers can still receive General Assistance. In most states, 
however, this is a small program that provides minuscule benefits to 
people with the lowest of family incomes. To choose an extreme ex 
ample, in August, 1974, Alabama provided General Assistance benefits 
of $12.50 to 42 people. While we have no hard numbers, it is unlikely 
that many strikers benefit from this program.
Does the provision of government transfers to strikers affect strike 
activity?
This question is not merely "academic." It has arisen in the most 
practical of settings. For example, in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, a case 
involving the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers in 
Rhode Island, the first circuit court demanded an empirical burden of 
proof. The court said:
[The] present record suffers from a fundamental defect. It 
provides no support for a causal relationship between the 
receipt of benefits, which unions obviously desire and often 
actively seek, and longer, costlier strikes. . . . [The] record 
lacks even a crude form of what we assume would be the 
most relevant and probative type of evidence statistical com 
parisons of the length and cost of strikes in states granting 
unemployment benefits (Rhode Island and New York) and 
the length and cost of strikes of similar size in similar in 
dustries in other states not granting such benefits. 12
10 Setting the Stage
Similarly, in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, a case involving payment 
of AFDC-U benefits to strikers, the first circuit court called for evidence 
indicating,
. . . how many states permit strikers to receive welfare; 
whether or not strikes tend to be of longer duration where 
welfare is received; and studies or expert testimony evaluating 
the impact of eligibility for benefits on the strikers' resolve. 13
There exist but a handful of studies that examine the relationship be 
tween transfer payments and strike activity. Perhaps best known is a 
work by Thieblot and Cowin, which is primarily based on case studies. 14 
A study of Great Britain by Gennard similarly relies on description, 
case studies, and gross cost estimates. 15 John Kennan 16 applies modern 
statistical methods in examining the relationship between unemploy 
ment insurance and the duration of strikes. His work, however, focuses 
on the New York and Rhode Island policy of providing UI benefits in 
very long strikes, and thereby ignores the multitude of other policies 
under which strikers receive government transfers. 17
A distinguishing feature of the present work is that it uses modern 
statistical methods in an analysis of a broad range of government policies. 
Chapter 5 introduces the relevant theory, the hypotheses to be tested, 
the methods, and the data. Chapter 6 presents quantitative results and 
draws conclusions.
Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of theory. Theory is crucial to this 
project because it provides a bridge between the institutional details in 
chapters 2-A and the quantitative results in chapter 6. Chapters 2-4 essen 
tially tell us that in certain circumstances workers involved in strikes 
obtain government transfers. Theory addresses the question of whether 
there is a logical basis for arguing that these transfers affect strike ac 
tivity. Much past work has treated this as a simple question that can 
be glided over in one or two sentences. In our view, that is a serious 
mistake for two reasons.
First, the answer is not at all obvious. Payment of government transfers 
to strikers will surely make it easier for workers to support themselves 
during a strike. But why would that result in more strike activity? The 
employer is presumably aware of the availability of such transfers. If
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government transfers strengthen the bargaining position of the union, 
then one might expect a rational employer to be more willing to settle 
without a strike, or, failing that, settle sooner rather than later. That 
means less strike activity. The point is that a concept of what starts and 
stops strikes necessarily underlies any claim that government transfers 
increase strike activity. That concept deserves critical examination; it 
should not be left between the lines.
The second reason for exploring theoretical issues is that empirical 
work always raises questions that are best answered with a theory. What 
explanatory variables should be included in an analysis of strike activi 
ty? What is the appropriate dependent variable? What are the key 
hypotheses? What is the proper interpretation of a result? Empirical 
work always requires answers to such questions. Theory helps to make 
the answers logically consistent and explicit rather than implicit.
Thus, chapter 5 opens with a review of theories. On the basis of this 
discussion it is clear that there is no general consensus on the "right" 
theory of strikes. Rather, there are competing and often contradictory 
theories. Fortunately, for our purposes a general theory of strike ac 
tivity is not requisite. We only need a theory that links transfer policies 
to strike activity. That theory was found in the work of Melvin Reder 
and George Neumann. The fundamental proposition of the theory is 
that strike activity is a decreasing function of the combined (union plus 
management) cost of strikes. As the potential cost of a strike increases, 
according to Reder and Neumann, the parties have a greater incentive 
to develop protocols that allow them to reach peaceful settlements. From 
this theory we derive a series of hypotheses linking specific provisions 
of unemployment insurance and welfare programs to strike activity.
Those hypotheses can be tested with state level data. Transfer policies 
affecting strikers usually vary across but not within states. If transfer 
policies affect strike behavior, then that should be revealed through dif 
ferences in the "average" level of strike activity across states. In con 
sequence, we collected data on several dimensions of strike activity for 
the 50 states over the period 1960-1974. We also collected data on the 
specifics of state transfer policies ("stoppage-of-work," "innocent 
bystander," etc.) for the same period. Chapter 5 closes with a discus-
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sion of the nuances of data sources, variable measurement, and statistical 
methodology.
Chapter 6 then presents results from a sequence of regression analyses 
on annual cross-sections and on the full (1960-1974) panel. On the basis 
of the statistical evidence, we conclude that there is a link between the 
unemployment insurance system and strike activity. A more generous 
unemployment insurance program is related to a higher strike frequen 
cy in states that use "innocent bystander" or "stoppage-of-work" dis 
qualification rules. Similar results were not obtained for other unemploy 
ment insurance provisions, e.g., the New York-Rhode Island waiting 
period, or other dimensions of strike activity, e.g., average duration 
of strikes. Finally, our statistical models did not uncover evidence linking 
welfare programs to strike activity. Either such a link is nonexistent 
or our methods are insufficiently precise to discern it.
What is the proper policy?
When should government transfers be provided to workers engaged 
in strikes? As discussed in chapter 7, at the heart of this question lies 
a philosophical problem concerning the appropriate role of the modern 
state in what are usually two distinct spheres: government transfers and 
industrial relations. The answer necessarily involves finding a balance 
between what are often conflicting policy goals in the two spheres. For 
example, a goal like government neutrality in labor relations comes in 
conflict with the goal of alleviating hardship and distress. Thus, the 
chapter begins with an examination of current policy goals and tradeoffs 
between those goals.
Chapter 7 ends with the authors' position on the proper policy. Briefly 
stated, in our opinion the present system is seriously flawed. It denies 
public assistance benefits to the family of a law-abiding striker irrespec 
tive of hardship. It provides unemployment insurance benefits to strikers 
when the involuntary nature of their unemployment is fraught with am 
biguity. It places part of the burden of financing strike related transfers 
on the larger society, and thereby increases the level of strike activity. 
Chapter 7 proposes a package of alternative policies that are oriented 
toward the twin goals of alleviating hardship and promoting industrial 
peace.
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The unemployment compensation laws of all states contain provisions 
that disqualify workers if they are unemployed because of the existence 
of a labor dispute. State employment security agencies have the respon 
sibility of determining, first, if a labor dispute exists and, second, if 
the claimant's unemployment is the result of the labor dispute. These 
are only threshold tests, however, in determining the claimant's eligibility 
for unemployment benefits. Whether workers unemployed because of 
a labor dispute qualify for benefits depends on the precise policies follow 
ed by a particular state and there is considerable variation in these 
policies. The most common provisions are summarized for the reader's 
use as a reference in exhibit 2.1. We will discuss these provisions in 
more detail in this and the following chapter.
A fundamental distinction hinges on whether a state imposes a blanket 
disqualification on workers unemployed because of the existence of a 
labor dispute or disqualifies such workers only if the labor dispute has 
caused a "stoppage of work" at the establishment where the worker 
is employed. In the former category, approximately 20 states disqualify 
workers while a labor dispute is in "active progress" (or alternatively 
as long as the workers' unemployment continues to be the result of the 
dispute). In the latter category, approximately 27 states disqualify 
workers only if the labor dispute has caused a substantial curtailment 
of the employer's operations. In stoppage-of-work states, striking 
workers can collect benefits if their employer continues to operate at 
or near normal levels. In simplest terms, workers are denied benefits 
if their strike is a success, but are granted benefits if their strike fails.
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Exhibit 2.1
Principal Labor Dispute Disqualification Provisions 
in Unemployment Insurance Systems
Prevalence 
Standard provisions: as of 1984
Labor dispute Individuals filing claims for benefits are All jurisdictions 
disqualification disqualified if unemployed because of the ex 
istence of a labor dispute.
Establishment A worker is ineligible for benefits if the Almost all 
rule labor dispute causing his unemployment jurisdictions
is at the "factory, establishment, or premises
at which he is or was employed."
New work Otherwise eligible claimants cannot be All jurisdictions 
denied benefits for refusing to accept new work 
if the job vacancy was created by a strike, 
lockout, or other labor dispute.
Exceptions:
Stoppage-of- Also referred to as the "American Rule." 27 states 
work Striking employees are not disqualified for 
benefits if an existing labor dispute has not caus 
ed a cessation or substantial curtailment of 
operations at the plant or establishment where 
the strikers are employed.
Waiting period Strikers become eligible for benefits Two states (New
if, after a specified period of time, the York & Rhode
labor dispute has not ended. Island)
Innocent Workers who are unemployed because of Approximately 
bystander a labor dispute may qualify for benefits if 44 states 
they can show that they are not participating 
in, financing, and/or directly interested in the 
dispute.3
Lockout Workers may collect benefits if their 21 states 
employer is withholding available work in order 
to bring pressure to bear in support of his 
bargaining position, or to resist recognition of 
an employee bargaining agent.
Illegal actions Benefits are paid to workers if the employer Nine states 
by employers is found to be the cause of the labor dispute, 
by refusing to conform to the provisions of a 
collective bargaining contract and/or by failing 
to comply with federal or state laws pertaining 
to collective bargaining or the terms and con 
ditions of employment.







Workers are eligible for benefits if, after 
going on strike, they obtain bona fide 
interim jobs from which they are then 
laid off.
A worker, regardless of his own level of 











disqualification for benefits if he was, at the time of the
commencement of the dispute, a member of 
a grade or class o£ workers any one of 
whom participated in, financed, or had a 
direct interest in the dispute.
a. Innocent bystander statutes do not uniformly include all three conditions; requirements vary 
across states. In some jurisdictions, for example, a worker need only prove that he did not par 
ticipate in the labor dispute in order to qualify for benefits.
The remaining states, most notably New York and Rhode Island, fall 
outside either of these two categories. Both New York and Rhode Island 
disqualify strikers in the early stages of a labor dispute, but allow strikers 
to collect benefits if a strike lasts longer than eight weeks (New York) 
or seven weeks (Rhode Island).
Most states will allow workers to collect benefits if they can show 
that they are not actually participating in, financing, or directly interested 
in the labor dispute. Such workers are often called "innocent 
bystanders.'' These workers may be unemployed because of a dispute, 
but if they are not picketing or otherwise aiding the strikers, do not 
help to finance strike benefits paid to the strikers, and do not stand to 
benefit from a settlement growing out of the strike, they will usually 
be allowed to collect unemployment benefits.
About 21 states pay benefits to workers if their employer has locked 
them out. These states do not believe workers should be denied benefits 
if the labor dispute is in fact the employer's fault. The remaining states 
do not distinguish between strikes and lockouts, disqualifying workers 
regardless of which side bears responsibility for the dispute.
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Policy Development
The development of most state policies regarding the eligibility of 
strikers for unemployment compensation began with the passage of the 
Social Security Act in 1935. When Congress passed the Social Securi 
ty Act, it provided the impetus for the establishment of a state- 
administered unemployment compensation system. The Social Securi 
ty Act imposed a tax of 3 percent on the payrolls of all employers of 
eight or more employees. 1 The Act allowed a state to avoid up to 90 
percent of this tax, however, if it passed legislation providing for the 
payment of benefits to unemployed workers. If the state's legislation 
met federal standards, the state could retain the bulk of the federal tax 
in a state-administered unemployment compensation fund. Benefits paid 
to eligible unemployed workers would be financed out of the monies 
collected in the fund. The portion of the payroll tax retained by the federal 
government would be used to assist the states in the administration of 
their unemployment compensation laws. 2
All states and territories that had not previously enacted unemploy 
ment compensation legislation proceeded to pass such laws in the two 
years following the passage of the Social Security Act. To assist the 
states in the development and administration of their legislation, the 
Social Security Act created the Social Security Board as an indepen 
dent agency. The Board was also charged with the task of deciding 
whether state laws qualified for the tax offset and allotting the funds 
appropriated for the administration of the state laws. 3
The Board drew up several "Draft Bills for State Unemployment Com 
pensation," modeled largely on state workers' compensation laws and 
the British Unemployment Insurance Act of 1911. 4 One of the Board's 
Draft Bills became the prototype for almost all state laws that were subse 
quently passed. 5 According to Edwin Witte, "Each of the (state) laws 
had some provisions different from every other law, but all had far more 
similarities than differences." 6 In fact, Hetherington reports, most states 
simply copied most of the provisions in the Social Security Board's Draft 
Bill and enacted their own legislation "in great haste and without a great 
deal of independent study." 7
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One of the provisions contained in the Draft Bill sought to disqualify 
workers whose unemployment was "due to a stoppage of work which 
exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or premises 
at which he is or was last employed. " 8 The Draft Bill also recommended 
that such workers be allowed to collect benefits if they could show that 
they were "not participating in or financing or directly interested in 
the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work'' and ' 'do not belong 
to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the com 
mencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the 
premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating 
in or financing or directly interested in the dispute."9 Most states in 
cluded this language without modification in their unemployment com 
pensation statutes. But, given the haste with which the laws were pass 
ed, it is unlikely that many legislators understood the implications of 
the labor dispute qualification provisions they were adopting.
Many of the problems that the states have encountered in administering 
and interpreting the labor dispute disqualification provisions stem from 
the fact that the key terms in the Draft Bill's recommendations were 
left undefined. For example, what precisely is a "labor dispute"? How 
does a labor dispute differ from a "stoppage-of-work"? What is an 
"establishment"? How should a state distinguish between those workers 
at an establishment who are ' 'participating in or financing or directly 
interested in" a dispute from those who are not? What is a "grade or 
class" of workers?
State agencies and courts have had more than five decades to grapple 
with these terms. Out of a multitude of agency and judicial decisions, 
some common interpretations have developed, but there is also con 
siderable diversity in the definitions. The differences in the treatment 
of workers involved in labor disputes has been multiplied by numerous 
revisions that states have made in their unemployment compensation 
laws down through the years. For example, several states have amend 
ed their statutes to exclude lockouts and other employer-caused disputes 
from the definition of "labor dispute." These amendments have often 
been passed as a result of a state's experience with particular labor 
disputes or in response to lobbying efforts by unions, employers, and 
other interested parties. 10
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The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the fundamental ques 
tions each state must answer when formulating its policy on the use 
of unemployment compensation in labor disputes. First, does a labor 
dispute exist? If it does, is the claimant's unemployment the result of 
that labor dispute? How have the states and the federal courts inter 
preted the provision that holds that the labor dispute must be at the 
"establishment" where the worker was last employed? To aid the reader 
in understanding the complexities of the rules governing the eligibility 
of a claimant for unemployment compensation in a labor dispute, we 
will, in the next chapter, use flow charts that summarize the principal 
questions that must be answered in determining that eligibility.
But the exceptions used to remove a claimant's disqualification are 
numerous, and vary from state to state. For example, is the claimant 
in a state with a lockout exception? How is the lockout exception ap 
plied in such states? Has the claimant had other employment during 
the strike? How does interim employment affect striker eligibility for 
unemployment compensation? These questions will be discussed in this 
chapter.
The next chapter discusses the three rules that later become the focus 
of our empirical tests: the stoppage-of-work rule, the policies followed 
by New York and Rhode Island, and the innocent bystander provisions. 
Chapter 3 will also examine the most significant Supreme Court deci 
sion regarding unemployment compensation in labor disputes, the New 
York Telephone case. In this decision, the Court gave each state wide 
latitude to shape its own policy regarding striker eligibility for unemploy 
ment compensation. 11 Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of 
unemployment insurance cases arising out of the air traffic controllers' 
strike in 1981.
What is a Labor Dispute?
With the exception of Alabama, Arizona, and Minnesota, the term 
"labor dispute" has not been defined in state unemployment compen 
sation statutes. 12 As a result, it has fallen upon state administrative agen 
cies and courts to formulate definitions of the term. Without statutory 
guidance, agencies and courts have frequently relied upon the definitions
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of "labor dispute" contained in federal statutes, such as the Norris- 
LaGuardia Act and National Labor Relations Act, or in state labor rela 
tions statutes. 13
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act requires, for example, that 
unemployment compensation be paid to otherwise eligible claimants if 
they have refused to accept new work because "the position offered 
is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute." 14 
This language suggests that Congress had a broad definition of labor 
dispute in mind not one confined merely to strikes and lockouts, but 
one that encompasses other types of labor disputes as well. Arguably, 
picketing, secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes, representational 
disputes, and other forms of concerted activity fall within the defini 
tion of labor dispute. Workers away from their jobs because of their 
involvement in such activities would not, in most jurisdictions, be eligible 
for unemployment benefits.
Difficult questions arise when there is an absence of concerted ac 
tivity or other forms of "manifest conflict," but it is nonetheless alleg 
ed that workers are unemployed because of the existence of a labor 
dispute. In 1946 the United States Supreme Court had occasion to con 
sider such a situation. 15 The case arose when a group of Alaska can 
nery workers were laid off at the end of the fishing season, but before 
a new collective bargaining agreement had been negotiated with their 
employers.
The canneries then announced that they would not reopen for the new 
season unless the workers agreed to a new contract. The workers filed 
claims for unemployment benefits, arguing that the term' 'labor dispute,'' 
in the Court's words, must be "narrowly construed to require a strike 
or leaving of employment which, in turn, calls for a presently existing 
employment relation at the time the dispute arises. According to this 
view, the term would not cover a situation, such as presented here, where 
the controversy precedes the employment." 16
The Court, however, rejected the argument of the cannery workers, 
holding that "the term, 'labor dispute,' has a broader meaning than 
that attributed to it by the respondents." 17 Although the Court did not 
believe that a "labor dispute" must always be construed "as broadly 
as it is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor
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Relations Act," 18 nevertheless it did find that there was a "full-scale 
controversy" between the workers' union and their employers. 19 Thus, 
the Court ruled that the workers were not eligible for benefits, even 
though their employment relationship had been severed and they were 
not engaging in a strike or any other form of concerted activity.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court did not accept a claim that 
a controversy arising out of an employee's charge that her employer 
had committed an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Rela 
tions Act constituted a "labor dispute" under the state's unemployment 
insurance statute. Florida had disqualified a union member for unemploy 
ment benefits because she had filed a charge against her employer with 
the National Labor Relations Board. A Florida court ruled that the fil 
ing of the charge initiated a "labor dispute," thus disqualifying the 
worker for benefits under the state's unemployment insurance statute. 
In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court concluded, 
' 'Florida should not be permitted to defeat or handicap a valid national 
objective by threatening to withdraw state benefits from persons sim 
ply because they cooperate with the Government's constitutional plan. "20 
Nash suggests that the exercise of an employee's rights under a federal 
statute cannot be interpreted by a state as a "labor dispute" that dis 
qualifies the employee for unemployment benefits. The term "labor 
dispute" cannot be defined so broadly that it encompasses every type 
of disagreement between an employer and an employee.
Nevertheless, as Lewis has pointed out, " 'Labor dispute' as a 
threshold concept in unemployment compensation proceedings has come 
to include virtually any controversy affecting the terms and conditions 
of the employment situation, regardless of whether the disputants stand 
in an employer-employee relationship. The restrictive construction of 
'labor dispute' has not received judicial acceptance." 21 The broad con 
struction given the term "labor dispute" means that employers have 
many opportunities to challenge their employees' entitlement to benefits 
if their employees' unemployment is arguably the result of a labor- 
management controversy.
But it must be emphasized that the finding that a labor dispute exists 
is only the first step in determining whether a worker involved in such
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a dispute is eligible for unemployment benefits. All but a handful of 
states remove a worker's disqualification for benefits, despite the ex 
istence of a labor dispute, if the worker falls under one of several' 'escape 
clauses," which we will presently discuss.
The Establishment Rule
In almost all jurisdictions, a worker is disqualified for benefits if the 
labor dispute is at the "factory, establishment, or premises at which 
he is or was last employed." Thus, as a general rule, a worker who 
is unemployed because of a strike at another, separate establishment 
is eligible for unemployment benefits, even if the establishment is owned 
and operated by his employer.
States have differed, however, in their definition of "establishment." 
Some states have defined establishment primarily on the basis of spatial 
or geographical terms. An establishment, under this approach, is a 
distinct physical place of business where the worker was last employed. 22 
Two plants belonging to the same employer but in different cities would 
be considered separate establishments, and workers laid off at one of 
the plants because of a strike at the other would be eligible for benefits. 
The only problem, as Milton Shadur points out, is "how small to draw 
the circle of physical proximity." 23
Other states, however, dismiss the significance of physical proximi 
ty and rely instead on a test that weighs the "functional integration" 
of the units regardless of the distance that separates them. In one early 
case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a situation in which 
workers at a Racine automobile plant set up a picket line to protest 
management's plan to close the plant; as a consequence, workers at 
the company's Kenosha plant were laid off. The Wisconsin court ruled 
that the workers at both plants were ineligible for benefits, even though 
there was technically no strike at the Racine plant and no picketing or 
other concerted activity at the Kenosha plant. The court held that the 
workers were disqualified because there was a labor dispute in active 
progress at the Racine plant and the Racine and Kenosha plants were 
functionally integrated. 24
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Taken to its limit, the functional integration test could be applied to 
separate plants owned by different employers or even to plants located 
in different states. Most jurisdictions, however, have not been willing 
to apply the test that broadly, but instead have limited its application 
to functionally integrated establishments owned by the same employer 
within the same state. 25
Almost all states will allow laid-off workers to collect benefits even 
if they are employed in a struck establishment but are engaged in a 
"separate branch of work" from the strikers. 26 Suppose, for example, 
an employer has two businesses located on the same premises. If a strike 
by the employees of the one business causes the employer to lay off 
the employees of the other business, the laid-off workers would be eligi 
ble for benefits by virtue of their being employed in a separate branch 
of work. Whether workers in a separate branch of work are permitted 
to collect benefits depends in part, however, on whether they are truly 
"innocent bystanders," that is, on whether in fact they all refrain from 
participating in or financing the labor dispute and have no direct in 
terest in it.
Lockouts
Although Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides unions with the 
right to strike or to refrain from striking, the statute does not clearly 
establish the right of employers to lock out. 27 The National Labor Rela 
tions Board and the courts have vacillated over the question of whether 
the right of the employers to lock out is the corollary of the right of 
unions to strike. 28
A lockout has been defined as ' 'the employer's withholding of available 
work from employees hired to perform such work in order to obtain 
a change, or resist a change, in terms or conditions of employment, 
or to resist recognition of an employee bargaining agent. " 29 It has clearly 
been established by the NLRB and the courts that the lockout can never 
be used to destroy the union or the union's bargaining rights. 30 Beyond 
that general principle, the NLRB has said that the employer's right to 
lock out depends on the circumstances of the individual case:
The nature of the measures taken, the objective, the timing, 
the reality of the strike threat, the nature and extent of the
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anticipated disruption, and the degree of resultant restriction 
on the effectiveness of the concerted activity, are all matters 
to be weighed in determining the reasonableness under the 
circumstances, and the ultimate legality, of the employer's 
action. 31
The NLRB and the courts have consistently recognized the employer's 
right to lock out in two situations: to protect the employer against the 
threat of a strike that might result in "unusual economic hardship" and 
to preserve the institution of multiemployer bargaining. In both these 
situations, the lockout is considered a "defensive" weapon that may 
lawfully be used by employers. In the former situation, the Board has 
particularly been tolerant of lockouts if the parties' contract has expired 
and the employer is uncertain about the timing of a strike by the union. 
In the latter situation, the board and the courts have approved an 
employer lockout if the employer is a member of a multiemployer 
association that has traditionally bargained with the union, and the union 
has struck one or more of the other members of the association. Where 
there has been a history of multiemployer bargaining, an employer 
lockout in reprisal for a strike against other employers in the associa 
tion has been deemed a lawful action by the Supreme Court. 32
Several ambiguities have attended the legality of a lockout when it 
is used by the employer as an "offensive" weapon. In the American 
Ship Building case, the Supreme Court held that a single employer's 
right to shut down his plant "for the sole purpose of exerting economic 
pressure against a union and in support of a lawful bargaining posi 
tion" was lawful, provided the employer had bargained in good faith 
to an impasse with the union. 33 The NLRB, however, has ruled that 
an offensive lockout becomes unlawful when an employer hires per 
manent replacements. 34 Moreover, although the employer's right to hire 
temporary replacements during a defensive lockout has been clearly 
established, 35 the employer's right to do so during an offensive lockout 
has been problematic. 36
In recent years, however, the Board has been more tolerant of offen 
sive lockouts and use of temporary replacements. The Supreme Court's
26 Unemployment Compensation I
ruling in American Ship Building has been extended to pre-impasse of 
fensive lockouts. 37 Furthermore, the right to use temporary replacements 
during an offensive lockout was substantially expanded in Harter Equip 
ment. 38 The Board, in this case, held that "an employer does not violate 
Section 8(a)(3) and (1), absent specific proof of antiunion motivation, 
by using temporary employees in order to engage in business opera 
tions during an otherwise lawful lockout, including a lockout initiated 
for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support 
of a legitimate bargaining position." 39 The decision has not been ap 
pealed and has been consistently applied to subsequent cases involving 
the use of temporary replacements during an offensive lockout. 40 The 
test for legality in lockout cases, then, is no longer a balance of com 
peting interests between employers' business concerns and employees' 
statutory rights. An offensive lockout is currently considered lawful 
unless initiated in support of bad faith bargaining or if motivated by 
antiunion animus. Since a struck employer's right to hire permanent 
or temporary replacements has long been recognized,41 limitations on 
the scope of similar employer behavior during a lockout suggest that 
under federal labor policy the employer's right to lock out is not precisely 
the corollary of the union's right to strike.
The distinctions that have been crafted in federal labor policy, 
however, have not had much influence on state policies regarding the 
payment of unemployment benefits to locked-out employees. As Willard 
Lewis has pointed out, court decisions involving unemployment in 
surance statutes have not been "distracted by 'offensive-defensive' or 
like tortious considerations of the underlying labor disputes."42 Initially, 
as noted previously, state policies were principally influenced by the 
Social Security Board's "Draft Bill," which in turn had been based 
largely on the British unemployment insurance act. The British statute 
disqualified employees unemployed because of a labor dispute from 
receiving unemployment compensation, and defined "labor dispute" 
to cover both strikes and lockouts. 43
Although the majority of states continue to deny unemployment 
benefits to employees without work because of a lockout, 21 currently 
pay benefits to such workers. 44 Evidently states with lockout provisions
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believe that workers who have been locked out are involuntarily 
unemployed in the sense that they are willing and able to work but are 
prevented from doing so by the action of their employer. Defenders 
of the lockout exception maintain that a state that refuses to pay benefits 
to locked-out employees violates the principle of state neutrality in labor- 
management relationships. 45 Moreover, in a state without a lockout ex 
ception, an employer facing a business downturn can avoid the increase 
in unemployment insurance taxes that would follow the layoff of his 
employees by ' 'provoking a dispute and then locking out his employees 
instead of laying them off." 46 Thus, a lockout rule serves to close a 
loophole in the unemployment compensation tax system.
Critics of the lockout exception have argued that it is inconsistent 
to grant an employer the (qualified) right to lock out under federal law, 
but to allow his employees to collect unemployment benefits under state 
law if the employer uses the weapon. They have argued that such state 
policies frustrate the operation of the National Labor Relations Act, 
and that a state's attempt to distinguish between a lockout and a strike 
is "discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious." 47
Fierst and Spector, writing in 1940, thought that the effort of several 
states to distinguish between a strike and a lockout was "quixotic." 
These authors noted the "enormous" administrative difficulties of mak 
ing such distinctions on a case-by-case basis. 48 On the other hand, Fierst 
and Spector thought that denying benefits to locked-out employees would 
work an inequity on employees by unreasonably enhancing the bargain 
ing power of employers. 49 Thus, the advisability of a lockout provi 
sion depends in part on whether the difficulties of administering the 
provision are outweighed by the state's interest in maintaining a 
reasonable balance of power between labor and management.
Predictions that a lockout rule would impose heavy administrative 
burdens on state unemployment insurance agencies are borne out in our 
survey of those agencies and by an examination of the decisions of the 
agencies and courts. States with lockout provisions have had to grap 
ple with a variety of vexing issues. For example, since state unemploy 
ment compensation statutes do not define "lockout," there has been 
extensive litigation concerning definitional issues. Cases that involve
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employers who have "physically" locked out their employees do not 
generally present major difficulties. The harder cases deal with employers 
who unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment after 
reaching a bargaining impasse with the union. When is a unilateral 
change so unreasonable as to constitute a lockout? Minnesota and Penn 
sylvania, two states with lockout provisions, represent contrasting ap 
proaches to this question.
In 1980, Local 4-P of the United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union and Sunstar Foods, Inc., a beef-slaughtering and packing com 
pany in Minnesota, reached impasse in contract negotiations over the 
employer's demand to reduce wages by approximately 20 percent. Union 
members walked off their jobs after Sunstar imposed its proposed wage 
scale unilaterally. Because of Minnesota's lockout provision, most of 
the workers then filed claims for unemployment benefits.
The claims deputy for the Minnesota Department of Employment 
Security determined that the claimants were ineligible for benefits 
because they were participating in a labor dispute. The Appeals Tribunal 
affirmed the decision of the claims deputy. But the workers then ap 
pealed the determination to the commissioner of the DES, and he revers 
ed the ruling of the Appeals Tribunal. In his view, the workers were 
separated from their employment because of a lockout. The case went 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, where Sunstar argued that since it 
had offered work to the employees, albeit at a substantially lower wage, 
there had been no lockout. The employees argued that the unilateral 
imposition by Sunstar of employment terms so unreasonable that the 
employees had no alternative but to leave did indeed constitute a lockout.
The Minnesota Court examined a large number of judicial decisions 
in jurisdictions with lockout provisions, seeking guidance on the ques 
tion of whether Sunstar's action had been so harsh as to constitute a 
lockout. In an earlier decision by the Minnesota Court, for example, 
an employer's unilateral wage cut of 2 to 4 percent had not been ruled 
a lockout. 50 But in cases in other states involving employer wage reduc 
tions of 15, 20, and 25 percent, the Courts had found the employers 
to be engaged in a lockout and permitted the claimants to collect benefits. 
The Minnesota Court seemed to suggest that if a unilateral wage reduc-
Unemployment Compensation I 29
tion amounted to less than 15 percent, the ensuing work stoppage should 
not be considered a lockout. But if the wage reduction were greater 
than 15 percent, the employer's action was so unreasonable that it had 
to be considered a lockout. 51
Clearly, such a rule may be administratively convenient but it is also 
highly arbitrary. It gives no weight to whether the employer and the 
union had bargained in good faith (an issue that was never raised in 
the Sunstar case) or to whether the employer's action was or was not 
justified by his financial condition. Moreover, the Minnesota Court prob 
ably overestimated its ability to find a general rule on wage reductions 
in the decisions of other state courts; we have found state practice to 
vary so greatly on this issue that seeking a general standard is probably 
a chimera.
Arguably, Pennsylvania interprets the lockout rule more liberally than 
any other state. 52 It not only insists that the employer bargain in good 
faith, but also requires that if the parties' contract has expired, the terms 
and conditions that existed under the contract must be maintained until 
a new agreement is reached. According to the acting executive direc 
tor of Pennsylvania's Office of Employment Security,' 'If the employer 
withholds work or fails to honor all of the terms and conditions of the 
prior agreement, the resultant stoppage is a lockout. " 53 Thus, in Penn 
sylvania, a work stoppage that results from any unilateral change of 
the wage scale by the employer following the expiration of a contract 
would be considered a lockout, and the affected employees would be 
deemed eligible to collect unemployment benefits. 54
In a leading Pennsylvania case, a union of oil refinery workers fail 
ed to reach agreement with the Sun Oil Company before the expiration 
of an existing contract. For five weeks after the termination of the con 
tract the parties worked on a day-to-day basis. When a federal mediator 
certified that an impasse had been reached, Sun Oil began to imple 
ment its contract proposals unilaterally. Union members responded by 
walking off their jobs. The Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review held that a lockout had occurred because of the company's 
"unreasonable" action and the refinery workers collected unemploy 
ment benefits. Sun Oil took the case to the United States Supreme Court, 
which dismissed the appeal "for want of a substantial, federal ques 
tion." 55
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According to one authority, "Pennsylvania has adopted a position 
both difficult to understand and difficult to justify." 56 Our Pennsylvania 
correspondent notes that as a result of his state's definition of a lockout, 
"union members have become more successful in gaining benefits 
in ... work stoppages at any time. This has created serious problems 
for service industries, light manufacturers, and . . . school districts." 57 
Clearly Pennsylvania's broad definition of a lockout differs substan 
tially from the treatment of lockouts by the NLRB and the federal courts. 
Yet, given the Supreme Court's decisions in the Sun Oil and New York 
Telephone cases, the Court obviously intends to tolerate such diversity.
Related to the lockout rules in unemployment insurance laws are those 
statutory provisions that pay benefits to workers if the employer is found 
to be the cause of the labor dispute. Seven states pay strikers benefits 
if the employer has refused to conform to the provisions of a collective 
bargaining contract. Seven states pay benefits if the employer has fail 
ed to comply with any federal or state laws pertaining to collective 
bargaining or the terms and conditions of employment. (Five of these 
states Alaska, Arizona, Maine, Minnesota, and New Hampshire  
have both of these provisions in their statutes. 58) Lewis has written, 
"Such exclusions from the labor dispute definition on the basis of il 
legal actions by employers leaves the state employment security agen 
cy charged with the double duty of policing the collective agreement 
and interpreting federal law. This makes possible inconsistent interpreta 
tions of the same law by federal and state courts." 59 Our research, 
however, suggests that these provisions are considered neither particular 
ly significant nor a cause of much concern.60 No doubt this view stems 
in part from the fact that so few states have such provisions. Also, the 
use of contract grievance procedures and arbitration has dramatically 
reduced the number of strikes occurring because of employer viola 
tions of collective bargaining agreements. On the other hand, one might 
expect that the growth of federal regulation of the workplace would 
have resulted in more strikes over alleged employer violations of federal 
law. The parties, however, generally avoid the use of economic weapons 
to resolve disputes over their adherence to federal regulations, prefer 
ring instead to use their own grievance procedures or to have the ap 
propriate agencies and the courts settle such issues. 61
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Interim Employment
Several states, including Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and Il 
linois, pay unemployment benefits to employees who, after going on 
strike, obtain bonafide interim jobs from which they are then laid off. 62 
In several states the courts have wrestled with the problem of drawing 
the line between interim (or temporary) and permanent jobs. In Florida, 
for example, a striker took a job that, in "good faith," he expected 
to be permanent. Nine months later he was laid off. The court then rul 
ed that he qualified for jobless pay. 63
In other states, attempts by strikers to obtain unemployment benefits 
after a period of temporary employment have been unsuccessful. The 
courts in most states seek to determine whether a striker who obtains 
new work has severed his employment relationship with the struck 
employer. Most courts have ruled that obtaining new work does not 
by itself indicate that the striker has severed his prior employment rela 
tionship. They have ruled instead that a striker's unemployment following 
an interim job is actually due to the labor dispute and not to the layoff 
by the new employer. 64
In 1968 Michigan developed a contrary rule in Great Lakes Steel Corp. 
v. Michigan Employment Security Commission. 65 There the court in 
terpreted the Michigan statute to allow strikers to collect benefits even 
when they had worked on interim jobs for as little as one day and their 
labor dispute with their regular employer had yet to be resolved. 66 In 
1974 the Michigan statute was amended in an attempt to clarify the mean 
ing of "bonafide interim employment." The Michigan statute now holds 
that a striker's disqualification for unemployment benefits is terminated 
by the striker "performing services in employment in at least two con 
secutive weeks falling wholly within the period of the individual's total 
or partial unemployment due to the labor dispute." 67
In a letter to the authors, the director of the Bureau of Unemploy 
ment Insurance, Michigan Employment Security Commission, offered 
his interpretation of the state's interim employment rule: "In each con 
secutive week the individual must earn wages in excess of [his] poten 
tial weekly benefit rate based on wages earned with the labor dispute 
employer." 68 Thus, it would appear possible for a striker in Michigan
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to work as little as one day in each of two consecutive weeks on an 
interim job to qualify for unemployment benefits.
Two strikes against the Dow Chemical Company illustrated how the 
Michigan rule operates in practice. In 1972, 166 workers represented 
by District 50, Allied and Technical Workers Union, went on strike 
against Dow's Bay City plant. (The Bay City local later became part 
of the United Steelworkers Union.) At first the strikers were declared 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. "But, at the urging of their local, 
many immediately took advantage of the 1968 court decision that held 
that any striker who takes an interim job and is then laid off can qualify 
for compensation even if he works only one day. Of 166 who struck, 
at least 135 took jobs with 'friendly' employers, many in local bars, 
earning as little as $1 to $18 to qualify for weekly benefits." 69
In 1974, workers at Dow's Midland, Michigan plant went on strike 
and once again the union urged the strikers to obtain interim jobs with 
"friendly" employers. Most of the strikers did so, were laid off, and 
then collected unemployment benefits for the duration of the strike. The 
strike lasted 26 weeks and was settled precisely at the point when most 
strikers' eligibility for benefits was about to expire. In an amicus brief 
submitted to the Supreme Court in the New York Telephone case, Dow 
charged, "This utilization of benefits was not fortuitous or unplanned 
but was, in fact, a part of the Steelworkers' comprehensive strike and 
defense progrant used by its local affiliates, in conjunction with 
allotments from the [Steelworkers'] Strike and Defense Fund, to aid 
local members in withstanding the financial pressure of a strike situa 
tion." 70
Under Michigan's experience rating provisions, only a proportional 
part of the strikers' benefits was assessed against their interim employers. 
Therefore, almost all of the benefits paid to the Dow strikers were charg 
ed to that company. As a result, Dow was ordered to pay most of the 
$3,400,000 that had been disbursed to the strikers in Bay City and 
Midland. 71 Dow challenged the Michigan law in the courts, arguing 
that payment of unemployment benefits to striking workers who had 
obtained and then been laid off from temporary jobs interfered with 
the employer's "federally protected right to bargain collectively."72 The
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suit was dismissed by the district court, but the court retained jurisdic 
tion and ordered that Dow not be charged with the expense of the 
unemployment benefits. 73
Summary
In this chapter we have provided an overview of the development 
of public policy with respect to the use of unemployment compensa 
tion in labor disputes. We have also discussed the fundamental issues 
that all states consider in determining striker eligibility for unemploy 
ment benefits, including the definition of a * 'labor dispute'' and the in 
terpretation of the establishment rule. Last, we examined two sets of 
circumstances that some states consider adequate to remove the dis 
qualification of strikers for unemployment compensation. The first set 
of circumstances involved lockouts and other employer-caused disputes; 
the second set involved strikers who obtain, and are then laid off from, 
interim jobs.
A theme of the chapter is the diversity across states in the treatment 
of workers away from their jobs because of a labor dispute. Although 
all states define a labor dispute in broad terms, they otherwise vary in 
their treatment of the establishment rule, lockouts, and interim employ 
ment. This theme is carried over into the next chapter where we take 
up the three unemployment insurance provisions that are arguably the 
most important rules affecting striker eligibility for benefits.
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One of the most common misconceptions about unemployment com 
pensation in labor disputes is that only two states New York and Rhode 
Island have provisions authorizing payment of benefits to workers 
unemployed because of a strike. Even putative experts on this topic 
sometimes maintain the fiction that the practice is confined to two states. 
For example, one authority made the case against the payment of 
unemployment benefits to strikers in the following terms:
The only redeeming factor of programs calling for unemploy 
ment compensation to persons involved in a labor dispute 
is that they are the practice in only two states. The misguid 
ed policy of two state legislatures has created an inequitable, 
albeit legal, arrangement that does injustice to employers and 
to the collective bargaining process as well. 1
Quite apart from this author's normative judgments about the prac 
tice, he simply errs in believing other jurisdictions never pay unemploy 
ment benefits to strikers. We have already examined, in the previous 
chapter, some of the conditions under which workers in labor disputes 
will qualify for benefits. In this chapter, we will first discuss the most 
important exception to the general rule that "strikers never collect 
benefits": the stoppage-of-work provision, which is in the statutes of 
more than half the states. Although many authorities seem to believe 
that the little-known stoppage-of-work provision is a statutory oddity 
of little consequence, we will argue in this chapter and later, on the 
basis of our empirical results, that the provision is critically important.
This chapter next examines the policies of New York and Rhode 
Island. We maintain that it is another misperception to believe that New
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York has the most liberal policy regarding striker eligibility for 
unemployment compensation. On the contrary, we will argue that New 
York's policy is less liberal than the policies of many other states, par 
ticularly those that have lockout, interim employment, stoppage-of-work, 
and innocent bystander provisions. Since New York does not use such 
qualifying provisions, and since very few strikes last longer than eight 
weeks, only a small minority of strikers ever collect benefits under New 
York's law.
A large majority of states recognize an obligation to protect workers 
who are unemployed because of a labor dispute but are not involved 
in the dispute. Accordingly, the next section of this chapter analyzes 
"innocent bystander" provisions. It is particularly important to under 
stand these provisions because of the role they will play in our empirical 
tests. We also examine "grade or class" provisions, which to some 
extent dovetail with innocent bystander rules.
In 1981 the nation's air traffic controllers went out on strike, in viola 
tion of a federal law prohibiting strikes by federal employees. When 
the striking controllers refused to obey President Reagan's order that 
they go back to work, the president discharged them. Subsequently, 
many of these controllers filed claims for unemployment compensa 
tion. The treatment of these claims by state agencies and the courts is 
considered in the last section of this chapter. The story of the air traffic 
controllers graphically illustrates the disparate experience of strikers 
under our unemployment insurance statutes.
Stoppage-of-Work Provisions
Approximately 27 state unemployment compensation statutes contain 
so-called stoppage-of-work provisions. 2 These provisions allow strikers 
to collect benefits if an existing labor dispute has not caused a cessa 
tion or substantial curtailment of operations at the plant or establish 
ment where the strikers are employed. Eligible strikers in work-stoppage 
states can collect benefits from the outset of a strike (or, more precise 
ly, after the normal waiting period, which in most states is one week 
after the claimant has filed for benefits). In the statistical analysis con 
tained in this study (see chapter 6), we will provide evidence that the 
work-stoppage rule does affect the level of strike activity in a state.
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It is therefore particularly important to consider the implications of a 
work-stoppage provision.
In effect, such provisions allow strikers to collect unemployment com 
pensation if their strike has failed that is, if the strikers have been unable 
to shut down their employer or otherwise cause a significant decrease 
in the level of his operations. As the figure 3.1 shows, in work-stoppage 
states, if a strike succeeds in forcing employers to close down or to 
reduce the scale of their operations significantly, the strikers cannot 
collect unemployment benefits (unless the state has other "exceptions" 
that remove the strikers' disqualification). But if employers hire 
replacements (or strike-breakers) or are able to use supervisors or other 
nonstriking employees to continue to operate at or near normal levels, 
the strikers can collect benefits. Thus, in work-stoppage states, 
unemployment benefits become a kind of insurance against a failed 
strike. 3
Under British law it had been established that the clause did not per 
tain to a stoppage-of-work by an individual employee; rather the law 
had been construed by the British Tribunal and British courts to per 
tain to a stoppage-of-work at the establishment where the striker was 
employed. 4 Using British precedents, most states adopted this interpreta 
tion of the work-stoppage rule. 5 In addition, most work-stoppage states 
will qualify strikers for benefits even if the plant or establishment is 
operating at only 75 or 80 percent of normal levels. 6 Hetherington has 
discussed the rationale for the work-stoppage rule:
[The] state interest in granting benefits to strikers is greater 
in cases where the strikers have failed to shut down their 
employer. For in these cases the employer ordinarily prevents 
a shutdown by hiring replacements for the strikers, and the 
fact of replacement represents a drastic change in the strikers' 
employment status. While they are technically still employees 
under the NLRA, they often have little prospect of getting 
their jobs back. Thus they are in essentially the same posi 
tion as workers who have permanently lost their jobs because 
the employer has replaced them with machines or gone out 
of business. A state would have good reason, then, for giv 
ing them the same compensation as it provides those 
workers. 7
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In adopting the work-stoppage rule, the initial motivation of British 
and American lawmakers may have been to protect striking employees 
in cases where the employer had broken their strike by hiring perma 
nent replacements. But in recent years an increasing number of 
employers have been able and willing to operate during strikes without 
depending on replacements to do so. Automation and other forms of 
new technology have given many employers the technical capacity to 
operate during strikes. The increasingly competitive markets in which 
many American companies conduct business have also strengthened 
employers' resolve to protect their sales, revenues, and profits by 
operating during a strike. Plant operation during strikes also grew in 
part because of high unemployment rates during the 1970s and early 
1980s: struck employers wishing to hire replacements had a large, 
available pool of workers from which to draw new employees. The ero 
sion of union strength and solidarity is also related to the increase in 
the number of employers who operate during strikes (although in this 
regard cause and effect are difficult to disentangle). Finally, some 
employers have been influenced by the perceived success of the federal 
government in operating the nation's air traffic control system despite 
a walkout in 1981 by virtually all of the controllers in the country. 8 
We will give this strike a closer look at the end of this chapter.
It can be assumed that a company's decision to operate during a strike 
may give it the bargaining power it needs to force the union to accept 
a settlement on (or close to) the employer's terms. It is perhaps the case 
that the growing number of employers who operate during a strike may 
choose to do so out of a desire to "break the strike" or even "break 
the union.'' But recent research suggests that employer decisions in this 
regard are primarily motivated by strategic considerations related to 
the employer's market position. This assertion is demonstrated by the 
fact that most employers who operate during strikes nowadays consider 
the hiring of permanent replacements only as a last resort. As Perry, 
Dramer, and Schneider conclude, "For the most part . . . plant opera 
tion has not been perceived or practiced as a weapon to enable an 
employer to break a union."9
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In the past, employer operation during a strike was a rarity in American 
labor relations. In the immediate post-World War II period the prac 
tice was largely confined to high technology industries such as oil refin 
ing, telephones, and broadcasting. In recent years, however, the prac 
tice has spread to more labor-intensive industries, such as newspapers, 
hotels, paper, and shipbuilding. 10 The trend to employer operation during 
strikes magnifies the importance of the work-stoppage rule. Such pro 
visions may have had little practical significance in the era when 
employers routinely shut down their plants during strikes. But in work- 
stoppage states, it is probably the case that the growth of plant opera 
tion during strikes has resulted in growth in the number of strikers col 
lecting unemployment benefits. Moreover, the use and cost of unemploy 
ment compensation under work-stoppage provisions should have a grow 
ing influence on the parties' relative bargaining power and hence on 
the frequency and duration of strikes. 11
Curiously, most authorities on this topic have failed to recognize the 
significance of the work-stoppage rule. For example, Hetherington 
speculated that the work-stoppage rule was likely to have less impact 
than other rules allowing strikers to collect unemployment benefits:
In pre-strike bargaining, for instance, [the work-stoppage 
rule] is not likely to have much influence on either the 
employer or the employees; for both, the prospect of the 
employees collecting unemployment benefits at the 
employer's expense will be balanced by the knowledge that 
this prospect will be realized only if the strike fails. Nor is 
there likely to be much of an effect on either side after a strike 
has begun and failed: at this point the relative bargaining 
power of employer and employees will be fixed by the failure 
of the strike, not by the availability of unemployment benefits 
to the strikers. 12
Hetherington, however, does not supply any evidence to support his 
view. A contrary view is that, in fact, unions and their members can 
make informed estimates of the likelihood of employers operating dur 
ing strikes, particularly in industries such as telephones and oil refin 
ing where the practice is routinely followed, and that the payment of 
unemployment benefits to strikers does alter the relative bargaining
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power of the parties. In states with work-stoppage provisions, employees 
may be more prone to strike because they know that if their strike fails 
they will not suffer a cessation of income. In addition, if struck employers 
bear none or only a small part of the expense of the unemployment 
benefits, which is frequently the case under experience rating provi 
sions, and if they know continued operation will serve to protect their 
market position, they may not have much incentive to avoid strikes. 
Clearly, empirical evidence on the effect of work-stoppage provisions 
on strike activity is needed to assess the validity of the two contrary 
points of view.
Down through the years the work-stoppage rule has been the subject 
of considerable litigation. For example, in Kimbell, Inc. v. Employ 
ment Security Commission, the Supreme Court dismissed, for want of 
a substantial federal question, an appeal that involved New Mexico's 
work-stoppage provision; the plaintiff in the case had contended that 
the retroactive post-strike award of unemployment benefits to strikers 
was preempted by federal labor law. 13 Apparently Oklahoma is cur 
rently the only state with a work-stoppage provision in which the state's 
highest court has held that the provision refers to a stoppage-of-work 
by the employee, and not the employer. 14 Since 1975, the highest courts 
of four additional states have ruled that the work-stoppage provision 
allows strikers to collect benefits so long as their activities have not 
substantially curtailed the operations of their employer. 15
The most recent of these decisions dealt with a 1980 strike by the 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union against the marketing divi 
sion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in Anchorage, Alaska. In response to 
the strike, Chevron hired replacements, reassigned nonstriking 
employees, and used subcontractors to take over the work normally per 
formed by the strikers. As a result, Chevron had no difficulty making 
all of its deliveries and meeting its customers' demands during the strike. 
Using Alaska's work-stoppage provision as the basis for their claim, 
39 strikers applied for unemployment benefits.
The director of the Alaska Division of Employment Security, in cor 
respondence with the authors, noted that Alaska had always tacitly 
followed the lead of other states in holding that "stoppage-of-work" 
referred to the work carried on at the employer's establishment, and
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not the work of the individual employee. "Accordingly, we would pay 
benefits to strikers who did not bring about a substantial curtailment 
of their employer's operations." 16 But when the Chevron strikers filed 
for benefits, the Division of Employment Security decided to deny their 
claim. According to the director, "We [found] that the courts of other 
jurisdictions were frequently ill-informed in the subject matter, and that 
they had a tendency to rely upon the stare decisis principle (the deci 
sions of the courts of other states) without seriously weighing public 
policy considerations, the legislative intent or history of their own states, 
or even the rationale of the courts upon which they place their 
reliance." 17 The Alaska agency decided to use the Chevron strike to 
create a legal test of the interpretation of the state's work-stoppage 
provision.
The initial denial of benefits to the Chevron strikers was upheld by 
the assistant director of the Division, a referee for the Department of 
Labor, and the Commissioner of Labor, who overruled his prior inter 
pretations of the work-stoppage provision. The Commissioner's deci 
sion was affirmed by the Alaska Superior Court in 1981. The Chevron 
workers appealed to the state's Supreme Court, which reversed the lower 
court's ruling. 18
In reviewing the history of the stoppage-of-work provision in Alaska 
and other states, the Supreme Court found that the great majority of 
states had interpreted the provision to mean a stoppage-of-work at the 
employer's plant or establishment, not a stoppage-of-work by the in 
dividual employee. In Alaska, this interpretation had prevailed for 27 
years. During that period the Alaska legislature had, on several occa 
sions, amended the state's unemployment compensation statute but had 
never tried to alter the standard meaning of the work-stoppage provi 
sion. The Court took the inaction of the legislature as a sign that it ac 
quiesced in the Employment Security Division's formerly consistent 
interpretation of the provision.
The Employment Security Division maintained that the standard in 
terpretation of the work-stoppage provision forced the state to take sides 
with the employee in a labor dispute, thereby placing the employer "in 
the ridiculous position of having to finance the strike against him through 
his direct reimbursement of the [unemployment insurance] fund, or
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through taxes paid into the fund." 19 The superior court agreed that the 
work-stoppage rule compromised the state's neutrality in labor disputes. 
But the state's Supreme Court disagreed:
This statute can be seen as attempting to chart a neutral course 
between two absolute approaches to the payment of 
unemployment benefits. If compensation were always paid 
to striking workers, the state would abolish the labor dispute 
disqualification entirely and could be viewed as always siding 
with the striker. If compensation were never paid to 
strikers ... the state could be viewed as seriously interfer 
ing with the right to strike and thus siding with management. 
The legislature, by enacting the "stoppage of work" 
language has avoided these positions, and ocalled upon the 
[Employment Security Division] to refrain from passing on 
the merits of the dispute in evaluating benefit claims. Strikers 
who do not stop the employers' operations qualify for benefits 
while those who succeed in curtailing production do not. 
Employers whose operations continue must therefore con 
tribute to the fund while employers whose work is stopped 
do not. We do not find this scheme to be without some 
measure of logic. 20
The Alaska court then found that the OCAW strike in fact had not 
caused a stoppage-of-work at Chevron's Anchorage facility; therefore 
the strikers were entitled to receive unemployment benefits.
New York
New York passed its unemployment compensation law in April 1935, 
before Congress enacted either the National Labor Relations Act or the 
Social Security Act. New York legislators, therefore, could not know 
whether their treatment of strikers would be consistent with the subse 
quent recommendations of the Social Security Board. The New York 
law was drafted by a tripartite committee, consisting of employer, union, 
and public representatives. 21 The committee recommended that workers 
unemployed because of a labor dispute (called an "industrial controver 
sy" in New York law) be paid benefits after a 10-week waiting period,
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and the New York legislature adopted this recommendation. In April 
1941, the legislature reduced the waiting period to eight weeks. 22
In contrast to the great majority of states, New York disqualifies not 
only strikers but also innocent bystanders during the first eight weeks 
of a labor dispute. 23 Thus, New York uses a "no-fault" approach, dis 
qualifying all workers unemployed because of a labor dispute in its early 
stages, and qualifying them for benefits thereafter. 24
The New York State Department of Labor has explained the state's 
unique approach in the following terms:
New York's provision reflects a "hands-off' policy in in 
dustrial controversies. Once the fact of an industrial con 
troversy has been established, the state does not examine the 
issues or the merits of the dispute. It does not determine who 
is "participating in," "financing," or "interested in" the 
dispute or who belongs to the same "grade or class of 
workers" involved in the dispute. It does not decide whether 
the dispute is a "lockout" or a "strike," or whether it is 
legal or illegal. 25
The committee that drafted the New York law believed that any at 
tempt to affix responsibility for a labor dispute would be administratively 
cumbersome. For example, the committee thought that it is often im 
possible to distinguish strikes from lockouts. If eligibility for unemploy 
ment compensation depended on such distinctions, the committee main 
tained, unions and employers would end up blaming each other for the 
existence of a labor dispute, and administrators and judges would be 
burdened with the task of resolving the parties' competing claims. To 
prevent "manipulation" by either employers or unions, the committee 
recommended that New York's statute "require no administrative ad 
judication as to the cause of the industrial dispute or the nature of the 
participants." 26
From the start, the New York law has been the focus of controversy. 
Proponents acknowledge that it is "a rough sort of compromise," which 
"may have seemed desirable for administrative and social reasons." 27 
They argue that when a strike has dragged on for an extended period, 
it becomes difficult to determine whether a striker is voluntarily or
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involuntarily unemployed. To retain his or her eligibility for benefits, 
a striker in New York is required to seek and accept suitable temporary 
jobs and, according to the law's proponents, this requirement has been 
strictly enforced. 28 Thus, it is argued, the unemployment of a worker 
involved in an extended strike may be more a consequence of the state 
of the labor market than of the existence of the labor dispute.
Employers have regularly lobbied for changes in New York's law, 
arguing that it encourages unions to strike and prolongs the duration 
of existing disputes, violates the principle of state neutrality in labor 
disputes, interferes with the federally established policy of "free col 
lective bargaining," constitutes an unnecessary drain on the state's 
unemployment insurance fund, and, because employer unemployment 
insurance taxes are experience rated, forces employers to finance strikes 
against themselves. 29 Through the years, numerous amendments to 
change the law have been introduced in the New York legislature, but 
proponents of the law have always been able to prevent their passage. 30
Rhode Island
Rhode Island's law, passed in 1936, pays benefits to strikers after 
seven (rather than eight) weeks. 31 A major difference between the New 
York and Rhode Island laws is that the latter pays benefits to innocent 
bystanders after a one-week waiting period. Another major difference 
is that Rhode Island does not adversely adjust an employer's experience 
rating because his or her employees have collected benefits during a 
strike. Finally, Rhode Island has a stoppage-of-work provision that 
allows strikers to collect jobless pay after a one-week waiting period 
if their employer's operations have not been substantially curtailed by 
the labor dispute. 32 Under these various qualifying provisions, Rhode 
Island potentially allows more workers unemployed because of a labor 
dispute to collect benefits than any other state.
In the past, at least five other states (Alabama, Louisiana, Penn 
sylvania, Tennessee, and New Jersey) have allowed strikers to collect 
unemployment benefits after a waiting period of from three (Penn 
sylvania) to eight (Alabama and Louisiana) weeks. 33 All of these laws 
were repealed, according to Carney, "as a result of public pressure. " 34
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The question of whether federal labor policy prohibits New York (or 
any other state) from paying unemployment compensation to strikers 
remained unresolved until the United States Supreme Court issued a 
definitive ruling in New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department 
of Labor.
The New York Telephone Case
On July 14, 1971, the Communications Workers of America, AFL- 
CIO, launched a nationwide strike against the Bell System. 35 Four days 
later the parties reached an agreement in principle, subject to ratifica 
tion by the union's members, and the CWA ordered all of its members 
to return to work. In New York, however, about 38,000 workers 
employed by the New York Telephone Co. (Telco), the Western Elec 
tric Co., and AT&T's Long Lines Department defied their union's order 
and remained on strike. The New York workers continued to strike 
because they objected to their settlement being in line with the pattern 
settlement on wages, fringe benefits, and other so-called "national 
issues" that applied to Bell System employees throughout the rest of 
the country. CWA members in New York wanted to "break the pat 
tern" by holding out for a larger settlement. The New York Telephone 
Co. resisted its employees' demands because it felt that yielding would 
lead to "labor turmoil throughout the Bell System." 36
At first the international union opposed continuation of the strike in 
New York, but eventually the union lent its support. 37 After the eight- 
week waiting period, the New York Telephone workers began to col 
lect unemployment compensation and continued to do so until their strike 
ended in February 1972. 38 The strike was settled when Telco agreed 
to "a modest, but precedentially significant increase in wage benefits" 
above the national pattern. 39 For a five-month period, 33,000 New York 
Telephone workers collected $49 million in unemployment insurance 
benefits; the average benefit paid to a claimant was about $70 per week. 40
At the start of the strike, Telco's unemployment insurance account 
had credits of about $40 million. Collection of unemployment benefits 
by the striking New York Telephone workers nearly exhausted this ac 
count. Moreover, during the two years that followed the settlement of the
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strike, Telco's tax payments to the state were increased by about $16 
million over what they would have been had the strike never occurred. 41 
Subsequently, Telco brought suit in a federal district court against 
the New York Department of Labor, seeking a declaration that the New 
York statute authorizing the payment of unemployment compensation 
to strikers was invalid because it conflicted with the policy of "free 
collective bargaining" established in federal labor laws. The district 
court, in its decision in the suit, concluded that the availability of 
unemployment compensation was a substantial factor in the workers' 
decision to remain on strike and had a "measurable impact on the pro 
gress of the strike." 42 Judge Owen, in his decision, wrote
I regard it as a fundamental truism that the availability to, 
or expectation of a substantial weekly, tax-free payment of 
money by a striker is a substantial factor affecting his will 
ingness to strike or, once on strike, to remain on strike, in 
the pursuit of desired goals. This being a truism, one therefore 
would expect to find confirmation of it everywhere. One 
does. 43
On appeal to the circuit court, however, the New York Department 
of Labor succeeded in getting the district court's decision overturned. 
The Second Circuit considered the issue of whether federal labor policy 
had preempted the states from paying unemployment compensation to 
strikers. Noting that the question had been a political "hot potato" since 
the early 1930s, the circuit court conducted a review of congressional 
intent as manifested in the legislative history of the National Labor Rela 
tions Act, the Social Security Act, and other relevant statutes, and con 
cluded that there was "no clear preemptive intent" on the part of the 
Congress. "Indeed, virtually all the evidence is to the contrary."44 Judge 
Meskill, writing for the court, said,
The conflict between New York's statute and the broad fed 
eral policy of free collective bargaining does not render the 
State statute unconstitutional. The conflict is one which Con 
gress has decided to tolerate. 45
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The stage was thus set for the Supreme Court's hearing of the case. 
The Court, in a six-to-three decision, upheld the constitutionality of 
the New York statute, even though it agreed with the district court's 
finding that the New York law "altered the economic balance between 
labor and management." 46 It quoted with approval its own finding in 
an earlier case concerning the payment of welfare benefits to strikers 
in New Jersey: ' 'It cannot be doubted that the availability of state welfare 
assistance for striking workers in New Jersey pervades every work stop 
page, affects every existing collective-bargaining agreement, and is a 
factor lurking in the background of every incipient labor contract." 47
Despite its view that the payment of unemployment compensation to 
strikers had a deleterious effect on collective bargaining, the Court 
declared that the ultimate resolution of the case depended on congres 
sional intent. In its examination of the legislative history of the rele 
vant federal statutes, the Court found that Congress had been silent on 
the issue when it passed the NLRA and Social Security Act in 1935, 
but on several subsequent occasions had explicitly addressed the mat 
ter. "On none of these occasions," the Court said, had Congress sug 
gested that' 'such payments were already prohibited by an implicit federal 
rule of law. Nor, on any of these occasions, has it been willing to supply 
the prohibition."48 Concluding, Justice Stevens, the author of the plurali 
ty opinion, said,
In an area in which Congress has decided to tolerate a sub 
stantial measure of diversity, the fact that the implementa 
tion of this general state policy affects the relative strength 
of the antagonists in a bargaining dispute is not a sufficient 
reason for concluding that Congress intended to pre-empt 
that exercise of state power. 49
By upholding the constitutionality of the New York statute in the New 
York Telephone case, the Supreme Court virtually validated all existing 
state laws that pay unemployment benefits to strikers. 50
Innocent Bystanders
"Innocent bystanders" are workers who are not (1) participating 
in a labor dispute by picketing or refusing to cross a picket line,
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(2) financing the dispute (e.g., through the payment of union dues that 
are used to finance strike benefits), or (3) directly "interested" in the 
dispute (in the sense of benefiting from a settlement that grows out of 
a dispute). Suppose, for example, that a unionized group of production 
workers strike their employer, causing the employer to lay off his non 
union office personnel; can the office workers collect unemployment 
benefits? Approximately 44 states would consider the office workers 
to be innocent bystanders and would therefore allow them to collect 
benefits. The remaining states, however, do not distinguish innocent 
bystanders from actual strikers, and therefore disqualify both groups. 51
Ohio, for example, is one of a handful of states that denies unemploy 
ment benefits to innocent bystanders. The constitutionality of Ohio's 
statute was tested in a case that illuminates the anomalous consequences 
of state control over these matters. In 1974, the United Mine Workers 
union staged a nationwide strike that shut down a large proportion of 
the nation's coal mines, including those operated by U.S. Steel and 
Republic Steel. Shortages of coal resulting from the UMW's strike caus 
ed the two corporations to lay off over 1200 employees at their steel 
plants in Ohio. These workers were represented by the United 
Steelworkers union. As the district court pointed out, "The steelworkers 
were in no way involved in the disqualifying labor dispute between the 
coal miners and the steel companies nor did they benefit from that 
dispute." 52
In short, the steelworkers were innocent bystanders. Many of the laid- 
off steelworkers applied for unemployment benefits but were notified 
by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services that their claims were 
disallowed. One of the steelworkers, Leonard Hodory, filed a class ac 
tion suit on behalf of himself and the other laid-off workers. Hodory 
challenged the constitutionality of the Ohio law on the grounds that it 
had been preempted by the Social Security Act of 1935, denied him 
and his fellow workers equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by 
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and bore "no real and 
substantial relation" to the purpose of unemployment insurance legisla 
tion. 53
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Hodory pointed out that he was unemployed through no fault of his 
own. It was clear that, but for Ohio's labor dispute disqualification pro 
visions, he would have been eligible for unemployment benefits. It was 
the purpose of unemployment insurance legislation, Hodory argued, 
to provide benefits to persons whose unemployment was involuntary. 
Since his unemployment was indisputably involuntary, to deny him 
benefits, Hodory maintained, frustrated the fundamental purpose of both 
Ohio's unemployment compensation statute and the Social Security 
Act. 54 Indeed, one of the anomalous consequences of Ohio's statute was 
that it allowed employees who were locked out to collect benefits but 
it denied benefits to innocent bystanders. Hodory thought that this was 
an arbitrary distinction that served to deny him equal protection under 
the law.
But the State of Ohio in the Hodory suit argued that denying inno 
cent bystanders unemployment benefits was not an arbitrary measure, 
but one that did indeed serve a suitable government interest. The state 
argued that granting benefits to innocent bystanders would, because of 
experience rating, place an added financial burden on the struck 
employers. In effect, Ohio argued that if the steel workers were allow 
ed to collect benefits that were ultimately financed by the steel com 
panies, the companies would be placed at an unfair disadvantage in their 
negotiations with the coal miners. Moreover, Ohio argued that paying 
innocent bystanders could seriously drain the state's unemployment com 
pensation fund, and thus denying such workers benefits was not arbitrary 
but helped to achieve a legitimate purpose, namely, protecting the fiscal 
integrity of the compensation fund. 55
Although Hodory won his case in the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
sided with the State of Ohio, holding that the state's denial of unemploy 
ment benefits to innocent bystanders (while granting them to locked- 
out employees) was not so arbitrary that it violated the equal protection 
clause of the Constitution. Nor was the state's policy preempted by the 
Social Security Act or other federal legislation, a holding that 
foreshadowed the Court's conclusion in the New York Telephone case. 56
In states with innocent bystander provisions, determining which 
workers are or are not participating in, financing, or directly interested
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in a labor dispute has often been the source of thorny problems. Once 
again it is difficult to find consistent interpretations in the decisions of 
the employment security agencies and the courts. Suppose, for exam 
ple, that a nonunion, white-collar worker arrives at her place of employ 
ment only to find that the unionized production workers have gone on 
strike and established a picket line around the establishment. If the white- 
collar worker refuses to cross the picket line and report to her job, she 
risks the displeasure of her employer. If she crosses the picket line, 
she not only risks the displeasure of the strikers but possibly her own 
physical safety. In innocent-bystander states, if she crosses the picket 
line but finds that the employer has no work for her to perform, she 
will probably be able to collect unemployment benefits. If she refuses 
to cross the picket line and then discovers that she has been laid off 
because of the strike, she will probably be ineligible for benefits. Despite 
the layoff, her refusal to cross a picket line will be considered "par 
ticipation" in a labor dispute. 57
But suppose further that the white-collar worker genuinely fears that 
if she crosses the picket line she will be physically harmed. What if 
the picketers are brandishing clubs or making verbal threats or have 
actually harmed another worker who attempted to cross the line? If the 
white-collar worker refuses to cross the picket line under these condi 
tions, will she be ineligible for unemployment benefits?
Only four state statutes specifically deal with the issue of innocent 
bystanders who have failed to cross a picket line. Three Colorado, 
Kansas, and Texas appear to impose a blanket disqualification on such 
workers, regardless of extenuating circumstances. One Illinois takes 
a contrary approach, holding that "an individual's failure to cross a 
picket line . . . shall not, in itself, be deemed to be participation by 
him in the labor dispute." 58 In Illinois, the Bureau of Employment 
Security will disqualify innocent bystanders for benefits if they have 
refused to cross a picket line and have also engaged in other behavior 
the agency believes constitutes participation in the strike, such as "bring 
ing food and coffee to the pickets, helping [to] man strike headquarters, 
and deciding as a group and not as individuals not to cross the picket 
line." 59
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In other jurisdictions, the courts have generally ruled that innocent 
bystanders who have refused to cross a picket line "must show a fear 
of personal injury" to be eligible for unemployment benefits. 60 The 
burden of proof in such cases is placed on the claimants; they must prove 
to the court that their fear is "reasonable," "well-founded," or 
' 'justifiable. " 61 It has been said that this burden' 'is often very heavy. "62 
For example, rumors of picket-line violence, 63 or even a showing that 
actual acts of violence occurred64 have not persuaded some state courts 
that claimants should be paid benefits. As a result of these and other 
decisions, Gross has pointed out, "Many nonstrikers who in fact have 
a 'reasonable fear' for their personal safety may be denied benefits unless 
they actually suffer bodily injury." 65
How much latitude do states have to disqualify claimants because they 
have helped to finance a strike conducted by other workers? The Supreme 
Court addressed this question in Baker v. General Motors Corp. 66 In 
October, 1967, while the UAW was conducting a national strike against 
Ford, the union held a special convention to authorize "adequate strike 
funds to meet the challenges of the 1967 and 1968 collective bargain 
ing effort." 67 In effect, the convention doubled regular monthly dues 
(from $20 to $40 per member) for a two-month period. Shortly thereafter 
the strike against Ford was settled, and in December the union reached 
a national agreement with General Motors. The emergency dues were 
waived by the union in December and January, reverting to the regular 
rate.
But in January, three UAW locals went on strike at three GM foun 
dries. During these strikes UAW members collected strike benefits from 
the fund in which the emergency dues had been deposited. As a conse 
quence of the foundry strikes, "operations were temporarily curtailed 
at 24 other functionally integrated GM plants, idling more than 19,000 
employees." 68 Most of these laid-off employees applied for unemploy 
ment benefits, basing their claims, in effect, on the premise that they 
were innocent bystanders.
Their claims were denied by the Michigan Supreme Court on the 
ground that the emergency dues payments constituted "financing" of 
the foundry workers' strikes. The claimants then took their case to the 
Supreme Court, where they argued that Michigan's action had to be
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rejected because it infringed on the claimants' federal rights under the 
National Labor Relations Act.
The high court did not accept the argument of the claimants, however. 
The Court defined the parameters within which the case fell:
New York Telephone Co. makes it clear that a state may, but 
need not, compensate actual strikers even though they are 
primarily responsible for their own unemployment. And, on 
the other hand, Hodory makes it equally clear that a state 
may refuse, or provide, compensation to workers laid off 
by reason of a labor dispute in which they have no interest 
or responsibility whatsoever. In between these opposite ends 
of the spectrum are cases in which the furloughed employees 
have had some participation in the labor dispute that caused 
their unemployment. This is such a case. 69
The Court was troubled by the fact that the claimants' payment of 
emergency dues occurred before the foundry workers decided to strike, 
raising the question of whether the claimants could have possibly an 
ticipated that their dues would be used to finance the strikes. But the 
Court was persuaded that there was "a meaningful connection between 
the decision to pay the emergency dues, the strikes which ensued, and 
ultimately their [i.e., the claimants] own layoffs." 70 The Court main 
tained that the claimants' unemployment was not actually involuntary 
but was, indeed, entirely foreseeable because of their payment of the 
extra dues. Disposing of this issue, it then ruled that Michigan's treat 
ment of the laid-off UAW members was not preempted by federal law. 
Rather, Michigan had to be accorded the same latitude in these matters 
as New York had been in the New York Telephone case and Ohio in 
the Hodory case.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens also noted, "We of course ex 
press no opinion concerning the wisdom of one policy choice or 
another. " 71 And he added a caveat, "We have no occasion to consider 
the circumstances, if any, in which individuals might be disqualified 
solely because they paid regular union dues required as a condition of 
their employment."72 Many states currently disqualify claimants merely 
because their regular dues have been used to finance a strike by their
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fellow union members, but Justice Stevens' caveat suggests that the con 
stitutionality of such a practice is still an open question. 73
Grade or Class
Even if an innocent bystander can prove that he did not personally 
participate in, finance, or have a direct interest in a labor dispute, he 
may still be disqualified for unemployment benefits if he was, at the 
time of the commencement of the dispute, a member of a grade or class 
of workers any one of whom participated in, financed, or had a direct 
interest in the dispute. The "grade or class" disqualification was in 
cluded in the Social Security Board's Draft Bill and was subsequently 
adopted by approximately 40 states. 74 In these states, a nonstriking clai 
mant must not only prove his own "innocence," he must prove the 
innocence of all of his nonstriking co-workers who are in the same grade 
or class.
Three arguments have been advanced in support of the grade-or-class 
disqualification. First, the provision is intended to discourage so-called 
"key man" strikes. Suppose a small number of workers strike and shut 
down a plant; in some cases, a walkout by one "key man" might be 
enough to halt production. In the absence of a grade-or-class provision, 
the other workers might be able to collect benefits if they can show 
that they were innocent bystanders. But if all workers in the same grade 
or class are disqualified for benefits, there is less reason for key-man 
strikes to occur. 75
Second, grade-or-class provisions are said to benefit unions "by 
discouraging defections from their ranks." 76 According to Ahrens, 
"Workers, knowing they would be disqualified on the grounds of par 
ticipation or financing if they belonged to a union which called the strike, 
would seek to avoid union membership in order to gain unemployment 
benefits if a strike were called. Disqualifying the entire grade or class 
of workers would destroy this incentive not to join unions." 77
Third, it is said that grade-or-class provisions ease the administrative 
burdens of employment security agencies. Whereas the determination 
of whether a claimant's participation in, financing of, or direct interest 
in a labor dispute must be made on an individual basis, the disqualifica-
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tion of an entire grade or class will follow a showing that a single claim 
ant in a grade or class did not have the status of an innocent bystander. 78 
According to Ahrens, "The grade or class provision is useful to ad 
ministrators, then, because it allows the decision of benefit claims on 
a group, rather than individual basis, and because it permits them to 
avoid difficult fact determination in some cases." 79
There has been, however, considerable variation in the definition of 
grade or class in the decisions of the courts. In some jurisdictions, 
membership in a grade or class depends on the type of work perform 
ed, e.g., whether it is office work or production work. 80 In other jurisdic 
tions, membership in a grade or class depends on whether the type of 
work performed is functionally or operationally integrated. 81 In still 
other jurisdictions, workers who are members of the same union82 or 
the same group of unions negotiating jointly with an employer83 are 
considered to be members of the same grade or class.
A court decision in the state of Washington provides an example of 
how the definition of grade or class can significantly affect the eligibility 
of workers for unemployment benefits. Prior to 1980, the employment 
security agency, using the functional integration test, would disqualify 
all construction workers at a given site if a strike by one trade caused 
the layoff of workers in other trades working at the same site. But in 
Abbott v. Employment Security Department, a state court ruled that union 
membership, and not the functional integration of work, should be the 
primary test in determining the boundary of a grade or class. 84 Since 
that decision, according to the Commissioner of Washington's Employ 
ment Security Department, "Some trades have struck without posting 
pickets, resulting in a job shutdown without requiring participation in 
the dispute by other trades. Trades sent home by the employer when 
all possible work is completed have been ruled to have met the excep 
tion tests of the law since they have not participated in the dispute nor 
have they any direct interest in its outcome. This has resulted in pay 
ment of benefits to individuals who would have been denied as little 
as five years ago." 85
Grade-or-class provisions have been criticized on two grounds. On 
the one hand, most of the workers who are disqualified for benefits would
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also be disqualified under innocent bystander provisions. For exam 
ple, in the case of key-man strikes it would probably be difficult for 
nonstriking workers who are in the same grade or class as the striking 
workers to show that they are not directly interested in the outcome 
of the strike or, if they are dues-paying members of the same union, 
that they are not helping to finance the strike. Thus, in most cases, the 
inclusion in a statute of both innocent bystander and grade-or-class pro 
visions is a redundancy. On the other hand, in those cases where nonstrik 
ing workers are members of the same grade or class as striking workers 
but are truly innocent bystanders, it may be inequitable to deny them 
benefits. Grade-or-class provisions, then, may be desirable solely because 
of their administrative convenience. 86
To clarify the questions that must be answered to determine whether 
a claimant will qualify for unemployment benefits, we construct the 
flow charts that appear here.
In this and the previous chapter, we discussed a number of court deci 
sions affecting the eligibility of employees involved in labor disputes 
for unemployment insurance benefits. We conclude this section of our 
discussion with a summary of the key cases, which is contained in ex 
hibit 3.1.
The Air Traffic Controllers
On August 3, 1981, nearly 12,000 air traffic controllers represented 
by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization ("PATCO") 
walked off their jobs. A few hours after the strike began, President 
Reagan personally announced that "any striker who was not back on 
the job within 48 hours would be discharged and could not be reemployed 
by any federal agency." 87 The Federal Aviation Administration con 
tinued to operate the nation's air traffic control system, using nonstrik 
ing controllers, military personnel, supervisors, controllers brought back 
from retirement, and trainees from the FAA's Air Traffic Service 
Academy. The President carried out his threat to discharge the striking 
controllers, but their replacements managed to return the air traffic con 
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Figure 3.2
DOES THE STATE HAVE INNOCENT BYSTANDER PROVISIONS?
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In the days and weeks that followed their walkout, many PATCO 
members filed claims for unemployment compensation. Although the 
majority of states denied the controllers' claims, a handful granted them 
benefits. In some of the states with work stoppage provisions, controllers 
argued that they were eligible for benefits because the FAA had hired 
replacements, the system continued to operate at or close to normal 
levels, and—implicitly at least—their strike had failed. In other states 
with lockout provisions controllers claimed benefits on the ground that 
they had been locked out by their employer, the FAA.
The air traffic controllers' case illustrates the difficulties that arise 
when state agencies and courts are faced with the problem of reconcil 
ing labor dispute disqualification provisions with other potentially con 
flicting disqualification provisions in unemployment insurance statutes. 
All statutes contain provisions that require disqualification of claimants 
who were terminated by their employer because of misconduct con 
nected with their work. Both the definition of misconduct and the period 
of disqualification, however, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus, 
for example, Pennsylvania only disqualifies claimants if they have been 
guilty of' 'willful misconduct.'' Pennsylvania then requires the claimants 
to earn six times their weekly unemployment benefit amount on a new 
job before they become requalified for benefits; Connecticut, which also 
uses a "willful misconduct" standard, requires that claimants earn 10 
times their weekly benefit amount on a new job. Most of the remaining 
states disqualify claimants for milder forms of misconduct. Many ad 
just the period of disqualification on a case-by-case basis, de 
pending upon the seriousness of the misconduct; others impose a fixed 
period of disqualification; still others disqualify claimants for the dura 
tion of their unemployment or longer. The period of disqualification 
for misconduct can be as short as three weeks in Alabama, or as long 
as 52 weeks in Florida. 89
In most states, the fact that the air traffic controllers had been discharg 
ed by the federal government for misconduct (i.e., for their participa 
tion in an illegal strike) was deemed to take precedence over the con 
trollers' involvement in a labor dispute. These states held that the con 
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FAA and thus their participation in a labor dispute. The issue of whether 
there had or had not been a lockout or stoppage of work at the airports 
where the controllers worked was accordingly not a matter that affected 
the eligibility of the controllers for benefits.
Thus, for example, New Jersey disqualified the controllers for six 
weeks, but then permitted them to collect benefits for the duration of 
their unemployment. 90 Arkansas disqualified the controllers for eight 
weeks. 91 Iowa also disqualified the controllers for misconduct. But a 
group of Sioux City controllers appealed the initial determination to 
a Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the FAA chose not to appear and 
the controllers, who realized that a strike against the federal govern 
ment can be considered a felony, pleaded the Fifth Amendment and 
refused to testify. Because the burden of proving misconduct in Iowa 
falls on the employer, and since neither the FAA nor the controllers 
presented any evidence at the hearing, the Hearing Officer had to make 
his decision on the presumption that the controllers were innocent of 
misconduct, and thus he ruled them eligible for benefits. The case went 
to the Iowa Supreme Court, which upheld the Hearing Officer's deci 
sion. 92
Michigan, on the other hand, found that the labor dispute provisions 
took precedence over the misconduct disqualifier. The Michigan 
Employment Security Board of Review refused to disqualify the strikers 
for misconduct, saying,
A finding of misconduct necessarily implies an evaluation 
of the claimants' behavior. Here, there is no behavior to ex 
amine except for the claimants' participation in a peaceful 
strike. If that participation was misconduct because it was 
allegedly "wrong", then it must be concluded the strike itself 
was wrong. However, the Michigan Courts have long em 
braced a policy of neutrality in labor dispute situations, a 
policy which precludes the Board from examining the merits 
of a dispute. 93
Michigan, however, appears to be the only state that qualifed the air 
traffic controllers on this basis.
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In Connecticut, the employment security agency found that even 
though the controllers had been discharged, they had not been guilty 
of either "felonious misconduct" or "repeated willful misconduct," 
which are the kinds of behavior Connecticut required before it would 
deny discharged employees their claim for unemployment benefits. 94 
Accordingly, Connecticut initially allowed all of the controllers who 
filed claims to collect benefits. The FAA, however, appealed the employ 
ment security agency's determination, and the Connecticut Supreme 
Court overruled the agency's decision in 1985. 95 The Connecticut court 
held that the controllers had been guilty of felonious misconduct under 
the laws of the United States (but not Connecticut), and therefore should 
have been disqualified.
In another case in Montana, the state's Supreme Court held that "the 
misconduct provision of Montana's Unemployment Insurance Act ap 
plies to the PATCO strike and disqualifies the PATCO members from 
benefits because the unemployment resulted from an unlawful strike. "96 
The dissenting opinion, however, emphasized that the strikers had 
already received unemployment compensation, "and we all recognize 
the impossibility of recovering the benefits from the individual air con 
trollers." 97
In Hawaii, 135 air traffic controllers filed claims, arguing that they 
were eligible for unemployment benefits under the state's work-stoppage 
provision. The FAA countered that striking controllers had been pro 
perly discharged for misconduct. The state agreed with the FAA, but 
allowed the controllers to collect benefits for five weeks. 98
Of all the state courts' decisions, only Louisiana ordered payment 
of benefits because the FAA had "failed to sustain its burden of prov 
ing that former air traffic controllers were engaged in willful miscon 
duct at time of strike.'' The Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned that 
the FAA had allowed the controllers to join a union (PATCO) and to 
be represented by PATCO in collective bargaining. The controllers, 
therefore, did not commit "willful misconduct" since they "reasonably 
believed in the legality of the strike because of representations by the 
bargaining agent recognized by the FAA."99
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At the time of this writing, several states were still wrestling with 
the claims of the air traffic controllers. The controllers' cases, however, 
clearly illustrate, as one of our respondents noted, the "division of 
authority throughout the country" over the treatment of misconduct in 
labor disputes. 100 It is unlikely that the resolution of the controllers' 
claims by the courts will serve to harmonize the misconduct and labor 
dispute disqualification provisions in state unemployment insurance laws.
Conclusion
At this point it should be abundantly clear that state policies regard 
ing striker eligibility for unemployment compensation are far from 
uniform. Although common patterns of practice are detectable, whether 
workers unemployed because of a labor dispute qualify for benefits 
depends not only on a state's unemployment compensation statute but 
also on the application and interpretation of the statute by the state's 
employment security agency and courts. State autonomy in determin 
ing whether strikers should or should not receive unemployment pay 
was upheld by the Supreme Court in the New York Telephone case. 
Although the Court clearly believed that the payment of benefits to 
strikers could affect the balance of power in collective bargaining— 
and inferentially the incidence and duration of strikes—it decided that 
Congress intended to tolerate such practices.
State autonomy has meant that workers unemployed because of a labor 
dispute who may be otherwise identical will be eligible for benefits in 
some states but denied them in others. Diversity of treatment may result 
in anomalies and inequities, but that may be a price worth paying to 
enjoy the presumed benefits of state autonomy. One of the benefits, 
it can be argued, is that each state has the opportunity to tailor labor 
dispute disqualification policies that best meet the needs of its work force 
and employers and are consistent with its political philosophy.
Conceptually, states can be ranked on the basis of how generously 
they treat workers unemployed because of a labor dispute. It is certain 
ly not self-evident, however, that New York should be ranked at the 
top of the list. Only a small proportion of strikes in New York last longer 
than eight weeks. The New York Department of Labor estimated that
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over the period 1947-78 about 13 percent of all strikers were involved 
in disputes lasting more than eight weeks. These strikers collected 
unemployment benefits amounting to less than 1 percent of the total 
benefits paid to all unemployed beneficiaries. Although the average dura 
tion of strikes lasting longer than eight weeks in New York was 14.8 
weeks, the average duration of the payment of benefits to strikers was 
only 4.4 weeks. 101 Clearly, only a small minority of strikers in New 
York ever become eligible for benefits and the cost of the benefits 
disbursed to strikers is nominal. In other respects, New York has more 
restrictive policies regarding the payment of benefits to workers involved 
in labor disputes than do most other states. It does not have a stoppage- 
of-work provision, it does not have a lockout provision, and it only 
pays benefits to innocent bystanders after the eight-week waiting period. 
In a later chapter we will present empirical tests that show that the ef 
fect of New York's law on strike activity is statistically insignificant. 
Recognition that New York's law is actually more restrictive than the 
laws of most other states may help explain this result.
In contrast, strikers in stoppage-of-work states can collect unemploy 
ment benefits virtually from the outset of a strike. Given the increasing 
number of employers who are choosing to operate during a strike, it 
is likely that the number of strikers who are taking advantage of stoppage- 
of-work provisions is growing. Arguably, those states with stoppage- 
of-work provisions are more "generous" than those states without them, 
including New York.
The most generous states may be those that have stoppage-of-work, 
lockout, and innocent bystander provisions. In 1984, there were nine 
states that had all three of these provisions. 102
Curiously, most of the states falling into this category do not have 
strong labor movements (Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia 
are the exceptions). In a later chapter, we will test the proposition that 
a state's generosity is related to its level of strike activity. We will show 
that lockout provisions have no discernible effect on a state's level of 
strike activity, perhaps because lockouts are a relatively rare 
phenomenon. But we will also show that states with comparatively high 
benefit levels and both stoppage-of-work and innocent bystander pro 
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Welfare in Labor Disputes
Before the depression of the 1930s, the welfare system in the United 
States was financed and administered by state and local governments. 
As Carney notes, "The federal government had no role in public 
assistance except to provide veterans' pensions and disaster relief." 1 
State and local welfare agencies provided relief to needy persons unable 
to work because of physical or mental disabilities, to victims of disasters, 
and to the blind, the aged, and dependent children.
Mass unemployment during the depression, however, caused the ex 
isting welfare system to collapse. According to Schlesinger, a quarter 
of the labor force in 1933 was "subsisting wanly and desperately on 
relief on an average stipend of about 50 cents per day per family. 2 
State and local governments simply lacked the resources to meet the 
needs of the millions of able-bodied workers who, unable to find work, 
coped with destitution.
Within the first month of taking office, President Roosevelt sent a 
message to Congress requesting the establishment of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). By the end of that first 
month, Congress had complied with his request, establishing FERA 
and authorizing it to distribute $500 million to bankrupt state and local 
relief agencies. Roosevelt then picked Harry Hopkins to be FERA's 
administrator. Hopkins—who would become one of Roosevelt's chief 
advisors and closest confidantes—moved quickly to disburse FERA's 
funds to local agencies. 3
In May 1933, Hopkins received a letter from the executive director 
of the Pennsylvania State Emergency Relief Board asking for instruc 
tion on whether FERA would permit certain strikers in Montgomery 
County to receive federal relief payments. Hopkins issued the follow 
ing statement:
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration is concerned 
with administering relief to the needy unemployed and their
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families. Each case applying for relief to the local emergen 
cy relief agencies should be treated on its merits as a relief 
case wholly apart from a controversy in which the wage earn 
ed may be involved.
The FERA will not attempt to judge the merits of any labor 
dispute. State and Federal agencies, as well as courts, exist 
which are duly qualified to act as arbiters and adjusters in 
such disputes.
Unless it be determined by the Department of Labor that 
the basis for relief is unreasonable and unjustified, the FERA 
authorizes local/relief agencies to furnish relief to the families 
of striking wage earners after careful investigation has shown 
that their resources are not sufficient to meet emergency 
needs. 4
Although Hopkins said that FERA would not authorize public 
assistance for strikers if the Department of Labor found that the basis 
for a strike was "unreasonable and unjustified," in fact the Depart 
ment of Labor never developed a means of making such a determina 
tion. 5 Nevertheless, Hopkins's policy was subsequently reaffirmed in 
statements issued by FERA in October 1933, and again in September 
1934. 6
Thus, when 12,000 agricultural workers went on strike in October 
1933 against cotton growers in California's San Joaquin Valley, the 
federal government authorized relief to all needy strikers. The 1933 
cotton strike, which Daniel has called "the zenith of the New Deal's 
larger program of permanently altering the economic power relation 
ship between government and farm employers," was marked by violent 
confrontations between growers and workers. 7 The federal administrator 
of the National Recovery Act in California, George Creel, acting without 
formal authority, intervened in the strike in an attempt to stem the 
violence and bring about a settlement. When the growers attempted to 
"starve out" the strikers, California Governor James Rolph, after receiv 
ing approval from FERA officials, authorized the state's Emergency 
Relief Administration to provide food and other supplies to all needy 
strikers. Creel then threatened to exclude the growers from the New
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Deal's farm support programs unless they agreed to submit their dispute 
to a fact-finding commission. At the same time, the strikers were told 
by state officials that federal relief would be denied them unless they, 
too, agreed to fact-finding and returned to work. 8
The state's plan to condition the distribution of federal relief 
on the strikers' return to work failed miserably. When strikers 
learned that strings were attached to the relief supplies of 
fered to them, they refused to accept them. . . . Finally, when 
several strikers' children died of malnutrition and a public 
scandal seemed imminent, state officials relented. ... By 
October 21 [the seventeenth day of the strike] the strikers 
were receiving relief without conditions attached. The sud 
den shift in the state's policy prompted angry growers to com 
plain that relief workers were now dispensing aid to strikers 
on condition that they remain off the job. 9
In the event, both sides agreed to Creel's fact-finding proposal. The 
fact-finding commission, after two days of hearings, produced a recom 
mendation for settling the strike. When both sides denounced the recom 
mendation, Creel once again used the lever of relief payments to force 
them to change their minds. On the one hand, he promised the growers 
that if they accepted the fact-finders' recommendation, all federal relief 
to the strikers would be terminated. On the other hand, he warned the 
workers that if they did not accept the recommendation and return to 
work, they would no longer receive federal relief. Still the strikers did 
not yield. 10 According to Daniel, "The stalemate was finally broken 
not by strikers clamoring to return to work . . . but by [their] union's 
Communist leaders, who concluded that the strike had caused enough 
suffering and that neither the strikers nor the union could gain anything 
by prolonging it further. 11
Bernstein has said that the San Joaquin Valley strike was "perhaps 
the first time in American history that strikers were fed at public ex 
pense, the cause of bitter criticism." 12 Moreover, the authors know 
of no instance in later years of a public official using welfare assistance 
in such a direct and aggressive manner to coerce striking workers and 
their employers to accept a settlement.
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Criticism of FERA's policy of authorizing relief for needy strikers 
intensified in 1934. In late August, newspapers across the country 
reported that members of the United Textile Workers, who were set 
to begin a strike the following month, would receive public relief. These 
reports "raised a storm of protest." 13 An attorney representing textile 
manufacturers in Georgia wrote to President Roosevelt, saying that "the 
strike never would have been called . . . without the financial support 
from the Federal Government." 14 Bowing to pressure, the Alabama 
Relief Administrator ordered relief payments to the strikers to be ter 
minated, a move that "apparently contributed to the defeat of the 
union." 15
The arguments surrounding FERA's policy of authorizing public aid 
to strikers have persisted to this day. Hopkins contended that providing 
public subsidies to strikers would not affect the number or duration of 
strikes and would cost the government very little. Moreover, Hopkins 
believed public subsidies to strikers would reduce the potential for 
violence during strikes, thus contributing to law and order, and would 
be consistent with the New Deal philosophy of encouraging collective 
bargaining through the enhancement of union bargaining power. 16
Those opposing FERA's policy generally disagreed with the New 
Deal's prounion philosophy and also maintained that public subsidies 
would increase the incidence and duration of strikes. The strikes by 
the agricultural workers and the textile workers provided evidence, op 
ponents believed, of the pivotal role that public relief could play in af 
fecting a union's propensity to strike. In both cases, the threat or actual 
termination of relief seemed to lead to the capitulation of the union. 17 
Despite the controversy, FERA's policy, as Brown pointed out, "had 
a strong influence on the position of the officials in the later permanent 
state and local welfare agencies when it became necessary for them to 
deal with similar situations." 18
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
The Social Security Act, passed in 1935, established two categories 
of income maintenance programs. In one category are social insurance 
programs, such as old age insurance and unemployment compensation.
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These programs base benefit payments on an individual's past earn 
ings and on tax contributions. In the other category are public assistance 
programs, which provide aid to the elderly, the blind and the disabled, 
and to families with dependent children. These are based on need alone.
The program now called Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) was established by the Social Security Act to provide assistance 
to children in need because of the death, incapacity, or continued absence 
of a parent. Congress has given the states considerable discretion in 
setting AFDC benefit levels. Each state determines its own standard 
of need and then the family's income and resources are compared to 
this standard. In principle, "the monthly AFDC cash payment is the 
difference between the family's standard of need and the amount of fami 
ly income and other resources. However, in most states, the actual cash 
benefit paid is below the state's standard of need because of statutory 
and administrative limits on maximum benefits and the failure of many 
states to keep their need standards up-to-date based on current living 
costs." 19 There has always been considerable variation across states 
in the amount of monthly benefits paid. For example, in 1983, the max 
imum monthly benefit for a family with three children ranged from $120 
in Mississippi to $751 in Alaska. 20
It was not originally the purpose of AFDC to assist needy children 
simply because of the unemployment of a parent. AFDC's aim was to 
assist female-headed households with no other means of support. As 
the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "The original conception of AFDC 
was to allow widows and divorced mothers to care for their children 
at home without having to go to work, thus eliminating the practice 
of removing needy children in situations of that kind to institutions." 21 
When the program was established, "female household heads with small 
children were usually considered to be unemployable." 22 In practical 
terms, given the chronic job shortage that existed during the depres 
sion years, AFDC mothers were unlikely to be able to find jobs even 
if they made an effort to do so. In addition, it was assumed that 
unemployment compensation would be the principal means of support 
ing those with a labor market attachment who were without work. 23
Consequently, in the early years of the Social Security Act, Congress 
never considered the issue of whether needy strikers should receive
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AFDC benefits. The matter was left to the states to decide. 24 Thieblot 
and Co win assert that many state welfare officials "were not only guided 
by the precedents established by Harry Hopkins and the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, but were themselves sympathetic to 
unions and their aims. In the absence of congressional direction to the 
contrary, welfare aid to strikers was not only assured in most states, 
but on some occasions even promised beforehand." 25 As an illustra 
tion, Theiblot and Cowin note that in 1936, the secretary-treasurer of 
the United Mine Workers told a meeting of the Steel Workers Organizing 
Committee that workers employed by U.S. Steel could "count on public 
relief if S.W.O.C. called a strike." 26
Even though the Social Security Act did not prohibit the payment of 
AFDC to needy strikers, it is unlikely that, prior to the 1960s, many 
strikers ever received such benefits. In previous research on this topic, 
it is reported that strikers received welfare assistance in the 1940s and 
1950s in a number of noteworthy labor disputes. But in almost all of 
these reported cases, strikers received general assistance under state 
programs, rather than AFDC. For example, some auto workers in 
Michigan received welfare assistance during the UAW's strike against 
General Motors in 1945; steel workers received assistance during a strike 
against the basic steel companies in 1946; and electrical workers on 
strike against a General Electric plant in Erie, Pennsylvania received 
assistance in 1948. 27 According to Chamberlain and Kuhn, "in the long 
steel strike of 1959, federal, state, and local benefits and relief provid 
ed the striking steelworkers with at least $22,750,000 worth of aid. " 28 
I.W. Abel, then the secretary-treasurer of the United Steel Workers, 
estimated that the total amount of public aid received by steelworkers 
during the 1959 strike was $45 million. 29 Whichever estimate is closer 
to the truth, it is clear that most of the public aid was in the form of 
unemployment compensation and general assistance, rather than 
AFDC. 30
In the majority of cases, needy strikers did not receive AFDC during 
the 1940s and 1950s simply because they did not meet the program's 
strict eligibility criteria. Almost all AFDC recipients during this period 
were needy families in which a female head was unlikely to have had
Welfare in Labor Disputes 83
any work experience at all. It is true that if a striker "deserted" his 
family, his children could obtain AFDC assistance, provided his fami 
ly met the other eligibility requirements. But there is no evidence that 
many strikers were willing to leave their homes to achieve this result. 
As long as the focus of the AFDC program was the needy children of 
"unemployable" mothers, the issue of paying AFDC to strikers had 
no practical significance. 31
As early as World War II, the labor movement began to establish 
ties with public relief organizations. The Congress of Industrial Organiza 
tions (CIO) established the Community Services Program in 1946, head 
ed by Leo Perlis, to further this effort. "It was the CIO that first of 
ficially adopted the Community Services program, and it was CIO af 
filiated unions which Leo Perlis described as being the first to approach 
the use of public aid during a strike in an organized manner." 32 In 1956, 
shortly after the merger of the AFL and CIO, the AFL-CIO Depart 
ment of Community Services was established. Perlis became the direc 
tor of the new department, which was charged with promoting the union 
movement's involvement in local agencies, such as the united fund, local 
community chests, and other charitable organizations. Through the ac 
tivities of the Community Services Department, "unions have become 
active participants in community welfare organizations and, accordingly, 
have become knowledgeable of the services and policies of these agen 
cies. As a result, the availability of public funds as strike benefits has 
become an integral part of organized labor's strike planning." 33
Over the years, AFDC eligibility criteria were significantly broadened, 
leading to a growing number of recipients. In 1937, for example, about 
half a million children were receiving AFDC; by 1960 the number had 
grown to 2.4 million. The cause of their dependency also changed: in 
the late 1930s about 40 percent of the dependent children received 
assistance because of the death of the father, 25 percent because the 
father was incapacitated, and 35 percent because the father was absent 
from the home. By the early 1960s, however, only 6 percent received 
assistance because of the death of the father, 20 percent because of the 
incapacity of the father, and 65 percent because of the father's absence. 
The remaining 9 percent were in a new category: they received AFDC 
because of the unemployment of the father. 34
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As the nature of the AFDC population changed through these years, 
new concerns were voiced about the program's operation. In the years 
after World War n, the number of female labor force participants grew 
dramatically. The belief that "a woman's place is in the home" was 
called into question, no less for welfare mothers than for other women. 
The growing number of job opportunities for women constituted a 
challenge to the original premise of the AFDC program: that women 
with needy children should not work and were, in any event, 
unemployable. Yet welfare mothers were positively discouraged from 
working because any dollar a woman earned from work would be sub 
tracted from her family's benefit. As the role of women in American 
society changed, this "100 percent tax" on benefits was increasingly 
criticized. 35
In addition, the growing number of AFDC recipients who qualified 
for benefits because of the father's absence drew attention to the possibili 
ty that the AFDC program was contributing to the breakup of the fami 
ly. Most state programs during this period disqualified a family from 
receiving AFDC if an able-bodied man was living in the house, even 
if he was unemployed. This rule encouraged fathers who were unable 
to support their families to leave home so that their wives and dependents 
might qualify for AFDC. "Proponents of welfare reform claimed that 
this eligibility requirement forced many fathers into real or pretended 
abandonment of their families." 36 Many critics charged that the grow 
ing rate of divorce, separation, and desertion was at least partly at 
tributable to AFDC eligibility rules. 37
Moreover, renewed concern in the 1960s with the problem of pover 
ty in America further fueled criticism of the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the AFDC program. 38 As a consequence, the AFDC program was 
significantly restructured and liberalized during the 1960s. In the wake 
of these changes, strikers in large numbers became eligible for benefits 
under the AFDC program for the first time.
AFDC-U 1961-1981
To remedy the possibility that AFDC eligibility criteria were caus 
ing fathers to abandon their families, Congress amended the program in
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1961 to provide assistance to the needy children of unemployed parents 
(AFDC-U). 39 Although it is not clear that Congress intended to create 
a new source of public assistance for strikers when it established the 
AFDC-U program, by its action Congress opened the door for states 
to provide AFDC-U benefits to strikers' families. 40 The new program 
made it possible for strikers and their families to qualify for AFDC 
assistance without the necessity of the striker "deserting" his spouse 
and children. 41
Accordingly, the AFDC-U program quickly became a possible source 
of support for workers on strike. It is well to keep in mind, however, 
that to receive AFDC-U assistance, a striker had to meet all of the AFDC 
eligibility requirements. Although Congress changed these requirements 
from time to time, generally they consisted of the following:
• A striker had to have one or more dependent children living in his 
household.
• The children had to be under a certain age. For example, in 1981, 
just prior to the passage of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act, 
states had the option of paying benefits to children through the age of 
18 or to children through the age of 21 if the children were regularly 
attending a school, college or university or a vocational or technical 
training course.
• The striker and his family had to meet a strict needs test. In 1981, 
before the passage of the OBRA, a family was ineligible for benefits 
if it had property or financial assets in excess of $2,000. The value of 
the family's home, personal effects, and one automobile was excluded 
from this calculation.
• The striker had to have been unemployed for at least 30 days prior 
to the receipt of benefits. A striker was considered unemployed if he 
or she had worked less than 100 hours in the preceding month. The 
striker could not have refused without good cause, within that 30-day 
period, a "bona fide" offer of employment or training. Of course, states 
that allowed strikers to collect AFDC-U did not consider the availability 
of work at a struck establishment a "bona fide" offer of employment.
• If the striker was eligible for unemployment compensation, he or 
she had to apply for and accept such benefits. The unemployment com 
pensation benefits were then counted as part of the striker's income. 42
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Congress gave the states the option of participating in the AFDC-U 
program. The number of states participating in the program has varied 
but is usually around 25. States that elect to participate must operate 
their programs under federal standards and regulations, but otherwise 
have considerable administrative control and discretion.
Strikers receipt of AFDC-U benefits was a source of considerable 
litigation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In general the courts found 
that in the absence of an explicit legislative or regulatory prohibition 
otherwise eligible strikers could receive AFDC-U. Of course, the 
relevance of this litigation is currently in abeyance because Congress 
provided an explicit prohibition on strikers receiving AFDC-U in 1981. 
Nevertheless, a review of the litigation is useful because the issues ad 
dressed in these cases are fundamental in any consideration of appropriate 
policy in this area.
It should also be noted that many of the court cases that dealt with 
striker receipt of AFDC-U also dealt with striker receipt of General 
Assistance (GA). In part this is because strikes that lead to the receipt 
of AFDC-U also often lead to the receipt of GA. Moreover, although 
the AFDC-U and GA programs differ in their administrative structures 
(the former is administered jointly by the federal government and the 
states, while the latter is administered strictly by the states), the legal 
issues associated with the payment of program benefits to strikers are 
quite similar. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, however, we 
focus here on litigation involving payment of AFDC-U to strikers. In 
doing so, however, we discuss some themes that have also emerged 
in GA litigation.
Legal debates over the payment of AFDC-U to strikers largely dealt 
with three issues. First, did states have the option, under the Social 
Security Act or regulations issued by the Secretary of Health, Educa 
tion, and Welfare, to grant (or deny) AFDC-U benefits to strikers? Sec 
ond, was the granting of such benefits violative of the public policy 
of state neutrality in labor disputes? Third, in the absence of an explicit 
prohibition in federal or state statutes on the payment or welfare benefits 
to strikers, did other provisions in those statutes imply a prohibition? 
Of particular concern in this regard were the provisions in the Social
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Security Act stating that an individual is ineligible for AFDC-U if he 
is out of work "without good cause" or if he has refused a "bona fide 
offer of suitable employment." Parallel or related provisions in state 
welfare codes have also been the centerpiece of litigation over the pay 
ment of general assistance to strikers.
The first question was considered in a series of cases that culminated 
in the Supreme Court's decision in Batterton v. Francis in 1977. 43 Un 
til 1968, the definition of "unemployment" under the AFDC-U pro 
gram was left to the states, which meant that the states had the option 
of deciding whether strikers did or did not fall within the definition of 
an unemployed parent.44 In 1968, however, Congress amended the Social 
Security Act, withdrawing "some of the definitional authority delegated 
to the States."45 The 1968 amendments required a participating state 
to provide AFDC-U where a needy child "has been deprived of paren 
tal support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in 
accordance with standards prescribed by the secretary) of his father."46
Accordingly, in 1969 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
promulgated a regulation that included a definition of unemployment, 
but was silent on the issue of whether strikers fell within the defini 
tion. 47 Acting under this regulation, Maryland's Department of Employ 
ment and Social Services issued a rule that denied AFDC-U benefits 
to families in which the father was out of work for reasons that dis 
qualified him for unemployment compensation. Grounds for disqualifica 
tion for unemployment compensation in Maryland included voluntari 
ly leaving work without good cause, gross misconduct, and participa 
tion in a labor dispute (other than a lockout).
In Francis v. Davidson (referred to as Francis I), a federal district 
court held that the Maryland rule was invalid. 48 The case arose out of 
a class action suit brought by two subclasses: fathers who had been denied 
AFDC-U benefits in Maryland because they had been on strike, and 
fathers who had been denied benefits because they had been discharg 
ed for misconduct. The district court found that the Maryland rule was 
invalid because it clearly went beyond the HEW regulation, which had 
defined unemployment strictly in terms of hours worked. The court main 
tained, "A man out of work because he was discharged for cause by
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his employer is unemployed. There can be no two ways about that con 
clusion." 49 The court also believed that a man out of work because of 
a labor dispute was also "unemployed," and therefore held that the 
Maryland rule was in conflict with the HEW regulation.
Reacting to the decision in Francis I, the Secretary of Health, Educa 
tion, and Welfare issued a new regulation in 1973 that, for the first 
time, explicitly gave the option to the states to exclude from eligibility 
for AFDC-U fathers whose unemployment resulted from their participa 
tion in a labor dispute. 50 Francis I had focused significant attention on 
the issue of striker eligibility for AFDC-U. For example, the Senate 
Finance Committee, in considering 1972 welfare reform proposals, 
specifically proposed overturning Francis I and eliminating striker 
eligibility by federal statute. 51 Business opposition to welfare for strikers 
was also mounting, fueled in part by the publication of the book by 
Thieblot and Co win in 1972. 52 Moreover, the Nixon administration had 
come into office in 1973, determined to implement a "New Federalism," 
under which states would have more discretion to administer a large 
number of joint federal/state social programs. 53 It was in this atmosphere 
that Nixon's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare sought to over 
turn Francis I by issuing a new regulation.
After the 1973 regulation was issued, Maryland again tried to imple 
ment its rule, petitioning the district court to dissolve the injunction that 
had been issued as a result of Francis I. But Maryland officials were 
again frustrated when the court refused to dissolve the injunction. That 
Court, in a case that is known as Francis II, recognized that "the con 
flict between the federal and the Maryland regulation ended after the 
former was amended," but continued the injunction on the grounds that 
giving states the option of denying benefits to strikers and their families 
violated the statutory requirement that the Secretary of Health, Educa 
tion, and Welfare had to establish the standards concerning the defini 
tion of unemployment. Francis II held that the Secretary did not have 
the authority to delegate this responsibility to the states. 54
Francis II was then consolidated on appeal with a similar case and 
the circuit court affirmed the decisions of the two district courts in an 
unpublished per curiam decision. 55 The Supreme Court then granted
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certiorari. In Batterton v. Francis, the court overturned Francis I and 
//by holding that the 1973 HEW regulation and, by inference, the con 
tested Maryland rule were valid. The court did not agree with the district 
court's view on Francis //that the term "unemployment" was unam 
biguous. The Supreme Court said that "Congress itself must have ap 
preciated that the meaning of the statutory term was not self-evident, 
or it would not have given the Secretary the power to prescribe stan 
dards." 56 The Court acknowledged that the Secretary "could 
not . . . adopt a regulation that bears no relationship to any recogniz 
ed concept of unemployment or that would defeat the purpose of the 
[AFDC-U] program. But the regulation here at issue does not even ap 
proach these limits of delegated authority." 57 The Court stressed that 
it had been the intent of Congress to aid the families of the involuntari 
ly unemployed, and that it was perfectly consistent with that intent for 
the Secretary to permit the states to deny benefits to strikers, whose 
unemployment arguably was involuntary. 58
In Francis II the district court had invalidated the HEW regulation 
in part because the court believed the regulation did not serve the pur 
pose of providing a uniform national standard for determining AFDC- 
U eligibility of those participating in labor disputes. But the Supreme 
Court held that, even though one purpose of the 1968 amendments to 
the Social Security Act was to foster uniform national standards of 
eligibility, this purpose did not preclude the Secretary of HEW from 
recognizing local policies. The Court said that "the goal of greater 
uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on each 
State." 59 The Court therefore held that the 1973 HEW regulation "ade 
quately promotes the statutory goal of reducing interstate variations in 
the [AFDC-U] program. In this respect, the regulation is both reasonable 
and within the authority delegated to the Secretary." 60 The issue of 
whether states participating in the AFDC-U program could be given 
the option of denying benefits to strikers' families was thus settled. By 
1980, eight of the 26 states participating in the program had chosen 
to deny benefits to strikers. 61
The second issue addressed in AFDC-U and GA cases was whether 
the payment of welfare benefits to strikers violated the principle of state
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neutrality in labor relations and, especially, in labor disputes. The issue 
of state neutrality has always been a central concern in the debate over 
whether strikers should be eligible for government transfer payments. 62 
The debate sharpened after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 
a statute that made the policy of state neutrality in labor relations much 
more explicit than it had ever been before. During the debate in the 
Senate that preceded passage of the Act, Senator Taft explained the pur 
pose of the legislation of which he was cosponsor:
Our aim should be to get back to the point where, when an
employer meets with his employees, they have substantially
equal bargaining power so that neither side feels it can make
unreasonable demands and get away with it. 63
The philosophy of the Taft-Hartley Act was to establish a statutory
framework for collective bargaining that favored neither employers nor
unions. Within that framework the parties would be free to fashion the
precise terms of their relationship through collective bargaining. Nothing
in that framework dictated that the parties had to reach agreement. They
were, within broad limits, free to disagree and to use economic weapons
(strikes, lockouts, and other forms of concerted activity) against one
another. 64 In the larger debate over striker eligibility for public assistance,
and in a number of court cases dealing with that issue, the question
of whether the eligibility for and receipt of AFDC-U and GA benefits
by strikers upset the balance of bargaining power between the unions
and employers and placed the government squarely on the side of the
strikers was a central concern.
For example, in the 1972 Senate debate over a proposed amendment 
to the Social Security Act to eliminate striker eligibility for AFDC-U, 
Senator Russell Long (Dem., La.) said. "The Senator from Louisiana 
feels that the Government should be neutral between labor and manage 
ment in a labor dispute, and to pay welfare benefits to people who are 
on strike is not being neutral." 65 Senator Jacob Javits (Rep., N.Y.) 
responded, "One thing the Senator from Louisiana has said is quite 
proper: The Government should be neutral. But the Government should 
not hurt children whose father happens to be on strike. That is not be 
ing neutral either." 66
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A leading case in which the court's decision hinged in part on its view 
of whether the payment of AFDC-U and GA to strikers violated the 
policy of state neutrality in labor disputes is Strat-O-Seal Manufactur 
ing Co. v. Scott. 67 Strat-O-Seal sought to enjoin the Illinois Depart 
ment of Public Aid from paying welfare benefits to strikers. The com 
pany contended that the payment of AFDC-U and GA benefits "is con 
trary to the announced policy of our State to remain neutral in labor 
disputes. " 68 Because of a desire to maintain neutrality in labor disputes, 
Strat-O-Seal argued, Illinois had a policy of refusing to pay unemploy 
ment compensation to strikers. 69 It would be inconsistent, Strat-O-Seal 
argued, for Illinois to refuse to pay strikers unemployment compensa 
tion, but not AFDC-U and GA.
But the Illinois court disagreed, rejecting the analogy between 
unemployment compensation and public assistance. The court pointed 
out that strikers in Illinois had been paid public assistance for 16 years. 
The Illinois legislature certainly knew about this practice, but had chosen 
to do nothing about it. The court was not prepared to overturn an ex 
isting practice, an action it thought was more properly the prerogative 
of the legislature. 70
. Moreover, the court did not agree that the payment of welfare benefits 
to strikers violated the principle of state neutrality in labor disputes. 
On the contrary, the court expressed the following view:
Labor union membership or activity and the right to strike 
in proper cases and under proper circumstances is an accepted 
fact in our industrial community. Plaintiffs would ask us to 
exact by judicial interpretation as the price of exercising that 
right a forfeiture of the benefits available to others under the 
Public Assistance Code. By so doing, we exact a quid pro 
quo and impose economic sanctions not specifically required 
by the code. The strong arm of the State is thus employed 
to strangle authorized activity and State neutrality ends. 71
Other state courts, following the lead of the Illinois court in Strat-O- 
Seal, also found that the payment of welfare benefits to strikers did not 
violate the policy of state neutrality in labor disputes. For example, one 
series of cases in New York State grew out of the efforts of the Social
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Services Commissioner in Onondaga County (in which the city of 
Syracuse is located) to prevent strikers in the county from receiving 
GA. In the first case in this series, Lascaris v. Wyman (known as Lascaris 
I), County Commissioner Lascaris brought an action for a declaratory 
judgment against the State Commissioner of Social Services seeking 
a judicial interpretation of the state's social welfare law as it applied 
to striking employees. At the time the case arose, in 1969, New York 
counties had been paying general assistance to needy strikers for at least 
17 years, even though there had never been an explicit provision in 
the state welfare law that either forbade or required such payment. Coun 
ty Commissioner Lascaris accordingly sought judicial approval of his 
intention to deny benefits to strikers in his county. But the court in 
Lascaris I was no more anxious to overturn a long-standing practice 
in the state than the court in Strat-O-Seal had been. 72 Closely follow 
ing the reasoning in the Strat-O-Seal case, the Lascaris I court held 
that denying welfare benefits to strikers would amount to a forfeiture 
of the employees' right to strike, which was guaranteed by New York's 
labor law. 73
After Lascaris I, the New York legislature, in 1971, passed an amend 
ment to the Social Services Law elaborating on the circumstances in 
which a person would be deemed "employable" and therefore ineligi 
ble for GA. Employees participating in a labor dispute were not in 
cluded in the amendment's definition of an employable person. 74 Then, 
in the summer of 1971, the Communication Workers of America began 
the strike against the New York Telephone Company that, as we have 
seen, resulted in the company challenging the payment of unemploy 
ment compensation to strikers under New York's unemployment in 
surance statute. 75 Some of the striking telephone workers in Onondaga 
County applied for welfare benefits under New York's Social Services 
Law, but once again County Commissioner Lascaris sought judicial ap 
proval of his determination that the telephone workers were ineligible 
for GA.
Lascaris brought an action in the State's Supreme Court (the lower 
court in New York) seeking declaratory judgment to confirm his deter 
mination. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plain 
tiff, 76 but the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed. 77
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Lascaris then appealed to New York's highest court, the Court of Ap 
peals. In this case, known as Lascaris 7/, 78 the Court of Appeals held 
that strikers were eligible to receive GA, provided they registered with 
the state employment office and did not refuse suitable employment. 
The court said that "a person on strike does not, simply because he 
is on strike, 'refuse' to accept employment." 79 In the court's view, the 
1971 amendment to the Social Services Law had not affected striker 
eligibility for GA. In fact, the court believed that the amendment should 
be regarded as legislative approval of New York's long-standing prac 
tice of paying GA to otherwise eligible strikers. 80
But did the payment of welfare benefits to strikers violate the state's 
policy of neutrality in labor disputes? The court, in strongly worded 
language, held that it did not:
It may be fairly said that in cases such as this the policy of 
government neutrality in labor controversies is, in reality, 
little more than an admirable fiction. Although, on the one 
hand, the State may not be acting in a strictly neutral fashion 
if it allows strikers to obtain public assistance, it may not, 
on the other hand, be seriously maintained that the State 
adopts a neutral policy if it renders strikers helpless by de 
nying them the public assistance or welfare benefits to which 
they would otherwise be entitled. Indeed, it seems manifest 
that public assistance serves a purpose different from and, 
by that token, not in conflict with that which underlies the 
State's policy of neutrality. 81
Quoting the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in ITT v. 
Minter, the court in Lascaris //pointed out that "welfare programs, 
supplying unmet subsistence needs to families without time limitation, 
address a more basic social need then does unemployment compensa 
tion," which is based on prior earnings and not on demonstrated need. 82 
Given its view that the 1971 amendment had not affected striker eligibility 
for GA and that payment of GA did not violate the policy of state neutrali 
ty in labor disputes, the court in Lascaris II ruled that public assistance 
should be paid to otherwise eligible strikers. 83
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Thus, attempts to deny strikers either state general assistance or (before 
1981) AFDC-U on the grounds that such assistance should be regard 
ed as state subsidization of strikes in violation of the public policy of 
government neutrality in labor disputes have not found favor in the 
courts. Some scholars have criticized the courts on this point. For ex 
ample, Carney has written, "Although the claim that inaction, as well 
as action, affects the fortunes of the combatants has a certain 
philosophical merit, it tends to obscure the fact that provision, rather 
than denial, of subsidies to strikers represents a change in the status 
quo and thus, from an historical standpoint, constitutes a governmen 
tal intervention. " 84 The courts have acknowledged that paying welfare 
benefits to strikers constitutes a form of government intervention in labor 
disputes, but they have rejected the argument that paying benefits in 
terferes with the policy of "free collective bargaining," not only for 
the reasons previously discussed but also because the claim was not 
supported by empirical evidence. As the court in Lascaris II put it, "It 
is not at all clear—there is no evidence in the record on the point— 
exactly what impact public assistance grants have on the system of col 
lective bargaining." 85 Arguably the Lascaris //court would have taken 
a dimmer view of paying public assistance to strikers if it had been possi 
ble to show that such payments increased the frequency and duration 
of strikes.
The third question addressed by the courts was whether, in the absence 
of an explicit statutory ban on the payment of welfare benefits to strikers, 
other provisions in federal and state statutes implied a prohibition. For 
example, the Social Security Act, as noted, denied AFDC-U to applicants 
who had refused without good cause a bona fide offer of employment. 
Similarly, most state codes require that an applicant for general assistance 
register for employment at a state employment agency and accept of 
fers of suitable employment or training. In some welfare cases it was 
contended that, by participating in a labor dispute, strikers had left their 
jobs without good cause and, by not returning to their jobs at the struck 
establishment, strikers were refusing offers of suitable employment. 
Courts have rejected such arguments, recognizing that the imposition 
of such strictures on strikers would be tantamount to denying them the 
right to strike.
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In other cases it was contended that, even though strikers should not 
be forced by statutory work requirements to abdicate their right to strike, 
strikers who registered for employment were not truly interested in ac 
cepting jobs offered by other employers, and their lack of interest in 
alternative jobs amounted to a refusal to accept suitable employment. 
In general courts have rejected this contention as well.
For example, in Strat-O-Seal the court dealt with the claim that merely 
participating in a strike constituted a refusal to accept suitable employ 
ment. Provisions in the Illinois Public Assistance Code made benefits 
available to "persons who for unavoidable causes are unable to main 
tain a decent and healthful standard of living" and denied benefits to 
"any employable person who refuses suitable employment or training 
for self-support work." 86 The plaintiff in Strat-O-Seal argued, first, 
that the strikers' need arose from an avoidable cause—namely, the strike 
itself—and that, second, their unwillingness to return to their jobs con 
stituted a refusal to accept suitable employment. The Illinois court re 
jected both arguments. In the court's view, "The need for aid does not 
arise solely and initially from participation in a strike. It arises either 
from the refusal to help oneself or the inability to do so." 87 Refusal 
to help oneself, the court pointed out, is an avoidable cause of need 
and therefore a bar to public assistance. The inability to help oneself 
is an unavoidable cause and therefore qualifies applicants for public 
assistance. Some strikers had the economic resources to help themselves, 
could not refuse to use their resources, and were therefore ineligible 
for public assistance. But other strikers had exhausted their resources 
and could help themselves only "by abdicating the right to participate 
in a proper strike or by remaining on the job in the struck plant." 88 
But, the court held, to require needy strikers to abandon their strike 
"is to place the hangman's noose over an existing right when the 
legislature has not specifically done so." 89 Thus, need that arises out 
of an employee's participation in a bona fide strike and his refusal to 
return to his employer was not held by the Strat-O-Seal court to be a 
bar to public assistance.
In Lascaris I striking General Electric employees in Onondaga County 
had applied for general assistance. The company remained open during
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the strike for those employees who desired to work. The county com 
missioner contended that by refusing to return to their jobs the strikers 
had refused to accept suitable employment and should therefore be denied 
general assistance. The court had to interpret provisions of the New 
York Social Services Law that required an applicant for benefits to 
register with the nearest employment agency, report for interviews at 
the agency when requested to do so, accept referrals to jobs, and report 
for employment when a suitable job was available. But the statute was 
silent on whether a striking employee could qualify for benefits if he 
refused to go back to work for his employer. The court held, "Where 
an employee loses employment by reason of a bona fide strike, lockout 
or other industrial controversy, this will not be a bar to the employee 
in obtaining welfare assistance if he otherwise qualifies. Strict and nar 
row application of [the statutory requirements] cannot be used to force 
the employee back to work and forfeit his rights under the Labor Law.' ' 90
Not content with the decision in Lascaris I, the county commissioner 
raised the same argument in Lascaris II (which, of course, arose after 
the Social Services Law had been amended). Again the court had to 
rule on whether a striking employee's refusal to work for his employer 
during the strike constituted a refusal to accept suitable employment. 
The Appellate Division pointed out that a union member who returns 
to work for his employer during an authorized strike could be fined, 
or even expelled, by his union. Therefore, the Appellate Division said, 
"A refusal by a union member to work for his employer can hardly 
be viewed as a 'voluntary act,'" 91 and accordingly the court conclud 
ed that mere participation in a strike did not constitute a refusal to ac 
cept suitable employment and thus was not a bar to public assistance. 
But, although the issue was raised, the Appellate Division did not ad 
dress directly the contention that strikers should be disqualified because 
they had also refused suitable jobs offered by other employers. 92
When the case was heard by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff more 
forcefully pressed the argument that the strikers were not willing to ac 
cept alternative employment during the strike and were thus disqualified 
from receiving welfare assistance. The plaintiffs claim, however, was 
based on inference rather than on direct evidence. The plaintiff merely
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asserted that since the strikers were likely to return to work at the struck 
employer at the conclusion of the strike, they had "in effect refused 
to accept any other employment.' ' 93 But the Court of Appeals said, ' 'The 
short answer to the plaintiffs argument is that applicants for assistance 
in the present case have—and this is conceded—registered for other 
employment . . . and there is no 'evidence whatever in the record that 
they have either failed to attend job 'interviews' or refused 'referrals' 
or that they have refused to accept an offer of such employment." 94
The issue of striker eligibility for welfare benefits reached the federal 
courts for the first time in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter in 1970. 95 The 
principal question the court had to decide in this case was whether pay 
ing strikers welfare benefits amounted to state interference with the 
employer's right under federal labor law to engage freely in collective 
bargaining and was therefore barred under the doctrine of federal 
preemption. Recall that we analyzed the question of federal preemp 
tion in our discussion of the New York Telephone case. At this point 
we deal only with ITT's claim that granting AFDC-U to strikers violated 
the provisions of the Social Security Act that prohibit the payment of 
benefits to persons who "without good cause . . . refused a bona fide 
offer of employment." 96
The Minter case arose out of a strike by a teamsters local against ITT's 
lamp division plant in Lynn, Massachusetts. Some of the striking workers 
applied for and received both AFDC-U and general assistance. 97 ITT 
sought a temporary restraining order in the district court to stop the 
payment of benefits to its striking employees. The district court denied 
ITT's motion and the corporation appealed. The first circuit affirmed 
the lower court's denial of injunctive relief. 98
Although ITT's principal argument was based on the preemption doc 
trine, it also maintained that strikers should not be eligible for welfare 
benefits because by striking they had voluntarily left their jobs and hence 
were persons who "without good cause" had refused a "bona fide of 
fer of employment." The district court rejected the corporation's argu 
ment, pointing out that the strikers were engaged in a "rightful activi 
ty" that was protected by federal labor statutes. Moreover, the court 
said, "the possible consequences to a union member of returning to
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work as a strike breaker may well constitute good cause for failing to 
return to work." 99
In its consideration of the same point of law, the first circuit court 
declared that equating a refusal to work at a struck establishment with 
a refusal to accept a bonafide offer of employment "is no less circular 
or more persuasive than the contrary assumption," namely that exer 
cising one's federally protected right to strike always constitutes "good 
cause" to refuse employment. 10° The correct approach, in the first cir 
cuit court's view, was to allow the state, without deciding the merits 
of a particular dispute, "to make the determination of what is covered 
by 'good cause' and what constitutes a 'bona fide' offer of employ 
ment." 101 Since the strikers in the ITT case had registered for employ 
ment and (presumably) would be required to accept suitable alternative 
employment if it became available, the court held that the state welfare 
commissioner's determination that the strikers were eligible for benefits 
had not been precluded by either federal or state statutes. 102
In summary, efforts to prohibit or restrict the payment of welfare 
benefits to strikers through the courts were generally unsuccessful in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Those who sought to restrict striker eligibility 
for welfare benefits won only one major court victory, and that came 
in the Supreme Court's decision in Batterton v. Francis. The Court 
upheld the prerogative of a state participating in the AFDC-U program 
to deny benefits to strikers, but its ruling in no way disturbed the op 
posite choice that had been made by the majority of states in the program.
Otherwise federal and state courts did not accept the argument that 
the payment of welfare benefits to strikers violated the public policy 
principle of state neutrality in labor relations. Most courts simply did 
not believe that the payment of welfare benefits to strikers had a 
demonstrable effect on collective bargaining. The first circuit court in 
Minter, however, maintained that a court should engage in a balancing 
test, weighing "the impact on the state of declaring needy strikers and 
their families ineligible for welfare against the extent to which making 
them eligible stripped state government of its neutrality in a labor- 
management dispute.'' 103 The impact on collective bargaining, the Minter 
court said, was in effect an empirical matter, depending in part on
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"whether or not strikes tend to be of longer duration where welfare 
is received." 104 Such empirical evidence was lacking in Minter, but 
even if a court had evidence suggesting that welfare payments did have 
a discernible effect on collective bargaining, it was still necessary, ac 
cording to the Minter court, to weigh that impact against the state's 
legitimate interest in "minimizing hardships to families of strikers who 
have no other resources than the weekly pay check." 105 Clearly, the 
court believed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to muster 
enough evidence on the impact of welfare payments on collective 
bargaining to overcome the presumption that needy strikers deserved 
state support.
The courts also refused to accept the proposition that strikers should 
be ineligible for welfare because, by striking, they had without good 
cause refused to accept suitable or "bona fide" employment. In Strat- 
O-Seal, Lascaris I and //, and Minter, the courts recognized that adopt 
ing such a view would, in the words of Strat-O-Seal, place "a hangman's 
noose" over the right to strike. 106 On the other hand, the courts have 
held that to be eligible for welfare strikers had to register for employ 
ment, accept referrals to jobs, and accept alternative employment, if 
suitable work was available. In Minter the court said it would be in 
terested in knowing whether strikers actually did accept alternative 
employment, 107 but direct knowledge on this factual matter was absent 
in Minter and in other cases as well. It is possible that some courts would 
have denied welfare benefits to strikers if they had had direct evidence 
that otherwise eligible strikers had been offered suitable, bona fide jobs 
by other employers and had refused to accept them. But to date no court 
has been offered such evidence. 108
Courts have typically heard cases in which there was no explicit 
statutory ban on the payment of welfare to strikers and the state had 
a long history of paying benefits to strikers. 109 Under these circumstances 
courts have been unwilling to prohibit the payment of benefits to strikers 
and their families. As the court said in Lascaris II, "In light of this 
State's long-standing administrative policy sanctioning assistance 
payments to strikers, the Legislature, if it considers such a policy im-
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permissible, should manifest its design in clear and unmistakable 
terms." 110 The Minter court expressed essentially the same view with 
respect to the payment of AFDC-U to strikers, declaring that Congress 
was "the preferable forum" for resolving the issue. 111 Of course, in 
1981, Congress did speak clearly on this issue, eliminating striker 
eligibility for both AFDC-U benefits and food stamps. 112
Although the issue of striker eligibility for AFDC-U generated in 
tense political controversy and a substantial amount of litigation, it is 
not likely that program benefits played a major role in the vast majori 
ty of labor disputes in the 1960s and 1970s. It must be remembered 
that only a subset of states participate in the AFDC-U program and, 
before 1981, not all of the participating states granted benefits to strikers. 
Moreover, program rules effectively limited eligibility to the most im 
poverished strikers with dependent children. Furthermore, although some 
strikers might have qualified for emergency assistance, most strikers 
had to wait 30 days before they could attain eligibility—and, of course, 
the majority of strikes are settled well within 30 days. 113 Finally, ap 
plicants for AFDC-U only become eligible for benefits when they have 
exhausted their eligibility for unemployment compensation; strikers 
receiving unemployment benefits, therefore, would not also receive 
AFDC-U. 114
Given these restrictions, it is not surprising that relatively few strikers 
ever received AFDC-U benefits, despite claims to the contrary. Thieblot 
and Cowin, in their 1972 book, tried to estimate the annual cost of paying 
eligible strikers AFDC-U. The case studies they had conducted sug 
gested to them that 15 percent of all strikers would receive AFDC-U 
benefits in a "normal" year. Using this assumption, Thieblot and Cowin 
estimated that paying AFDC-U to strikers carried an annual price tag 
of $62.6 million. 115 There is reason to believe, however, that Thieblot 
and Cowin's figure is grossly exaggerated. In its consideration of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation bill in 1981, the Senate Budget Com 
mittee received a staff report suggesting that the elimination of AFDC-U 
for strikers would save about $5 million in a year. 116 If credence is given 
to the Senate estimate, then only .6 of 1 percent of total AFDC-U 
payments went to strikers in 1980. 117
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The Senate cost estimate can also be used to generate an estimate 
of the number of strikers who received assistance in 1980. Suppose we 
assume, for the sake of argument, that every striker received just one 
month of AFDC-U benefits. Since the average AFDC-U payment per 
family was about $400 a month in 1980, then at most 12,500 strikers 
received assistance during that year. 118 This is obviously an upper-bound 
estimate, since eligible strikers would have received two or more months 
of benefits if they were involved in strikes lasting longer than 60 days. 
(In the next chapter we present data showing that 14 percent of all strikes 
last longer than 56 days.) Nevertheless, our estimate suggests that in 
1980 less than .7 of 1 percent of AFDC-U families included a striker 
and less than 1 percent of all strikers received benefits. 119
These estimates present a very different picture from the one painted 
by Thieblot and Cowin. 120 The estimates are not intended, of course, 
to refute evidence that in some long strikes the AFDC-U program was 
a major source of support for strikers' families. m But they cast doubt 
on the perception, certainly widespread in the business community, that 
welfare benefits were commonly available to strikers. This perception 
was fostered by media coverage of some of the court cases discussed 
here as well as the extensive publicity given certain protracted strikes 
(such as the coal strikes of 1978 and 1981) in which large numbers of 
workers were reported to have received welfare and food stamps. 122
For more than a decade employers and their allies waged a campaign 
against the use of welfare assistance in labor disputes. As we have seen, 
their efforts to achieve their objective in the courts were largely unavail 
ing. Similarly, until 1981 efforts to ban payment of AFDC-U to strikers 
through Congressional action were also unsuccessful. But when Presi 
dent Reagan came into office and control of the Senate passed to the 
Republicans in 1981, the stage was set for major alterations in the na 
tion's social legislation. One of the principal targets of the Reagan ad 
ministration was the AFDC program. Under the leadership of Budget 
Director David Stockman, the administration sought amendments to the 
Social Security Act designed to cut $1.2 billion from federal expen 
ditures for AFDC (and therefore the same amount from State expen 
ditures). All of the changes proposed by the administration were
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incorporated into the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which was 
enacted into law on August 13, 1981. 123 Included in OBRA was an 
amendment to the Social Security Act that prohibited the payment of 
AFDC-U benefits to strikers and their families. 124
Food Stamps
The food stamp program has several features that distinguish it from 
other welfare programs. Most obvious is the fact that instead of pro 
viding cash to needy recipients, the program provides coupons or 
"stamps" that can only be used to purchase food. Less obvious, but 
perhaps substantially more important, the program operates under 
uniform federal rules. Unlike the AFDC program, the rules governing 
food stamp eligibility and benefit determination are the same throughout 
the United States. Moreover, the federal government pays the full cost 
of the stamps and half of the administrative costs. Although the states 
are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the program and 
the other half of the administrative costs, they have no control over 
policy. Essentially the states implement rules that are written in 
Washington. 125 By contrast, eligibility and benefit determination under 
the AFDC program are substantially in the hands of the states.
In addition, the food stamp program covers a broader population than 
the AFDC program. Whereas the AFDC-U program is restricted to 
families with dependent children, the food stamp population encom 
passes AFDC-U eligibles, single individuals, couples with children, and 
even communes. 126 Thus, in 1981, at the time OBRA was passed, there 
were 23 million food stamp recipients but only 2 million families receiv 
ing AFDC-U. 127
To be eligible for food stamp assistance, a household must qualify 
under a federal standard of need, below which a household's resources 
must fall for it to be eligible for benefits. The standard of need under 
the food stamp program has generally been more liberal than the stan 
dard of need established by most states under the AFDC-U program. 
For example, in 1975 most four-person families would qualify for 
assistance if the household's liquid assets did not exceed $1,500 and 
its annualized net income did not exceed $6,480. 128 Essentially, a
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household qualified for assistance if its net income was at or below the 
federal poverty line.
In 1981, however, OBRA changed the eligibility test from one bas 
ed on net income to one based on gross income. Households without 
an elderly or disabled member were required to have gross income, 
before any deductions for expenses, below 130 percent of the federal 
poverty level of income. Net income was to be used only to determine 
benefits. For example, a working family of four with a monthly in 
come of $1,191 (30 percent more than the poverty level of $916) became 
ineligible for benefits. The shift to a gross-income eligibility test was 
designed to remove from the program nearly one million recipients who 
were on the high end of the low-income population. 129
Whereas in the case of the AFDC-U program, an unemployed spouse 
must wait 30 days before becoming eligible for benefits, food stamp 
assistance is provided without a waiting period. This feature of the food 
stamp program was particularly significant for strikers, who until 1981 
could potentially become eligible for food stamp assistance on the first 
day of a strike. In addition, a household's receipt of food stamps did 
not decrease the welfare grants that may have been available to it under 
other federal and state laws. Thus, until 1981 strikers could potentially 
qualify for both food stamps and state general assistance on the first 
day of a strike, and for both food stamps and AFDC-U if the strike 
lasted longer than 30 days. 130
The food stamp program also contains a work requirement not unlike 
the one contained in the AFDC-U program. A "physically and men 
tally fit" adult loses eligibility for food stamps if he refuses to register 
for employment, voluntarily quits his job without good cause, or refuses 
to accept a suitable offer of employment. Before 1981 the Food Stamp 
Act specifically allowed an applicant to refuse employment at a plant 
or site because of a strike or lockout. OBRA, however, altered this pro 
viso so that now an applicant can refuse employment at a struck plant 
only if the household does not contain a member on strike. 131
When a household is deemed to be eligible for food stamps, it receives 
a monthly allotment of free stamps. A benefit schedule, which varies 
according to the size and net income of the household, is used to
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determine the allotment. A Thrifty Food Plan, which is based on recom 
mended daily allowances of nutrients for persons in various age/sex 
categories, is used to calculate the maximum food stamp benefit payable 
to a household of a particular size. A household's monthly allotment 
is the Thrifty Food Plan amount, reduced by 30 percent of a household's 
net income. Historically, the allotment for a family of four has generally 
been about 25 percent of its net income. 132
The origins of the food stamp program date to the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. At a time when farmers produced food they could not 
sell while thousands of unemployed workers stood in bread lines, the 
federal government began to distribute surplus food to the hungry. The 
first food stamp program was established in 1939. Needy households 
purchased stamps at their face value and also received free stamps as 
well. The stamps could be used to buy surplus food available at retail 
stores. The plan, however, was discontinued in 1943, at a time when 
the booming wartime economy had virtually eliminated both the 
unemployment and surplus food problems. 133
There were sporadic experiments with surplus commodity programs 
throughout the postwar period. In 1961 President Kennedy launched 
the immediate predecessor of the current program when he issued an 
executive order establishing pilot food stamp programs in seven states. 
The number of participating states had grown to 43 by 1964 when Con 
gress passed the Food Stamp Act, which remains the statutory framework 
for the current program. 134
The initial program under the Food Stamp Act was modest in scale. 
Much like the AFDC-U program, a state could choose not to participate 
in the program, and states that did choose to participate exercised substan 
tial control over eligibility criteria and allotment levels. In 1965 the 
program provided benefits to only 632,000 people at a cost of $32.5 
million to the federal government. 135 In the late 1960s several public 
interest groups focused national attention on the problem of hunger in 
America. 136 This attention caused Congress to increase substantially 
federal outlays for the food stamp program. In 1971 Congress established 
uniform national income and resource eligibility standards and again 
increased benefits available under the program. Then in 1973 Congress
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required that all counties in the nation offer food stamps by July 1974. 
By 1975 the food stamp program provided benefits to 19.2 million people 
at a cost of $4.4 billion. 137
The Food Stamp Act of 1964 did not speak to the issue of whether 
strikers should receive food stamps. Rather the issue arose only when 
reports began to surface that strikers were receiving stamps. Carney 
reports that in the fall of 1965, "lumberers in the Northwest became 
the first group of strikers to find in the Act a source of public subsidy." 138 
In 1967 strikers used food stamps during the UAW's strike against Ford, 
and later that year striking copper workers also received food stamps. 
These strikes generated considerable publicity over the issue of food 
stamps for strikers, leading representatives of the business community 
to voice opposition to the practice. 139
In 1968 the House of Representatives passed a food stamp bill pro 
hibiting strikers from receiving assistance. Senate opposition to the House 
measure resulted in the striker disqualification being removed from the 
final legislation. In 1970 Congress again confronted the issue. A mo 
tion in the House to prohibit strikers from receiving food stamps was 
defeated. Instead, Congress included language in the Act that explicit 
ly permitted strikers to receive food stamps: "Refusal to work at a plant 
or site subject to a strike or a lockout for the duration of such strike 
or lockout shall not be deemed refusal to accept employment." 140 The 
House Agricultural Committee's report on the 1970 amendments to the 
Food Stamp Act noted that it had adopted the striker provision because 
it did "not wish to take sides in labor disputes and does not believe 
this bill is the proper place to solve labor-management problems." 141
The controversy, however, raged on. Throughout the 1970s repeated 
attempts were made in Congress to curtail striker participation in the 
food stamp program, but all such efforts failed. In 1971, for example, 
the House Agricultural Committee voted to eliminate striker eligibility 
for food stamps but the committee's bill never reached the House floor 
for debate. The following year, the committee reversed its position, 
voting to allow strikers to continue to receive food stamps. 142 In 1974, 
the Ford administration attempted to overturn the existing policy, but 
the Senate voted against an administration-backed proposal. 143
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Congress again considered the issue in 1977. This time new language 
was added to the Food Stamp Act that reflected the political pressure 
on Congressional supporters of food stamps for strikers:
No household that contains a person involved in a labor- 
management dispute shall be eligible to participate in the food 
stamp program unless the household meets the income 
guidelines, asset requirements, and work registration re 
quirements of this Act. 144
By emphasizing that only strikers who were otherwise eligible could 
receive food stamps, the supporters hoped to eliminate the perception 
that strikers were somehow treated differently from other food stamp 
recipients. In discussing this provision, the House Agricultural Com 
mittee said in 1979:
[We] have constantly grappled with the issue of providing 
food stamp benefits to strikers. In the 1977 Act, we refused 
to eliminate them and the members of their households from 
consideration for participation simply because they were on 
strike, since such an automatic exclusion seemed unfair and 
inequitable and would have involved the government in the 
non-neutral act of pressuring the worker to abandon the 
strike. . . .
The Committee wishes to reiterate its intention that the food 
stamp program be limited to the truly needy as defined by 
the existing eligibility criteria. . . . Accordingly, the Com 
mittee has determined to add an amendment that makes crystal 
clear that it does not countenance making any striker or the 
striker's household eligible for food stamps by virtue solely 
of the existence of the strike and that [it] in no way condones 
strikers viewing being on strike as the sole qualifying criterion 
enabling them to receive food stamps. That is not the way 
the program works now. That is not the way the program 
ought to work ever. 145
But the committee then acknowledged that the amendment had not 
in any way changed existing policy; it had merely altered the emphasis. 146
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The effort made by congressional supporters in 1977 to deflect 
criticism of the policy did not succeed. Congressional opponents and 
their business allies continued to press their efforts to remove the striker 
qualification provision from the Food Stamp Act. Their efforts were 
fueled by reports that thousands of miners collected food stamps dur 
ing the 111-day coal strike of 1977-78. When coal miners again went 
on strike in March 1981, the press reported that food stamp ad 
ministrators in the coal states were preparing for an onslaught of ap 
plications from the striking miners. Later reports suggest that the ad 
ministrators overestimated the number of strikers who would qualify 
for assistance. 147
Shortly after Congress convened in January 1981, Senator Strom Thur- 
mond introduced legislation to bar food stamps for strikers. Thurmond 
cited the coal strike of 1977-78 as evidence of the need for the legisla 
tion. In offering the bill, Senator Thurmond said that the federal govern 
ment, by providing food stamps to strikers, was "injecting itself into 
the dispute.'' He maintained that providing food stamps in such a situa 
tion merely prolonged a strike and worsened the damage to the 
economy. 148 By June, the Senate had voted to adopt the Thurmond bill 
as part of legislation reauthorizing the food stamp program for four years. 
In the meantime, the House Agricultural Committee approved a com 
parable prohibition as part of a broad farm bill. 149
It was at this point that most of the pending 1981 social legislation 
was incorporated into the OBRA. In its final form, the OBRA contain 
ed the ban on food stamps for strikers that Senator Thurmond and his 
conservative allies had long sought. 15° Actually, the new legislation did 
not ban all strikers from receiving food stamps. One proviso permits 
strikers to continue to receive food stamps (/"the strikers' household 
had been eligible for assistance immediately prior to the commence 
ment of the strike. (Another proviso allows a household that does not 
contain a member on strike to maintain its eligibility for food stamps 
when any of its members refuses to accept employment at a struck plant 
or site.) Thus, even if a strike causes household income to fall to the 
point where the household satisfies the food stamp program's income 
and asset requirements, if the household had not been eligible for stamps 
prior to the beginning of a strike the household does not become eligi-
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ble for stamps during the strike. In any event, it is clear that the 1981 
legislation makes the great majority of strikers ineligible for food stamp 
assistance. 151
How much did this prohibition save the federal treasury? In February 
1981 Senators Helms and Thurmond, joined by Congressmen E. Thomas 
Coleman and William L. Dickinson, asked the General Accounting Of 
fice to gather "available data on participation in the Food Stamp Pro 
gram by households with members involved in labor-management 
disputes.'' 152 In a report submitted in March 1981, the GAO examined 
the food stamp caseload in five separate one-month periods during the 
interval 1976-79. The GAO review revealed the following:
"... The percentage of food stamp households containing a striker 
ranged from 0.29 percent to 2.1 percent of total food stamp 
households.
". . . Of all persons on strike, the percentage of strikers who par 
ticipated in the Food Stamp Program ranged from 3.6 percent to 
36.4 percent.
"... Food Stamp benefits provided to strikers' households may 
have amounted to $37 million in fiscal year 1980. " 153 
The $37 million figure implies that less than .5 of 1 percent of fiscal 
1980 food stamp expenditures took the form of benefits to strikers. 
Moreover, the percentage of food stamp households containing a striker 
reached an abnormally high level of 2.1 percent and the percentage of 
strikers participating in the food stamp program reached an equally ab 
normal level of 36.5 percent only in February 1978, in the middle of 
the 1977-78 coal strike. In each of the four other months examined by 
the GAO, the percent of food stamp households containing a striker 
never exceeded .4 of 1 percent of the total number of households receiv 
ing assistance and the number of strikers receiving food stamps never 
exceeded 11 percent of the number of workers on strike. 154
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that eliminating food 
stamps for strikers would result in savings of $50 million in 1982, $55 
million in 1983, and $60 million in 1984. 155 Note that these estimates 
mesh with the estimate of $37 million produced by the GAO for 1980. 156
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Again, it is important to contrast the GAO and CBO numbers with 
those contained in Thieblot and Co win. Their influential 1972 book 
claimed that in a typical year (which they called "1973") 60 percent 
of all strikers "would be expected to receive food stamps." 157 Recall 
that in 1972 many counties did not even have a food stamp program. 
Contrast their claim with the GAO finding that for the period 1976-79 
between 3.6 and 36.4 percent of all strikers received food stamps. 
Thieblot and Cowin also maintained that providing food stamps to 
strikers would cost $239 million a year in 1973. l58 The Thieblot and 
Cowin estimates were widely cited, especially by those seeking a ban 
on food stamps for strikers, but the estimates produced 10 years later 
by the GAO and the CBO demonstrate that Thieblot and Cowin's 
numbers were again grossly exaggerated. 159
In contrast to unemployment compensation, AFDC-U, and general 
assistance, there was very little litigation over the issue of food stamps 
for strikers prior to the 1981 legislation. Most of the issues that were 
subjected to judicial scrutiny in cases dealing with the payment of benefits 
to strikers under other government transfer programs had little or no 
relevance to the food stamp program. For example, because the pro 
gram operates under a federal statute and uniform federal standards, 
and states lacked the discretion—and apparently never attempted—to 
set their own rules, the doctrine of federal preemption clearly had no 
relevance to the policy. In Congressional debates, as we have seen, both 
proponents and opponents of the policy claimed that the principle of 
government neutrality in labor disputes required the adoption of the posi 
tion they advocated. Whether government neutrality was or was not 
violated by the payment of food stamps to strikers was, however, an 
issue that was never tested in the courts.
On the other hand, one federal district court had occasion to con 
sider, in Jaramillo v. County of Santa Clara, whether a regulation issued 
by the Department of Agriculture was in conflict with the plain language 
of the Food Stamp Act. 16° The Department had issued a regulation that 
prohibited the payments of food stamps to applicants who were par 
ticipating in a strike "which has pursuant to a court decision currently 
in force been determined to be unlawful.'' 161 When employees of Santa
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Clara County, California, planned to go on strike in 1975, the county 
obtained a temporary restraining order which enjoined the strike. Never 
theless, the employees did strike and, subsequently, some of them ap 
plied for food stamps. The county, which had the responsibility of ad 
ministering the food stamp program, denied food stamps to the strikers 
on the grounds that they were participating in an unlawful strike. 162
Plaintiffs in Jaramillo contended that the denial of food stamps to 
strikers because they were participating in an unlawful strike violated 
the Food Stamp Act, which, plaintiffs argued, made food stamps 
available to strikers regardless of whether a strike was lawful or unlawful. 
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. "By adopting regulations which 
in effect rule that food stamps shall be denied to participants in strikes 
judicially determined to be unlawful, the Department of Agriculture 
presumes to make a distinction not made by Congress and is engaging 
in legislation beyond its powers,'' the court said. 163 The court therefore 
held that the Department's regulation was void. 164 Apart from this case, 
however, the courts have had very few opportunities to rule on the pay 
ment of stamps to strikers. 165
In 1986, however, the UAW challenged the constitutionality of the 
1981 amendment banning food stamps for strikers in UAWv. Lyng. 166 
The UAW argued that the 1981 amendment "impairs the constitutional 
rights of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their families and 
unions in violation of the First Amendment" and "impairs these rights 
without rationally furthering a legitimate governmental purpose in viola 
tion of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 167 Judge Ober- 
dorfer of the District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with 
the UAW. He argued that the statute infringes upon individuals' First 
Amendment rights to free speech and free association, since it forces 
strikers experiencing economic hardship either to quit their jobs, cross 
the picket line and return to work, leave their families so that they may 
qualify for food stamps, or put pressure on their union to end the strike. 
Furthermore, the Court found that it violates the equal protection clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, by singling out striking employees for punitive 
treatment, treating them worse than individuals who voluntarily quit 
their jobs, and by directing "the 'onus' of the striker's exercise of his
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associational rights" as much "on the innocent members of the family 
as ... on the striker himself." 168
The district court's view in UAW v. Lyng differs from the second 
circuit court's view in Russo v. Kirby, decided 15 years earlier. In the 
earlier case, Judge Hays said the argument that denying welfare benefits 
and food stamps to strikers infringes their first amendment rights 
' 'borders on the frivolous." 169 He added, ' 'The equal protection claim 
is almost as insubstantial since the basis of classification is clearly not 
unreasonable." 170 In 1987 two federal courts specifically rejected the 
conclusions reached by the UAW court. In Eaton v. Lyng, the constitu 
tionality of the 1981 amendment was challenged by two strikers and 
members of their households. 171 In this case, a federal district court 
in Iowa ruled that the amendment did not interfere with plaintiffs' First 
Amendment rights, since it did not create a "genuine incentive to choose 
any of the alternatives which would require a waiver of a constitutional 
right" outlined by the UAW court. 172 The incentive "is created by the 
strike, and Congress has simply refused to use the food stamp program 
to solve the problem." 173 Rejecting the UAW court's argument that 
a "heightened level of scrutiny" should be applied to the law since it 
affected a group which has historically been discriminated against, the 
Court held that it was rationally related to legitimate government ob 
jectives and did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 174
Similar issues were addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 
Ledesma v. Block. 175 As in the Eaton case, the Court rejected the 
heightened scrutiny test and instead used a rational basis test to deter 
mine whether the statutory classification of strikers violates the equal 
protection clause. The Court held that the amendments "were rationally 
related to goals of government neutrality in labor disputes and concen 
trating benefits on people who are unable to work, and thus do not violate 
equal protection." 176
The courtroom battle over food stamps for strikers was ended in 
March, 1988, when the Supreme Court reversed the district court's UAW 
decision. 177 The Supreme Court ruled that the 1981 amendment does 
not "directly and substantially" interfere with strikers' rights to freely
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associate with their families and their unions. 178 Delivering the opinion 
of the majority, Justice Byron White wrote: "Exercising the right to 
strike inevitably risks economic hardship, but we are not inclined to 
hold that the right of association requires the government to minimize 
that result by qualifying the striker for food stamps." 179 For similar 
reasons, the Court held that the amendment does not infringe upon the 
right to freedom of expression: "it does not 'coerce' belief; and it does 
not require appellees to participate in political activities or support 
political views with which they disagree." 180 Finally, the Supreme Court 
ruled that, since the statute "has no substantial impact on any fundamen 
tal interest and does not 'affect with particularity any protected class,'" 
the proper level of scrutiny under the equal protection clause is the ra 
tional basis test. 181 Relying on the findings in the Hodory case, the Court 
ruled that the 1981 Amendment does not violate the Fifth Amendment 
since it is rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives of neutrality 
in labor disputes and protecting the government's fiscal integrity.
General Assistance
The General Assistance program is the nation's oldest assistance pro 
gram. Its roots stretch back to the nineteenth century. The program pro 
vides cash and in-kind benefits to impoverished people that fall outside 
the federal-state public assistance programs (e.g., Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children and Supplemental Security Income). For exam 
ple, it might provide emergency assistance to an able bodied single male 
who is without money and is unable to find work. It is distinguished 
from both AFDC-U and food stamps by the absence of a federal role. 
General Assistance is a state and local program. In some states, e.g., 
Georgia, it is funded and administered by counties, with county level 
administrators having substantial say over who receives benefits and 
how much they receive.
Since the federal government does not play a role in this program, 
General Assistance benefits are still available to strikers. The 1981 
OBRA legislation, which effectively cut off AFDC-U and Food Stamp 
benefits to strikers, did not touch the General Assistance program.
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Of course, whether a striker is eligible for GA benefits and the level 
of benefits received depends upon where the striker lives. Another im 
plication of the absence of a federal role is incredible diversity in GA 
programs across states. New York State runs a GA program that in 
August, 1974 provided an average monthly benefit of $98.85 to 164,000 
recipients. The corresponding numbers for Alabama's GA program were 
a benefit of $12.50 to 42 recipients. 182 In general, GA programs are 
much less generous and exhibit greater interstate variation than federal- 
state programs like AFDC.
Since GA eligibility rules are written by either states or counties, it 
is not surprising that there have been several instances where strikers 
received GA benefits. Indeed, the earliest U.S. litigation over strikes 
and transfers occurred in 1904 when striking coal miners in Illinois ob 
tained General Assistance benefits. 183 As noted above, the 1940s and 
1950s saw strikers receive GA benefits in several important labor disputes 
including the 1945 UAW strike against General Motors, and the 1946 
and 1959 steel strikes. Furthermore, as indicated by the litigation over 
AFDC-U, we know that many strikes involving receipt of AFDC-U 
also involved receipt of GA. Unfortunately, however, our knowledge 
in this area is largely anecdotal. We cannot answer such basic ques 
tions as, what fraction of strikers receive GA? or what fraction of GA 
benefits go to strikers? Moreover, we cannot answer these questions 
for the current year, for any earlier year, for the nation, or for any state.
Litigation over GA has largely followed the same paths as that over 
AFDC-U. Two themes are central. First, does payment of GA benefits 
to strikers violate federal labor law in that it compromises the principle 
of state neutrality in labor disputes? Second, in the absence of an ex 
plicit legislative prohibition against striker receipt of GA, do other seem 
ingly applicable provisions in the state's statutes imply a prohibition? 
The cases addressing these questions are largely the same as those for 
AFDC-U. 184 Moreover, the answers are basically the same for the two 
programs.
With regard to the first question, the courts have not viewed pay 
ment of GA to strikers as inconsistent with the public policy standard of
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neutrality. As for the second question, a state may choose to prohibit 
strikers from receiving GA. Like AFDC-U, however, the state's legisla 
tion must be explicit on the matter.
The major difference between GA and AFDC-U litigation lies in its 
relevance to the present. Given the 1981 OBRA legislation, past litiga 
tion over AFDC-U is legally irrelevant. That is not true for GA. Since 
strikers can still receive GA, past litigation influences the interpreta 
tion of laws governing that receipt.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, the reader may find it useful 
to refer to exhibits 4.1 and 4.2 for summaries of the legislative history 
and judicial decisions pertaining to the provision of public assistance 
to strikers.
Conclusion
Because welfare is quite distinct from unemployment insurance, the 
issues raised in this chapter are in some ways quite distinct from those 
raised in the previous two chapters. Welfare assistance is targeted on 
families with very low incomes; families with greater need (more 
dependents and lower incomes) generally receive larger welfare benefits. 
Unemployment insurance is paid to eligibles irrespective of family in 
come. Here the level of benefits primarily depends on the individual's 
past earnings record rather than on current needs. Whereas welfare 
assistance is targeted on the poor, unemployment insurance is targeted 
on the middle class. 185
This difference in the nature of the programs creates a subtle dif 
ference in the nature of the controversy surrounding payment of transfers 
to strikers. It is one thing to say that a striker with a private home and 
a working spouse should be denied unemployment insurance. It is quite 
another to say that a striker with no assets and children on the edge 
of starvation should be denied public assistance. The latter raises a ten 
sion between the government's role in labor disputes and its role in 
alleviating poverty—a role that governments have played since the middle 
ages. While that tension may also arise in unemployment insurance,
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Exhibit 4.1
Legislative History of AFDC and Food Stamp Regulations 
Pertaining to Strikers
Date Program Provisions Prevalence
1935 AFDC The Social Security Act established All jurisdictions 
the program to provide assistance to 
children in need because of the death, 
incapacity, or continued absence of a 
parent. In most states, a family was 
disqualified from receiving benefits if 
an able-bodied man was living in the 
house. The Act did not prohibit the 
payment of AFDC to needy strikers; 
the matter was left to the states to 
decide.
1961 AFDC-U Congress amended the program to Approximately 
provide assistance to the needy 25 states 
children of unemployed parents. Pro 
visions in the Act state mat an in 
dividual is ineligible for AFDC-U if 
he is out of work "without good 
cause" or if he has refused a "bona 
fide offer of suitable employment." 
States electing to participate in the 
program had the option of deciding 
whether strikers did or did not fall 
within the definition of an 
unemployed parent. Applicants must 
be unemployed 30 days before becom 
ing eligible.
1964 Food The Food Stamp Act established the All jurisdictions 
Stamps program to provide needy individuals 
with coupons that could be used sole 
ly for the purchase of food. Uniform 
federal rules govern eligibility in all 
states. A work requirement provides 
that an employable recipient loses 
eligibility if he refuses to register for 
employment, voluntarily quits his job 
without good cause or refuses to ac 
cept a suitable offer of employment. 
The issue of striker eligibility was not 
specifically addressed. There is no 
waiting period.
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Date Program Provisions Prevalence
1968 AFDC-U Congress amended the Social Security 
Act, withdrawing some of the States' 
authority to define an unemployed 
parent. Participating states were re 
quired to provide AFDC-U where a 
needy child "has been deprived of 
parental support or care by reason of 
the unemployment (as determined in 
accordance with standards prescribed 
by the Secretary) of his father." The 
definition of unemployment subse 
quently issued by the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare did 
not address the issue of strikers.
1970 Food Congress included language in the 
Stamps Act that explicitly permitted strikers 
to receive food stamps.
1973 AFDC-U The Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare issued a new regulation 
that explicitly gave states the option 
to deny benefits where the parent's 
unemployment resulted from participa 
tion in a labor dispute.
1973 Food Congress required all counties in the 
Stamps country to offer food stamps by July 
1974.
1981 Food Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
Stamps prohibited the provision of AFDC-U 
& and Food Stamp benefits to strikers 
AFDC-U and their families. Those strikers who 
had been eligible for food stamps just 
prior to the commencement of the 
strike may continue to receive them, 
however the allotment cannot be ad 
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Exhibit 4.2
Principal Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the 




72 111. App. 2d 480
(1966)
Lascaris v. Wyman 
305 N.Y.S. 2d 212 
(1969)







Russo v. Kirby 
453 F.2d 548 (1971)
Whether the payment 
of welfare benefits to 
strikers violates the 
principle of state 
neutrality in labor 
disputes.
Whether the payment 
of welfare benefits to 
strikers violates the 
principle of state 
neutrality in labor 
disputes.
Whether paying strikers 
welfare benefits vio 
lates federal law by 
compromising the prin 
ciple of state neutral 
ity in labor disputes. 
Whether granting 
AFDC-U to strikers 
violates provisions of 
the Social Security Act.
Whether the denial of 
welfare benefits to 
strikers infringed 
upon rights guaranteed 
by the First and Fifth 
Amendments.
The Circuit Court of Illinois 
upheld the State's long-standing 
policy of paying welfare benefits to 
strikers who were otherwise qualified. 
The Court held that need arising out 
of an employee's participation in a 
bona fide strike and his refusal to 
return to his employer is not a bar to 
public assistance.
The New York Supreme Court held 
that striking GE employees who 
refused available work from their 
employer were not barred from 
receiving welfare assistance if they 
were otherwise qualified.
The First Circuit Court held that 
payment of welfare benefits to 
teamsters on strike against ITT 
was not preempted by either 
federal or state law.
Provisions of the Social Security 
Act that prohibit the payment of 
benefits to persons who "without 
good cause...refused a bona fide 
offer of employment" do not 
necessarily apply to strikers. 
States should be allowed "to make 
the determination of what is 
covered by 'good cause' and what 
constitutes a 'bona fide' offer of 
employment."
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed 
a lower court decision requiring pay 
ment of welfare benefits to all 
strikers. The court held that federal 
courts did not have jurisdiction.
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Case Issue Findings
Francis v. Davidson 
340 F.Supp. 351 
(1972), summarily 
aff d 409 U.S. 904 
(1972)
Lascaris v. Wyman 
340 N.Y.S. 2d 397 
(1972)
Francis v. Davidson 
379 F.Supp. 78 
(D.Md. 1974)
Jaramitto v. County 
of Santa Clara 
91 LRRM 2755 
(1976)
Whether a Maryland 
rule denying AFDC-U 
benefits to families 
in which the father 
was unemployed as a 
result of partici 
pation in a labor 
dispute was in conflict 
with federal regulations.
Whether striking 
employees were pre 
cluded from receiving 
public assistance under 
a New York statute 
that disqualified 
employable persons 
who have refused to 
accept employment. 
Whether payment of 
welfare benefits to 
strikers violates the 
State's policy of 
neutrality in labor 
disputes.
Whether a Maryland 
rule denying AFDC-U 
benefits to children 
whose fathers are 
unemployed because 
of labor disputes, and 
the 1973 HEW 
regulation that ex 
pressly permits the 
rule, are valid.
Whether a Department 
of Agriculture 
regulation prohibiting 
payment of food stamps 
to applicants who 
were participating in 
an unlawful strike 
violated the Food 
Stamp Act.
The federal District Court held that 
the Maryland rule was invalid. The 
Court found that a man out of work 
because of a labor dispute was "un 
employed," as defined by HEW reg 
ulations, and therefore eligible for 
benefits as prescribed by the Social 
Security Act.
The New York Court of Appeals 
held that strikers were eligible to 
receive general assistance, provided 
they registered with the state em 
ployment office and did not refuse 
suitable employment. Going out 
on strike does not, by itself, 
constitute refusing employment. 
The Court held that payment of 
benefits does not violate the 
State's policy of neutrality.
The District Court held that the 
HEW regulation is incompatible 
with the federal AFDC-U statute, 
and is thus invalid. Accordingly, 
the Maryland regulation is also 
invalid.
The federal District Court held that 
the regulation was void since 
Congress in passing the Food Stamp 
Act had not intended to make a 
distinction between lawful and 
unlawful strikes.
Welfare in Labor Disputes 119
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Batterton v. Francis Whether states partici- 
432 U.S. 426 (1977) paring in the AFDC-U 
program could be given 
the option of denying 
benefits to strikers' 
families.
UAW v. Lyng 
648 F.Supp. 1234 
(1986)
Eaton v. Lyng 
669 F.Supp. 266 
(N.D. Iowa 1987)
Ledesma v. Block 
825 F.2d 1046 
(6th Cir. 1987)
Lyng v. UAW 
108 S.Ct. 1184 
(1988)
Constitutionality of 
the 1981 amendment 
to the Food Stamp Act 
banning the provision 
of benefits to 
strikers and their 
families.
Constitutionality of 
the 1981 amendment 
to the Food Stamp Act 
banning the provision 
of benefits to 
strikers and their 
families.
Constitutionality of 
the 1981 amendment 
to the Food Stamp Act 
banning the provision 
of benefits to 
strikers and their 
families.
Constitutionality of 
the 1981 amendment 
to the Food Stamp Act 
banning the provision 
of benefits to 
strikers and their 
families.
The Supreme Court overturned the 
lower court ruling that states did not 
have the authority to deny AFDC-U 
benefit to strikers. The Court held 
that a regulation issued by HEW in 
1973 explicitly giving states the 
option of disqualifying AFDC-U 
fathers whose unemployment 
resulted from participation in a 
labor dispute was valid.
The District Court held that the 
amendment is unconstitutional, since 
it interferes with individuals' First 
Amendment rights to free speech 
and free association, and violates 
the equal protection clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.
The District Court held that the 
1981 amendment violates neither 
the First nor the Fifth Amendment, 
and is rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective of 
neutrality in labor disputes.
The U.S. Court of Appeals held 
that the striker amendment is 
rationally related to government 
goals of neutrality in labor disputes 
and concentrating benefits on 
individuals who are unable to 
work and therefore does not 
violate the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court reversed the 
the District Court's ruling that the 
striker amendment is unconstitutional. 
The Court held that the statute does 
not interfere with strikers' rights 
to freely associate with their 
families and their unions, nor with 
their right to freely express 
themselves about union matters. 
The Court also held that the 
amendment does not violate the 
equal protection clause, since it is 
rationally related to the legitimate 
government objective of neutrality 
in labor disputes. The decision 
essentially ended the legal battle 
over the constitutionality of the 
OBRA.
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it is attenuated by the fact that alleviation of poverty is not the primary 
purpose of the unemployment insurance program.
Despite this difference, however, the issues raised in this chapter are 
in some ways quite similar to those raised in chapters 2 and 3. In par 
ticular, like unemployment insurance, there is significant diversity in 
welfare assistance to strikers over time and space. With regard to time, 
the introduction of AFDC-U and food stamps in the 1960s increased 
the availability of welfare aid to strikers, while the 1981 OBRA legisla 
tion sharply restricted that availability. With regard to space, some states 
provided AFDC-U to strikers and some did not. This diversity has been 
a major issue in the litigation over strikes and transfers. An anomaly 
in the pattern should, however, be noted. The FERA program of the 
1930s and the food stamp program of the 1970s are instances of a uniform 
national policy under which strikers receive government transfers. Both 
policies were controversial and short-lived.
Another common theme of this and previous chapters is the issue of 
state neutrality in labor disputes. State neutrality lies at the center of 
federal labor law, and any government policy that aids or hinders strikers 
must address it. The courts have generally found that neither a policy 
of providing nor denying transfers to strikers infringes on state neutrality 
to the extent that it must be prohibited. This is true for both welfare 
and unemployment insurance.
A final common theme of the chapters is the question of the effect 
of government transfers on strike behavior. That question has been raised 
by legislators and judges in the most "practical" of settings. It was 
raised in reference to unemployment insurance during the New York 
Telephone strike. It was raised in ITT v. Minter when the court ruled 
that "there is no evidence to show that the payment of AFDC-U and 
General Assistance benefits to eligible strikers in any way prolonged 
the strike." It is a question with implications that extend well beyond 
the "academic." The next several chapters seek to answer that question.
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Government Transfer Programs 
and Strike Theories
Designing an Empirical Test
The task of this chapter is to develop a theory and set of hypotheses 
that explain the effect of government transfer policies on strike activi 
ty. We begin the chapter with a brief review of previous strike research, 
noting the disparate theories and models that researchers have used. 
We then propose a formulation that we believe serves as a useful basis 
for understanding the link between transfer policies and strikes. Using 
this formulation, we are able to generate a set of hypotheses that can 
be tested in econometric models. The chapter concludes with a discus 
sion of the principal dependent, policy, and control variables that we 
used in our statistical tests.
The long history of research on strike activity 1 contains analysis of 
strikes over time2 and across industries, 3 economies, 4 bargaining rela 
tionships, 5 and other units of analysis. 6 But to our knowledge no research 
er has ever used the state as the unit of analysis, partly because bargaining 
relationships are not ordinarily based on state-level units. For purposes 
of analyzing the effects of transfer policies, however, the state is an 
appropriate unit of analysis. This is because transfer policies affecting 
strikers (with the exception of food stamps) vary across states but not 
within states. If transfer policies affect strike behavior, then that should 
be revealed through differences in strike behavior across states. In 
discussing the specification of our model, we consider the problem of 
reconciling the inconsistency between the level of the problem we wanted 
to address and the level at which previous theory and research on strikes 
exists.
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Models of Strike Activity
Distinct analytical models of industrial conflict have been developed 
from two perspectives. The dominant school of thought originates in eco 
nomic models and their explanations of strikes. The alternative perspec 
tive, while acknowledging the importance of economic factors, concen 
trates on the influence of political, social, and organizational conditions.
Hicks introduced the earliest economic model in his discussion of wage 
determination. 7 In this model employers choose between granting higher 
wages or accepting the costs of a strike, and workers choose between 
continuing a strike or taking lower wages. He argues that rational ac 
tors can always avoid a strike if each actor knows the tradeoffs for each 
side. Knowing the tradeoffs allows the actors to reach a settlement, the 
cost of which each side prefers to the cost of a strike. Strikes, accord 
ing to Hicks, occur only when one actor has imperfect information about 
the other side's preferences or when the union wishes to maintain the 
credibility of its strike threat. In the latter case, Hicks acknowledges 
that the union may wish to keep its "weapon" from getting "rusty." 
Under this scenario, most strikes are accidental, based on ignorance, 
and might be viewed as mistakes. The implication is that environmen 
tal conditions should not affect strike activity except to the extent that 
they block the free flow of information.
Mauro begins with Hicks's formulation in his analysis of strikes and 
imperfect information. 8 He argues that misinformation producing strikes 
may arise from the use by each side of different variables to assess its 
own position. The source of misinformation is the assumption by one 
party that its opponent actually uses the same variables it does. Examining 
strike frequency only, he finds that a strike at the expiration of the 
previous contract decreases the probability of a current strike, as do 
recent increases in productivity and high unemployment rates. He con 
cludes that strikes are a means of transmitting information that corrects 
the parties' misperceptions about one another. His data also suggest 
that relative wage changes have a more important influence on strike 
frequency than do absolute wage levels. Work in this tradition by Singh 
et al. 9 and Gartner10 examines the predictors of real wages in an at 
tempt to explain the concession and strike costs that face unions and 
management.
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Although the Mauro analysis moves research in Hicks' tradition toward 
a recognition of the role of environmental forces on strike decisions, 
such research still gives little emphasis to their systematic nature. Yet 
empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that the assumption that 
there is no systematic environmental effect is incorrect.
A second class of economic models is based on the assumption that 
bargaining involves three parties, rather than two. Ashenfelter and 
Johnson changed the direction of much succeeding strike research by 
developing a model based on certain assumptions about "union 
politics." 11 In this model, Ashenfelter and Johnson assume that union 
leaders and rank-and-file members have different interests and goals. 
Union leaders want to stay in office, while the rank and file want high- 
wage settlements. Union leaders and company representatives have 
perfect information about the market and the firm's financial condition, 
but the rank and file do not. Rank-and-file myopia often causes them 
to have unrealistic expectations about wage settlements, given market 
and firm conditions. Strikes occur because union leaders stay in office 
by managing the level of expectations of their members. When union 
members raise the level of their wage demands, leaders permit strikes 
to take place to lower their members' expectations. Thus, it is argued, 
a growing economy, inflation, low unemployment, high profits, and 
other economic factors should increase strikes because worker wage 
expectations are raised.
Research based in the Ashenfelter-Johnson tradition is plentiful. Both 
Flaherty 12 and Kaufman13 support the general findings of the model, 
but suggest that it applies to strikes over contract renegotiation and not 
over intracontractual disputes. They find that changes in the consumer 
price index are associated with increased strike frequency while real 
wage changes are associated with lower frequencies. However, another 
longitudinal study, which also takes a cross-national perspective, finds 
that, over time periods similar to those examined by Flaherty and Kauf 
man, the negative coefficients for unemployment and wage changes are 
only stable in the U.S. 14 Another qualification is offered by Moore and 
Pearce, who find that wage and cost expectations are most likely to 
influence strikes only during periods of rapid inflation. 15 Researchers
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in this tradition often examine profit rates as an indicator of worker 
expectations. Results have been inconsistent, with the weight of evidence 
suggesting that firm or industry profit rates have no effect on strike 
activity. 16 Firm inventories have also failed to show significant rela 
tionships with strikes in these studies. 17
The recent work that uses the Ashenfelter-Johnson frame of reference 
is ordinarily done at the economic-system and interindustry level. Un 
fortunately, such levels of analysis restrict the range of variables available 
to test the theory, and movement to a more appropriate unit of analysis, 
such as firms or bargaining units, always suggests the importance of 
other variables that change the analysis considerably. The theories 
developed both by Hicks and by Ashenfelter and Johnson were originally 
presented at the level of the bargaining relationship, but they have always 
been tested at a substantially more abstract level. A further problem 
is that the Ashenfelter-Johnson model places the entire blame for strikes 
on workers or more precisely on union leaders who manipulate worker 
expectations. Aside from the problem of ignoring the role of manage 
ment in instigating strikes, the model assumes that union leaders have 
control over their members and can actually manipulate their expecta 
tions very well.
Yet a third class of models is based on a bargaining-power theory 
of strikes. Factors that give resources or opportunity to one side or the 
other, it is maintained, alter the frequency, size (number of participants), 
and duration of strikes. Such models have tried to integrate the economic, 
sociological, and organizational analysis of strikes. Empirical research 
in this tradition spans the range of units of analysis from the 
economy wide 18 to interindustry level. 19
Power models also use economic variables in predicting strike ac 
tivity. For example, bargaining-power theory suggests that unemploy 
ment rates should affect strikes. Low unemployment gives an advan 
tage to workers because a tight labor market limits the ability of 
employers to easily replace them and increases the availability of alter 
native job income; high unemployment gives advantage to management 
by making the replacement of strikers relatively easy. These models, 
however, also give prominence to noneconomic factors, particularly
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the size and strength of the unionized sector in an industry. Also, at 
tention is given to the legal structure, which affects the strength of par 
ties in collective bargaining relationships.
Much of the work on strikes by Kaufman is exemplary. 20 Kaufman 
tries to show that in some periods, particularly 1945-77, economic ex 
planations of strike activity are sufficient because of the enormous stabili 
ty of the U.S. economy and of the institutional framework of collective 
bargaining. In earlier periods, when union organization and the legal 
structure of bargaining were less settled, political and organizational 
elements were more influential. A number of researchers would inter 
pret such results as reflecting the joint determination of both strikes 
and the strength of unions as a function of similar economic conditions 
in the post-World War H period. 21 Before World War H, the effect of 
union density and union size on strikes seems to have been more im 
portant than the influence of economic factors. This issue is particular 
ly important in designing research on strikes because underspecified 
models have often led to conflicting interpretations of the importance 
of the degree of unionization. 22
When the bargaining-power model is applied at the firm or industry 
level, the predominance of organizational and bargaining relationship 
factors over purely economic explanations of strikes emerges. Edwards, 
for example, emphasizes the importance of plant size and union densi 
ty in explaining strike activity; 23 Leigh adds workers' risk preference 
as a factor predicting strikes; 24 Siebert et al., add the size of union fund 
balances. 25
The bargaining-power approach to strike analysis has its basis in what 
is currently referred to as the "resource mobilization theory of collec 
tive behavior. " 26 Whether labor unions are social-movement organiza 
tions or institutionalized parts of the economic system does not matter, 
according to this theory. The critical factor in explaining the power of 
labor and management is the ability of each to mobilize people, money, 
political power, sentiment, and other resources in its behalf. Strikes 
and management countermovements against strikes require organiza 
tion and resources. An elaboration of this perspective leads to models 
that include elements of the legal structure presumed to affect bargain 
ing and strikes, firm characteristics that affect the ability of each side
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to mobilize participants, i.e., ease of communication and coordination, 
characteristics of the labor force that inhibit or enhance the chances 
that someone will join in opposition to or support of a strike, and en 
vironmental forces. 27 Less developed forms of this type of analysis ap 
pear in early works on strikes such as the classic argument by Kerr 
and Siegel that isolated living arrangements and physically demanding 
work combine to make some industries strike prone. Under such con 
ditions, workers develop common lifestyles and close communication 
with one another. Close living arrangements and difficult work are 
capable of increasing the salience of an issue and allowing workers to 
more easily coordinate their activities against an employer. 28 These fac 
tors increase the union's mobilization potential. Though the analysis 
of mobilization on the employer side has been absent from research 
using the resource perspective, Griffith et al., have demonstrated the 
importance of employer resistance to labor militancy. 29
Modified Model
Some economists and collective bargaining researchers have proposed 
a number of modifications of the economic and bargaining-power 
models. Of particular concern in these modifications is the inability of 
previous theory to specify the manner in which each side estimates the 
other's intentions or chooses its own criteria for strike decisions. One 
such variation is termed a joint-choice model and posits that strike ac 
tivity is a function of the joint (union and management) cost of strikes 
relative to other mechanisms for reaching a settlement. 30 The most 
elaborated version of this perspective was developed by Reder and 
Neumann. 31
Reder and Neumann argue that bargainers usually become involved 
in continuing relationships. When continuing relationships are establish 
ed, the frequency and duration of strikes is a decreasing function of 
the combined (union plus management) cost of strikes. They propose 
that as combined strike costs rise, bargainers develop protocols that make 
reaching an agreement easier. Protocols specify the procedures for 
negotiations, what topics will be covered, how to know when a settle 
ment is reached, what tactics are expected, and how each side will behave
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in the face of given variable states and constraints. Protocols are "the 
rules or conventions governing the procedure for negotiating collective- 
bargaining agreements." 32
A protocol might specify that in a particular bargaining relationship 
each side will submit a written proposal to the other before face-to- 
face negotiations begin, or that meetings will always be held away from 
the work location. More important, however, are portions of protocols 
that govern the actual basis of settling wage and benefit differences. 
For example, the parties might develop the practice of "imitating'' the 
settlement of another firm in the industry—pattern bargaining. It is well 
known that the wage pattern established by the United Auto Workers 
and the major automobile producers is closely followed by the UAW 
and employers in other UAW jurisdictions (such as auto supplies, 
aerospace, and agricultural implements). Acceptance of the auto pat 
tern in these other industries serves as a protocol that facilitates set 
tlements. Similarly, many municipal fire departments and firelighter 
unions abide by the protocol that their salary settlements should exact 
ly equal the salary settlements reached by the municipalities and their 
police unions. The "wage parity" protocol clearly makes it easier for 
cities to reach agreement with then* firefighters, although the agreements 
may be quite costly.
Reder and Neumann argue that such protocols will cover as many 
contingencies as are effective in making settlement costs lower than they 
would be given a strike. However, exceptional circumstances will arise 
that are not covered by the protocol and will increase conflict. They 
suggest that such a circumstance might be one in which product price 
is falling at the same tune that living costs rise.
Bargainers are thought to choose among alternative protocols, with 
each protocol associated with a different expected cost of strike activi 
ty. The objective of the parties is to minimize the expected costs of 
negotiating contracts. The costs consist of two parts. One part is the 
actual cost of strikes, and the other is the cost of making more and more 
elaborate specification of negotiating procedures. That is, protocols may 
reduce the probability of strikes but there is a cost attached to specify 
ing the protocol. The more contingencies and procedures that are figured
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into the protocol, the more costly is its specification. "In selecting a 
protocol, bargainers balance the cost reduction from reduced strike ac 
tivity against the increased cost of specifying a more detailed pro 
tocol. . . .""
Bargainers who face higher costs per strike will then "choose more 
comprehensive protocols that are associated with a smaller expected 
quantity of strike activity, and larger costs of protocol specification than 
those pairs which are faced with lower unit costs of strike activity." 34 
Thus, factors that increase the combined cost of striking should lead 
to more elaborate procedural protocols and a reduction in strike activi 
ty. Likewise, factors in the bargaining environment that reduce the com 
bined cost will lead to increases in strike activity. In the Reder-Neumann 
model, neither side is necessarily responsible for strike activity. Allowing 
both sides to determine the decision to strike or avoid a strike, we sub 
mit, provides a more realistic model for estimating the effects of fac 
tors such as the payment of unemployment insurance to strikers on strike 
activity.
There is an interesting connection between the ideas of Reder and 
Neumann and the work of Ronald Coase. Coase argued that even in 
the absence of well-defined property rights, voluntary bargaining can 
lead to efficient outcomes. 35 He illustrated his analysis with a discus 
sion of a problem confronting two neighbors: a rancher and a farmer. 
On occasion, the rancher's cattle stray onto the farmer's property and 
destroy some of his crops. According to Coase, even if property rights 
are ill-defined (i.e., even if it is not clear who is liable), the two can 
reach an efficient solution through voluntary bargaining. For example, 
if the straying cattle cost the farmer $25 in lost crops, and if it costs 
either the rancher or the farmer $20 to build a fence, then it would be 
efficient to spend the $20.
Coase argued that voluntary bargaining will tend to yield this effi 
cient outcome irrespective of how the parties share the costs. If the 
rancher is liable for the lost crops then he will build a $20.00 fence 
to avoid $25.00 in damages. If the rancher is not liable, then the farmer 
will build the fence. If the cost of lost crops is shared, then the two 
parties will bargain their way to building a fence. Thus, according to
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Coase the two parties reach an efficient outcome—building a fence- 
irrespective of how the costs are shared. Moreover, one might expect 
that the greater the cost of crop damage, the more resources will be 
devoted to building fences.
It is but a small leap from the Coase Theorem to the ideas of Reder 
and Neumann. Much like straying cattle, strikes use up resources. Pro 
tocols can reduce the frequency and duration of strikes, but, like building 
fences, protocols are costly to implement. The Coase Theorem would 
suggest that irrespective of the division of strike and protocol costs be 
tween union and management, the parties will arrive at an efficient level 
of protocols and strikes. Moreover, the more costly the damage of the 
strike to the two parties combined, the more resources will be devoted 
to establishing protocols that prevent or attenuate strikes. 36
Interpreting Transfer Payment Effects on Strikes
The ideas of Reder and Neumann are particularly attractive from our 
perspective. Not only does their theory encompass both parties in the 
bargaining relationship, it also yields interesting hypotheses on the link 
between transfer payments and strike behavior. We hesitate to embrace 
their theory with too much fervor; it has many worthy competitors and 
it is largely untested. We use it here, not because we think it is the domi 
nant theory, but, rather, because it yields intellectually interesting 
hypotheses that are helpful in organizing our analysis.
Transfer payments such as unemployment insurance, food stamps, 
or AFDC can alter the combined (employer/employee) costs of strikes. 
These payments can obviously reduce the cost of strikes to strikers. 
If there is not an offsetting effect on employer costs, then they unam 
biguously reduce the combined cost of strikes. By the logic of Reder 
and Neumann, that implies increased strike activity. If, however, the 
transfer payments are wholly financed out of taxes on the struck 
employer, then they will not alter the combined costs of strikes. In this 
case, although transfer payments reduce the cost of strikes to strikers, 
they increase the cost of strikes to the employer by an equal amount. 
Since the combined cost of strikes is not altered, by the logic of Reder 
and Neumann, strike activity remains unchanged.
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Once again, note the links to the Coase Theorem. In Cease's exam 
ple the fence was built irrespective of whether the farmer or the ran 
cher bore the cost of the crop damage. "The rule of liability does not 
affect efficiency." 37 In the present case, a rule of law that requires 
employers to finance strike benefits for their employees (e.g., through 
the unemployment insurance payroll tax) should similarly not affect ef 
ficiency; it should not affect the amount of resources devoted to 
establishing protocols that prevent or attenuate strikes. The probability 
of a strike occurring, however, increases to the extent that the cost of 
the strike benefits are not borne by the parties themselves—that is, to, 
the extent that the grant of benefits represents a pure subsidy to the parties 
provided by the government.
The key to understanding the effect of transfer payments on strike 
behavior then lies in understanding how the transfers are financed. 
Welfare benefits are financed out of general revenues. A struck employer 
does not have to bear the cost of welfare benefits received by the strikers. 
In this case, the ideas of Reder and Neumann lead to an unambiguous 
conclusion: when welfare benefits are paid to strikers, strike activity 
(both frequency and duration) should increase. Unemployment insurance 
benefits pose a different problem in that they are financed out of taxes 
on employers. Employers pay "experience rated" taxes; when a worker 
receives $1.00 in unemployment insurance benefits, the employer is 
supposed to pay $1.00 in taxes. Yet experience rating is not perfect. 
In all states there are firms that pay taxes that are not commensurate 
with benefits received by their workers. Moreover, it was once the case 
that unemployment insurance benefits were not subject to the federal 
income tax. Such "tax preferences" are a form of subsidy to the recip 
ient from the rest of society. Although experience rating usually in 
sures that the struck employer will bear some of the cost of unemploy 
ment insurance benefits to strikers, imperfect experience rating and tax 
preferences insure that the employer will generally not pay the full cost. 
Under these conditions Reder and Neumann's model implies that when 
unemployment insurance benefits are paid to strikers, strike activity will 
increase.
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State unemployment insurance law is directly interpretable in these 
terms. Our discussion in chapters 2 and 3 makes it clear that a majority 
of states permit strikers to collect unemployment insurance during a 
strike if their employer continues to operate. These states, termed "work- 
stoppage" states, are identified in table 5.1, and changes in such pro 
visions during the period covered by this study are shown in table 5.2. 
The tables show that 34 states had this provision in 1961 and that 6 
states dropped the provision during the next 13 years. New Jersey drop 
ped, then reinstated the provision during this time. Let us consider the 
effect of this provision on strike activity.
Table 5.1
Existence of Work-Stoppage and Innocent Bystander Provisions 
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws Regarding Strikers, 1961
Yes No
Work- AK, CO, DE, GA, HA, ID, AL, AZ, AR, CA, CT, 
stoppage IL, IN, IW, KN, ME, MD, DC, FL, KT, LA, MN, 
provision MA, MI, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NY, OR, RI, SC,
NH, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH, TN, WI
OK, PA, SD, TX, UT, VT,
VA, WA, WV, WY
Innocent AK, AZ, AR, CO, CT, DC, AL, CA, DE, KT, MN, 
bystander FL, GA, HA, ID, IL, IN, NY, UT, WI 
provision IA, KN, LA, ME, MD, MA,
MI, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV,
NH, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH,
OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD,
TN, TX, VT, VA, WA, WV,
WY
If payments to strikers under this provision are not fully financed out 
of taxes on the struck employer, then the provision reduces the expected 
total cost of strike activity. As such, the model would predict less com 
prehensive protocols and more strike activity. We hypothesize then that
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states with a work-stoppage provision should have higher rates of strike 
activity than states without such a provision. Such increases should oc 
cur for strike frequency and duration, but not for strike size (number 
of workers involved). Unemployment insurance provisions should not 
affect the size of units on strike, but will permit strikers to maintain 
a strike over a longer period. This effect should be ever greater as 
unemployment benefits increase because the cost of striking, given im 
perfect experience rating, is further reduced. Thus, we hypothesize that 
in states with a work-stoppage provision, strike frequency and dura 
tion will increase as the level of unemployment benefits increase, ceteris 
paribus. The importance of such increases lies in their interaction with 
the work-stoppage provision.
Table 5.2 
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Similar logic applies to other unemployment insurance rules that allow 
strikers to collect benefits. Thus, we hypothesize that a lockout rule, 
an interim employment rule, or a rule whereby strikers receive benefits
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after a period of disqualification (as in New York or Rhode Island) will 
increase the frequency and duration of strikes. Once again, there should 
be an interaction with benefit levels.
The "innocent bystander" provision raises a more complex problem. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the innocent bystander provision permits 
workers who are not strikers but who are out of work because of a strike 
to collect unemployment benefits. The effects of such a provision on 
the total cost of strikes is difficult to predict. On the one hand, it could 
be argued that strikers get nothing from this provision and the firm pays 
for it through higher experience rated taxes. The result would be an 
increase in the total cost of strikes and a reduction in strike activity. 
On the other hand, one could argue that firms benefit from this provi 
sion because even in its absence firms would have to compensate inno 
cent bystanders.
To elaborate the last point, note that in the absence of the innocent 
bystander provision, individuals may hesitate to accept jobs in a strike- 
prone firm. Given a choice between two jobs at the same wage, one 
with a strike-prone firm and the other not, a rational individual would 
presumably prefer to avoid the strike-prone firm. In consequence to 
draw a workforce a strike-prone firm would have to compensate potential 
"innocent bystanders" through compensating wage differentials. (The 
situation is the same as that which produces such differentials for in 
dividuals in layoff-prone firms.)38 Alternatively, innocent bystanders 
may be compensated through prestrike inventory buildup or poststrike 
catch-up. In either case, the innocent bystander provision could lead 
to lower employer cost resulting from a strike. Without the provision, 
employers bear the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders. With 
the provision, employers bear only part of this cost. The remainder is 
financed by the rest of society through imperfect experience rating and 
less-than-comprehensive taxation. The logic leads to the hypothesis that 
states that have an innocent bystander provision will haved higher strike 
frequencies and strikes of longer duration, ceteris paribus. As before, 
there should be an interaction with benefit levels.
Welfare benefits in the form of food stamps, general assistance, or 
AFDC-U (Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed
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Parent) are similarly interpretable in terms of the Reder-Neumann model. 
Both of these programs reduce the cost of striking for those strikers 
who are sufficiently poor to be eligible. Since they are not financed 
out of taxes on a struck employer, they should decrease the total cost 
of strikes. Our last hypothesis, therefore, states that an increase in the 
amount of welfare benefits available to strikers in a given state will lead 
to increased strike frequency and duration, ceteris paribus. Note, 
however, a key caveat to this hypothesis: welfare will only have this 
effect if strikers are sufficiently poor to be eligible for the benefits. One 
would be surprised, for example, if strikes by skilled craftsmen, e.g., 
printers, were affected by welfare programs. Since organized workers 
are usually skilled workers, organized workers are often not sufficiently 
poor to be eligible for welfare payments.
It is important to note that our hypotheses focus on the probability 
of reaching agreements, and not on the terms of the agreements. For 
example, the prospective grant of unemployment benefits to employees, 
which are entirely financed by the parties themselves, may not affect 
the probability of a strike occurring, but may affect the parties' wage 
agreement. Wage agreements may be higher, lower, or unchanged com 
pared to what they would have been in the absence of strike benefits. 
Once again, note the link to the Coase Theorem. The Coase Theorem 
deals only with the efficiency of agreements, and not with the distribu 
tion of rewards available to the parties through bargaining. Similarly, 
our hypotheses deal only with the level of strike activity, and not with 
the rewards that arise out of bargaining.
Empirical Implementation
Our approach to testing these hypotheses is a standard one. We specify 
a model of the form:
n m
(1) y = ao + E bj X, + £ Cj Tj + u 
i=l J = 1 J
We estimate the effect of transfer policies on strike activity by using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, supplementing traditional 
models of strike activity with measures of transfer program
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characteristics. In this model y represents a measure of strike activity, 
the Xj's are a set of n control variables, the Tj's are a set of m transfer 
policy variables, and u is the error term; also a$ is the constant term, 
the bj's are the coefficients of the control variables, and the Cj's, of 
course, provide an estimate of the effect of the transfer policies on strike 
activity.
As noted above, we used the state as the unit of analysis. In particular, 
we obtained data on the y, X , and T variables for 50 states and the 
District of Columbia over the period 1960-1974. We restrict our analysis 
to this period for several reasons. First, prior to 1960 (and the 1960 
census), it is difficult to obtain measures of some of our control variables. 
Second, the government stopped collecting comprehensive strike data 
in 1981, making it impossible to extend our analysis to the present. Third, 
during the period 1960-1974 one observes across-state variation in all 
of the programs we analyze. In particular, prior to 1974 there was 
substantial interstate variation in the food stamp program, and after 
wards the program was the same in all states.
It is eminently reasonable to use state-level data for purposes of ex 
amining links between transfer policy and strike activity. This is because 
unemployment insurance and AFDC policies vary across but not within 
states. If transfer policies affect strike activity, then, holding other fac 
tors constant, one should observe predictable patterns of strike activity 
across states and over time. Yet, while it makes sense to use state-level 
data, as discussed below, these data are not without complications.
Dependent Variables
Comprehensive time series data on work stoppages are available in 
the Work Stoppage Historical File, which we obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Labor. This data base provides information on all work 
stoppages in the U.S., between 1953 and 1974, involving six workers 
or more for one day or more. Table 5.3 lists the variables available 
for each strike observation.
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Table 5.3
Work-Stoppage Historical Files, 1953-1974 
Variables Available for Each Strike Observation
Duration of strike Contract status 
Workers involved Beginning date 
State Ending date 
SIC code Major issue 
Total work days lost
A variety of measures of three basic dimensions of strike activity— 
frequency (number of work stoppages), size (number of workers in 
volved), and duration (average length of strikes)—were derived for each 
state from the basic data. For example, with these data we were able 
to compute the measures of strike frequency in table 5.4 for each state 
and year.
Table 5.4 
Measures of Strike Frequency
No. of strikes over the negotiation of new contracts
No. of strikes during negotiation of a new contract over economic issues
No. of strikes during negotiations that are single state-single industry strikes
No. of strikes over the negotiation of economic issues
No. of strikes in manufacturing
No. of strikes in nonmanufacturing
No. of strikes in construction
No. of strikes which are single state-single issue strikes
No. of strikes with duration under 30 days
No. of strikes with duration over 30 days
No. of strikes with duration under 56 days
No. of strikes with duration over 56 days
No. of strikes with duration over 80 days
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In using states as the unit of analysis, it is necessary to standardize 
for population size. One would, for example, expect to observe a greater 
number of strikes in New York than in Nevada simply because of popula 
tion differences. Even if other determinants of strike activity were the 
same in the two states, New York would have the greater number of 
strikes. Ideally, the table 5.4 frequency measures would be standardiz 
ed for the number of bargaining units with the given characteristic. For 
example, an ideal dependent variable would be the number of strikes 
over the negotiation of new contracts divided by the number of bargaining 
units that were negotiating new contracts. Unfortunately, there do not 
exist state-level data on numbers of bargaining units. As such, we had 
to develop alternative ways to standardize measures of strike frequen 
cy. In particular, we used number of labor force participants, number 
of union members, and number of establishments in the state.
The result is a plethora of measures of the dependent variable. Table 
5.4 contains 13 measures of strike frequency, and each measure can 
be standardized with three variables: labor force participants, union 
members, and establishments. That means 39 measures of strike fre 
quency! And which of these is the "correct" measure for our purposes? 
Our theory does not really speak to that issue.
In order to deal with the plethora of measures, we used 1970 data 
as a laboratory. We regressed different measures of the dependent 
variable on the same vectors of X and T variables. We did this to assess 
whether results were sensitive to choice of dependent variable. As detail 
ed in chapter 6, in general the results were not sensitive to this change 
in specification. This is because the different measures of the depen 
dent variable are highly correlated. Of course, that simplifies the analysis; 
in that case the analysis can simply focus on a small subset of the many 
measures.
Our approach to measuring the average duration and average size 
of strikes was similar to our treatment of strike frequency. The average 
duration of strikes within a state in a given year is computed by adding 
up the duration of strikes for the state and year and dividing by the cor 
responding number of strikes. The average size of strikes is similarly
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computed by adding up the number of workers involved in strikes for 
the state and year and dividing by the corresponding number of strikes.
Once again the Work Stoppage Historical File yields a long list of 
possible measures. The average duration and average size of strikes 
can be computed for all strikes, for strikes concerned with the negotia 
tion of new contracts, for strikes concerned with economic issues, and 
so forth. Indeed, one could construct tables for duration and size that 
are every bit as lengthy as table 5.4. 39 Once again, to deal with this 
plethora of measures, we used 1970 data as a laboratory for assessing 
whether results are sensitive to choice of dependent variable. As discuss 
ed in chapter 6, in general results were not sensitive to this change in 
specification.
Several alternative measures were created using combinations of the 
frequency, breadth and duration measures because combined measures 
such as "work days idle" appear in the literature. However, these com 
posite measures were dropped from the analysis because they are prod 
ucts of other dependent variables, and because our theoretical framework 
yields no direct predictions on how transfer programs will affect such 
variables. The fundamental variables have straight forward 
interpretations.
Table 5.5 presents descriptive data on a subset of our dependent 
variables. The data include state-level observations across all years from 
1960 through 1974. (Since there are 51 jurisdictions and 15 years in 
our data base, the sample size is 765.) The data in table 5.5, therefore, 
provide a profile of the nature of strike activity in the United States 
during the period 1960-74.
A few aspects of this profile are worth noting. For example, about 
51 percent of all strikes were strikes over economic issues. (This pro 
portion can be derived by dividing FREQLAB2 by FREQLAF.) FRE- 
QUM implies that there was one strike for every 3,000 union members 
during this period. FREQEST shows that there was only one strike for 
every 1000 establishments. This number would be substantially higher, 
of course, if we had data on the number of unionized establishments.
The average duration (AVDUR) of all strikes during this period was 
26 days. Strikes over economic issues were slightly longer 
(AVDUR2=30 days). The 30-day cutoff is significant because needy
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strikers in two-parent families only became eligible for AFDC-U benefits 
after a 30-day waiting period. Only about one-quarter of all strikes that 
occurred during the 1960-74 period exceeded the 30 day limit. Of course, 
we know from other evidence that only a small proportion of the workers 
involved in such strikes would have qualified for benefits.
About 14 percent of all strikes lasted longer than 56 days. The 56-day 
cutoff is significant because of the New York law, which qualifies strikers 
to collect benefits after eight weeks. As we noted in chapter 3, the New 
York State Department of Labor estimated that about 13 percent of all 
strikers in the state were involved in strikes lasting longer than eight 
weeks during the period 1947-78.
The average strike during the 1960-74 period involved 356 workers 
(WORKSTRK). This statistic reflects the fact that unions are concen 
trated in larger plants and establishments. WORKLAB implies that there 
was a little more than a 2 percent probability that a member of the labor 
force would be involved in a strike in a given year. But WORKUM 
suggests the probability that a union member would go on strike in any 
given year in this period was close to 12 percent.
The standard deviations listed in table 5.5 show that there was con 
siderable variation in these strike measures across years and across states. 
It is, of course, this variation that we seek to analyze in our regression 
analysis.
Measures of Transfer Program Characteristics
The initial problem of data collection was the identification of the 
important dimensions of the three public policy areas. Food stamps, 
AFDC-U, general assistance, and unemployment compensation are com 
plex programs that use multiple criteria for eligibility and have a varie 
ty of benefit levels. Translating complex programs into variables suitable 
for testing was no easy task.
For the unemployment insurance program, our initial approach was 
to use a series of dummy variables to indicate whether a state allowed 
workers involved in a labor dispute to collect unemployment benefits 
under one of the several provisions previously discussed. For exam 
ple, the unique approach taken by New York and Rhode Island made it
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Table 5.5
Means and Standard Deviations of Strike Measures
Over All States and All Years, 1960-74
(n=765)
Strike measure
Number of strikes/labor force 
(X1000)
Number of strikes over 
economic issues/labor force 
(X1000)
Number of strikes/union 
members (X1000)



















Number of strikes/ 
establishments
Average duration in days
Average duration of 
strikes over economic 
issues in days
Number of workers 
involved in strikes/strikes
Number of workers 
involved in strikes over 
economic issues/strikes
Number of workers 
involved in strikes/ 
labor force (X1000)
Number of workers 
involved in strikes over 
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Table 5.5 (continued)
Strike measure Symbol Mean
Standard 
deviation
Number of workers 
involved in strikes/union 
members (X1000)
Number of workers 
involved in strikes over 
economic issues/union 
members (X1000)
Percentage of strikes 
lasting longer than 30 days
Percentage of strikes 
lasting longer than 56 days
Percentage of strikes 














obvious that a dummy variable representing those two states should be 
included in the analysis. Our legal and institutional research on the opera 
tion of the unemployment insurance system made it apparent that we 
also needed to specify variables for four other "UI Rules:" stoppage- 
of-work, innocent bystander, interim employment, and lockout. We 
therefore constructed dummy variables for each of these rules; in each 
case, the dummy variable indicates whether the state used the rule in 
a particular year.
Our theory and hypotheses suggested that the effect of these rules 
on strike activity would depend on (1) the "generosity" of the state's 
unemployment insurance system, and (2) the tax and experience rating 
practices used by a state to finance benefits. We measured the generosity 
of the state's system by using various measures of a state's benefit levels 
(e.g., the maximum benefit in the state, benefits as a percentage of week 
ly covered earnings, the average weekly benefit in the state), and also 
by the maximum weeks of benefit eligibility for claimants in a state.
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The exceptional complexity of state practices regarding the financ 
ing of unemployment benefits made it particularly difficult to capture 
this dimension of the unemployment insurance system in a parsimonious 
manner. We included five variables in our data base that we hoped would 
adequately describe a state's financing arrangements: the taxable wage 
base for employers in the state, the minimum tax rate in the state, the 
ratio of the taxable wage base to average yearly earnings in the state, 
and an experience rating index for the state (developed in work by 
Becker). 40 We also included a variable denoting the percent of workers 
in a state covered by the state's unemployment insurance law. Table 
5.6 lists the principal policy variables that we included in our analysis.
For welfare programs, we collected data, first, on whether a state 
had the AFDC-U program in a particular year and, second, on whether 
the state allowed strikers to collect AFDC-U benefits. These were coded 
as dummy variables. We also collected data on the maximum weekly 
benefit that a state paid to a family of four under its AFDC-U program, 
and we interacted the maximum benefit with the AFDC-U dummies.
Specifying variables for the food stamp program presented another 
set of difficulties. Since food stamps are provided under federal law, 
program characteristics (eligibility, benefit levels, etc.) are uniform 
across all states. Obviously, the invariance of these program 
characteristics made it impossible to test the effect of food stamps on 
strike activity in a given year. Prior to 1974 there was substantial varia 
tion in the availability of food stamps within states. Some counties had 
food stamp programs and some did not. Thus, we constructed a measure 
of the percent of the poverty population in the state residing in counties 
that operated a food stamp program, for each state and every year in 
our data base. Although this variable is an imperfect proxy, it was the 
only recourse open to us.
Finally, we constructed a dummy variable indicating whether strikers 
were eligible for general assistance in a particular state in a given year. 
Eligibility criteria and benefit levels under general assistance programs 
vary greatly from state to state, and even from county to county within 
a state, and comprehensive data on the characteristics of these programs 
are not available. We were able to collect enough information on state
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practices to use the variable in our analysis, but we acknowledge that 
the variable is subject to considerable measurement error.
Our interviews with individuals in the Unemployment Insurance Ser 
vice and other agencies helped us to identify the precise policy variables 
we needed to include in our analysis. Our surveys of state employment 
security agencies also helped. In these surveys, for example, we were 
alerted to the importance of the stoppage-of-work provision. We were 
also told by several of these respondents that unemployment insurance 
provisions that require payment of benefits to strikers when their 
employer has violated either the collective bargaining agreement or one 
of the labor laws were trivial and we should ignore them. Our reading 
of the case law confirmed this belief, and we followed this advice.
There is an interesting statistical problem associated with these 
variables. The specification in equation (1) implies that the vector of 
policy variables (T) is exogenous to strike activity. That means that the 
policies affect strike activity, but strike activity does not affect the ex 
istence of the policies. Is this a defensible position? On the one hand, 
it can be argued that the policies we are dealing with were put in place, 
in the vast majority of states, in the 1930s and 1940s and were not chang 
ed thereafter. It is unlikely that such longstanding policies are somehow 
endogenous. On the other hand, table 5.2 shows that eight states changed 
their policies regarding the work-stoppage and innocent bystander rules 
during the 1961-74 period, and we have anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that, in at least a few of these cases, the policies were changed because 
of increased use by strikers. In that sense, the change in the policy was 
a function of the state's (recent) strike activity. Moreover, there is no 
question that Congress' decision to change the AFDC-U and food stamp 
policies in 1981 was motivated, at least in part, by the perception that 
the availability of these benefits had increased strike activity. Thus, en- 
dogeneity is conceivable.
Note, however, the form of that endogeneity. Increased strike ac 
tivity is associated with a decreased propensity for states to provide 
transfers to strikers. That is a negative relationship. Our principal 
hypothesis concerns a positive relationship, i.e., increased government 
transfers to strikers are associated with increased strike activity. That
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Table 5.6
Variables Measuring Characteristics of Transfer Programs 
(Data Sources Appear in Appendix B)
Unemployment Insurance Program Variables:
UI RULE 1 = 1 if strikers receive benefits when employer continues 
to operate; else = 0
UI RULE 2 = 1 if New York and Rhode Island; else = 0
UI RULE 3 =1 if "innocent by slanders" receive benefits; else = 0
UI RULE 4 = 1 if strikers laid off from "interim employment" job 
receive benefits; else = 0
UI RULE 5 =1 if workers receive benefits during a lockout; else = 0 
UIMAX = maximum weekly UI benefit in state
UIMETH1 = benefits as a percent of weekly covered earnings for 
benefits below the maximum in state
AVEBEN1 = UIMETH1 *AHEMAN (see table 5.7 for AHEMAN)
UITAX = taxable wage base for employers in state
TAXEMAN = UITAX / (AHEMAN * 2000)
UIMAXRAT = maximum UI tax rate in state
UIMINRAT = minimum UI tax rate in state
UIPIST = Experience Rating Index from Becker (see footnote 41)
COVPC = percent of workers in state covered by state UI laws








percent of state's poverty population residing in coun 
ties that participate in food stamp program
1 if state allows strikers to receive AFDC-U payments; 
else = 0
1 if state has an AFDC-U program; else = 0
AFDC maximum weekly payment for a family of four 
in state
AFDCMAX * AFDCAID
1 if state provides general assistance to strikers; 
else = 0
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means that the form of endogeneity described above will impart a 
negative bias to a coefficient on a transfer policy variable. Alternative 
ly stated, if transfer policy exhibits this kind of endogeneity, then we 
are less likely to find a positive relationship between transfer policy 
and strike activity. We will return to this issue in chapter 6.
The Control Variables
Finally, to test our hypotheses we needed a vector of control variables, 
X. All of our hypotheses posit a relationship between transfers and strikes 
holding other factors constant. That raises the vexing problem of what 
should be held constant. The standard social science approach to this 
problem is to let the theory dictate the vector of control variables. Yet, 
available theories of strike activity, including that of Reder and 
Neumann, focus on the bargaining unit. For good reason, the present 
work takes the state as the unit of analysis. Clearly, variables that are 
appropriate controls for an analysis of bargaining unit strike activity 
may not be appropriate (or, if appropriate, may not be available) for 
an analysis of state-level strike activity.
As an illustration of this point, consider the empirical specification 
employed by Reder and Neumann. 41 They argue that two key deter 
minants of strike activity are the within-year coefficient of variation 
of finished good inventories and the within-year coefficient of varia 
tion of shipments. Other things equal, a larger coefficient of variation 
of inventories reveals firms that can buffer output streams from shocks 
to the flow of inputs, and ' 'the greater the extent to which a firm engages 
in such buffering, the lower is the incremental cost of a unit of strike 
activity."42 Thus a larger coefficient of variation of finished good in 
ventories should be negatively associated with strike activity. A parallel 
argument yields the prediction that a larger coefficient of variation in 
shipments should be positively associated with strike activity. Since our 
research assesses hypotheses linked to the Reder and Neumann theory, 
one could argue that these coefficients of variation should be included 
as control variables in our specification. But that does not make sense 
when the state is the unit of observation. Even if data were available 
on within-year variation in finished good inventories by state (and they
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are not), the variable would be of doubtful value. If a state has large 
inventory variation, that does not necessarily imply that unionized firms 
within the state have large inventory variation. And for purposes of 
understanding strike activity, it is the unionized firms that are important.
Moreover, there is a philosophical problem here. As indicated above, 
we do not view the Reder and Neumann theory as the dominant theory 
of strike activity. We rely upon it because it yields intellectually in 
teresting hypotheses that are helpful in organizing our analysis. Given 
that, we hesitate to formulate a vector of control variables from their 
theory alone. Previous research, which was motivated by other theories, 
yields important insights into potential control variables.
Of course, previous research does not solve our problem. For exam 
ple, previous research suggests that the unemployment rate influences 
the propensity to strike. But is it true that state-level unemployment 
rates influence state-level strike activity? When strike activity is ag 
gregated to the state level, it encompasses many different types of 
bargaining relationships. Some of them are plant-level relationships, 
others are multiplant, multistate, industrywide, or national relationships. 
Conceptually, one might expect the state unemployment rate to be the 
relevant measure for some of the relationships, particularly those at the 
plant or establishment level. But it is hardly likely that the state 
unemployment rate is the relevant measure for industrywide or national 
relationships. This illustrates our quandary: when the state is the unit 
of analysis, it is difficult to formulate a vector of conceptually "cor 
rect" control variables.
We resolved our quandary by collecting data on a long list of control 
variables. Table 5.7 presents the list.
Previous strikes research had shown that these variables influence 
strike activity. Since we did not have a clear basis for claiming that 
one control variable was preferable to another, we sought to examine 
whether results on the transfer policy variables (T) were robust to dif 
ferent vectors of control variables. After all, our goal was to obtain 
meaningful estimates of the influence of transfer policies on strikes— 
we were not concerned about the robustness or reliability of the results 
for the control variables. Thus, we constructed a series of tests in which
Government Transfer Programs 159
combinations of the table 5.7 variables were substituted for one another. 
Robust findings occur when the relationships between transfer policy 
measures and strike measures are maintained regardless of the control 
variables employed. It should, perhaps, be noted that our approach is 
not a new one. It is in part derived from the ideas of Learner. 43
Data were coded by a group of students who were trained and super 
vised by the authors. We collected data for all states and the District 
of Columbia for all dependent and policy variables from 1960 through 
1974. We begin with 1960 because, with minor exceptions, our data 
for these variables are complete. We end with 1974 because that is the 
last year of the Work Stoppage Historical File. Data for our control 
variables, however, are complete only for the two census years, 1960 
and 1970. There are complete data for most of the other control variables 
(including several of particular interest, such as the unemployment rate 
in the state, the number of union members in the state, average hourly 
earnings in the state for production workers, etc.), but there are miss 
ing values for certain others (particularly those denoting the composi 
tion of the labor force in the state). Where there were missing data for 
certain key variables, we estimated the values by means of interpola 
tion, using the closest years for which we did have data.
Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of models other researchers have 
used to analyze strike activity. On the basis of this discussion, it is clear 
that there is no general consensus in the literature on the "right*' theory 
of strikes. Rather, there are competing, and often contradictory, theories. 
Fortunately, we did not require a general theory of strike activity in 
this study. What we required was a theory that would specifically link 
transfer policies with strike activity. That theory was found in the work 
of Reder and Neumann, who used a joint-cost model of strike activity. 
The fundamental proposition in this theory is that strike activity is a 
decreasing function of the combined (union plus management) cost of 
strikes. As the potential cost of a strike increases, according to Reder 
and Neumann, the parties have a greater incentive to develop protocols 
that allow them to reach peaceful settlements. On the basis of the
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Table 5.7
Control Variables Employed in the Analysis 
(Data Sources Appear in Appendix B)
UNMEMLAB = No. of union members / LFTOT3 
MINELAB = No. of workers in mining / LFTOT 
CONSTLAB = No. of workers in construction / LFTOT 
MANULAB = No. of workers in manufacturing / LFTOT 
TRANLAB = No. of workers in transportation / LFTOT 
TRADELAB = No. of workers in trade / LFTOT 
FINLAB = No. of workers in finance / LFTOT 
SERVLAB = No. of workers in services / LFTOT 
PCTURB = LFTOT in urban areas / LFTOT 
PCTPHMALE = males between age 25 and 55 / LFTOT 
PCTFEM = No. females in labor force / LFTOT 
AFLMEMLAB = No. AFL-CIO members / LFTOT 
PCTMIG = net civilian migration 1960-1970 / civilian resident
population 1970
SOUTH = 1 if state is in South Census Division; else = 0 
RTTOWORK = 1 if state has right to work law; else = 0 
VALADPC = value added by manufacturing / total no. of employees
in manufacturing 
ESIZE100 = No. establishments with 100+ employees / no.
establishments 
ESIZE 20 = No. establishments with 20+ employees / no.
establishments
AVESIZE = No. employees in state / no. establishments 
AHEMAN = average hourly earnings of production workers on
manufacturing payrolls in state
WCH6970 = percent change in AHEMAN between 1969 and 1970 
WCH6870 = percent change in AHEMAN between 1968 and 1970 
MEDINC = median income of families in state in 1969 
POVRTY = percent of families with money income below poverty
line in state
URAT = unemployment rate in state 
INDUST = State Industrialization Index 
AFFLUENC = Affluence Index
a. LFTOT = number of people in state's labor force.
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Reder-Neumann model, we argue that transfer payments will increase 
strike activity only if they reduce the total cost of a strike to the parties. 
Since the cost of transfer payments are not fully borne by the parties 
to the dispute, we argue that transfer policies generally reduce the joint 
cost of strikes to the parties and therefore increase strike activity. On 
the basis of this premise, we then developed a set of specific hypotheses 
linking transfer policies to strike activity.
The policy variables of principal interest in this study are well defin 
ed for the unemployment insurance and AFDC-U programs. We 
acknowledge, however, that the policy variables are less well-defined 
for the food stamp and general assistance programs and may suffer from 
measurement error. We therefore have more confidence in our results 
for the two former programs than we do for the two latter programs.
The next chapter discusses the results of our econometric tests.
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Effect of Government Transfer Programs 
on Strike Activity
As detailed in the previous chapter, we approached the empirical work 
with a small set of hypotheses linking government transfer programs 
to strike behavior. Because the proper specification of a model estimated 
with state-level data was in doubt, we used 1970 data as a "laboratory" 
for developing a model. Thus, our strategy was first to estimate the 
model with 1970 data and then to examine whether the 1970 results 
were robust to alternative model specifications and alternative years of 
data. We used 1970 for this purpose because the 1970 Census provides 
a wealth of state-level data for control variables.
The organization of this chapter reflects that strategy. The chapter 
begins with our findings on the relationship between unemployment in 
surance and strike behavior. That work can be broken into three phases. 
In the first we sought to test whether state labor dispute disqualifica 
tion policies were related to strike behavior. The second phase examined 
whether disqualification policies affected strike behavior through an in 
teraction with other unemployment insurance program characteristics. 
Finally, we sought to test whether the 1970 results could be replicated 
in other years. Most of this chapter focuses on these three phases of 
our unemployment insurance research. It ends with a brief discussion 
of our findings on the effects of AFDC, food stamps, and general 
assistance on strike activity.
Labor Dispute Disqualification Policies and Strike Behavior
As indicated previously, we had reason to expect several types of 
state labor dispute disqualification policies to affect strike behavior. With 
51 observations in 1970, we could not include all of the table 5.6 UI
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variables in one model. To resolve this, we focused on the three UI 
rules that unemployment insurance administrators had viewed as poten 
tially important. These were the "stoppage-of-work" rule (UI Rule 1), 
the "New York-Rhode Island" rule (UI Rule 2), and the "innocent 
bystander" rule (UI Rule 3). 1 We hypothesized that these rules would 
tend to increase activity along several dimensions. As argued in chapter 
5, such rules tend to decrease the total cost of strikes, thereby leading 
to less comprehensive protocols and increased strike activity. The first 
phase of the unemployment insurance research sought to test these 
hypotheses with 1970 data. Although some of the regression coefficients 
for these rules proved to be statistically significant, in general the data 
did not support the hypotheses.
Table 1 illustrates the point. The dependent variables in the three 
regressions are the natural logarithm of strike frequency (number of 
strikes per labor force participant), average duration of strikes, and 
average size of strikes (number of workers involved per strike). 2 One 
can, of course, claim that these are imperfect measures of the theoretical 
ly appropriate dependent variables (e.g., one can argue that the analysis 
should focus only on strikes dealing with economic issues rather than 
on all strikes). As indicated in chapter 5, to address this argument we 
ran the same regressions for several alternative measures of strike fre 
quency, duration, and size. In addition, we estimated the model for 
specific industries, e.g., construction and manufacturing. Our results 
were remarkably insensitive to redefinitions of the dependent variable.
The key results in table 6.1 concern UI Rules 1, 2, and 3. Our 
hypotheses led us to expect statistically significant positive coefficients. 
The results for strike frequency in the first column, for example, show 
that UI Rules 1 and 2 have positive coefficients, but neither coefficient 
is statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels. 
The other two models are thoroughly inconsistent with our hypotheses. 
To our surprise, for example, UI Rules 1 and 2 have significantly 
negative effects on strike duration. That is, New York and Rhode Island 
as well as states with the work-stoppage rule appear to have experienc 
ed significantly shorter strikes than other states in 1970. Later we will 
examine whether the negative effects of these rules on strike duration 
are found in other years and when other specifications are tested.
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Table 6.1
Regressions on the Frequency, Duration, and Size of Strikes 
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1




% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force














































































Frequency = In [# strikes in a state in 1970/labor force size in state in 1970] 
Duration = In [average duration of strikes in the state in 1970] 
Size = In [# workers involved in strikes in the state in 1970/# strikes in the state in 1970]
—UI Rule 1 = 1 if strikers collect benefits when employers continue to operate during the strike.
—UI Rule 2 — 1 in New York and Rhode Island, otherwise zero.
—UI Rule 3 = 1 if "innocent bystanders" are permitted to collect benefits.
Of course, such results in part depend upon the other independent 
variables in the model. The table 6.1 models include six control variables. 
They are intended as proxies for the complex web of social and economic 
forces that shape strike activity within a geographic unit. As noted in
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chapter 5, a review of past theoretical and empirical work on strike 
behavior yields a wealth of additional possible control variables. We 
therefore estimated the table 6.1 models with several different com 
binations of control variables; all of the control variables we tested are 
listed in table 5.7. None of the alternative specifications yielded mean 
ingful results for the various labor dispute disqualification policies.
It is tempting to seek "explanations" for the coefficients on the con 
trol variables in table 6.1. Such temptation should, however, be resisted. 
Consider, for example, the results on the variable, "Percent 
Establishments with 100+ Employees." None of the table 6.1 coeffi 
cients on this variable are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Does one then conclude that establishment size has little effect on strike 
activity? Probably not. An assessment of the relationship between 
establishment size and strike activity should ideally use plant or bargain 
ing unit data. 3 State-level data are inappropriate for this purpose. The 
state is, however, an appropriate unit of observation in an analysis of 
the relationship between strike activity and the characteristics of state 
unemployment insurance programs. Moreover, in such an analysis it 
is appropriate to control for the complex web of forces outside the 
unemployment insurance program that influence strike activity in a state. 
The establishment size variable simply plays this role, as do the other 
control variables in table 6.1.
In summary, the first phase of our research indicated no statistically 
significant relationship between labor dispute qualification policies and 
strike frequency and size; the results for strike duration were contrary 
to our expectations. It appeared that either our hypotheses were incor 
rect or that "noise" in the data made it impossible to discern the ef 
fects of the disqualification policies. We could not, however, draw a 
firm conclusion without examining whether the disqualification policies 
interact with other program characteristics to influence strike behavior. 
The second phase of the research focused on this interaction.
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The Interaction of Labor Dispute Disqualification Policies 
and Program Generosity
As argued in chapter 5, the strike effects of UI Rules 1,2, and 3 
may in part depend upon program generosity. Given imperfect ex 
perience rating and the tax treatment of unemployment benefits, a more 
generous program in states with these UI rules should lead to lower 
total strike costs, less comprehensive protocols, and increased strike 
activity. We therefore tested several models that interact measures of 
program generosity with two of the disqualification rules, UI Rule 1 
and UI Rule 3. (UI Rule 2 was not included in this work because only 
two states—New York and Rhode Island used the rule, and the estimated 
coefficient would in consequence be meaningless.)4 Here we found an 
interesting relationship between strike frequency and interactions in 
volving a state's maximum unemployment benefit. Table 6.2 presents 
the evidence.
For purposes of comparison, the first regression in table 6.2 is the 
strike frequency regression from table 6.1. The second regression in 
dicates the effect of interacting the maximum unemployment benefit 
with UI Rule 1. Since the coefficient on this interaction is positive and 
statistically significant, the results indicate that a higher maximum benefit 
in states with UI Rule 1 is associated with higher strike frequency. 
Although similar results obtain when UI Rule 3 is interacted with the 
maximum benefit, if both the UI Rule 1 interaction and UI Rule 3 in 
teraction are included in the same regression, neither is statistically 
significant. (See column 3.) Of course the reason for this is that the 
two interaction terms are highly correlated. Accordingly, this evidence 
indicates that either the UI Rule 1 interaction or the UI Rule 3 interac 
tion is associated with higher strike frequencies. It provides, however, 
no basis for claiming that one of the interactions is the principal source 
of the association. Thus, we ran a fourth regression with an interaction 
between the maximum UI benefit and a variable indicating states that 
use either UI Rule 1 or UI Rule 3. The coefficient on this interaction 
term was positive and statistically significant. We believe this is a plausi 
ble result. It indicates that for states with UI Rule 1 or UI Rule 3, an 
increase in program generosity, as proxied by the maximum benefit, 
is associated with more strikes. 5
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Table 6.2
Strike Frequency Regressions That Include Interaction Variables 
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[UI Rule 1] x max. UI benefit
[UI Rule 3] x max. UI benefit
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See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.
This result led us to test models that included not only an interaction 
with the maximum benefit but other interactions as well. For example, 
we tested models with measures of unemployment insurance taxes 
interacted with UI Rule 1 and UI Rule 3 (see table 5.6 for the full
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list). In general, either this type of interaction variable had no effect 
on the regression or it was so highly correlated with the maximum benefit 
interaction variable that both coefficients had low f-statistics. Evident 
ly, 50 observations are insufficient to distinguish the effect of a state's 
maximum benefit from other characteristics of the state program (e.g., 
the minimum tax rate, the maximum tax rate, maximum duration of 
benefit receipt, coverage, etc.). Thus, we chose to represent program 
generosity with a single proxy—the maximum benefit.
If one must choose a single proxy for unemployment insurance 
generosity, the maximum benefit is an attractive choice. For purposes 
of this work, a proxy for program generosity should reflect the workers' 
and firms' perceptions of generosity at the time they decide to initiate 
or continue a strike. Given their comparatively high earnings, union 
members are likely to receive unemployment benefits that are at or near 
the maximum. This is one reason why the maximum benefit is a better 
proxy for program generosity than the average benefit. Moreover, a 
good proxy for program generosity should not be affected by factors 
that have nothing to do with legislative decisions regarding generosity. 
A proxy like the average benefit level depends not only on state policy 
but also on demographic factors (e.g., the average wage in the state 
or the state's ratio of part-time to full-time workers), while the max 
imum benefit is an instrument of and depends only on state policy. Thus, 
for purposes of analyzing interactions between UI Rules 1 and 3 and 
program generosity, we focused on their interaction with the maximum 
benefit.
Our next step was to examine whether results on the interaction 
variable were sensitive to the set of independent variables included in 
the model. As in the first phase of the research, we tested a long list 
of alternative independent variables (see table 5.7 for the list). The result 
obtained on the interaction variable was remarkably insensitive to such 
changes in specification. Table 6.3 illustrates this point. The first model 
in table 6.3 includes measures of industry composition, and the second 
includes two dummy variables standing for states with right-to-work 
laws and southern states—variables that may reflect community attitudes 
toward strikes. Although neither of these dummy variables has a
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significant effect on the dependent variable, the proportion of a state's 
labor force employed in the construction industry is associated with a 
significantly higher level of strike frequency. 6 Nevertheless, the inclu 
sion or exclusion of such variables has little effect on the magnitude 
or statistical significance of the interaction variable.
Table 6.3
Strike Frequency Regressions with Alternative Control Variables 
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or
UI Rule 3 = 1] x max. UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishment with 100+ employees
% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force
% population in poverty
South = 1
Right-to-work law = 1
Average hourly earnings
% of labor force in mining
% of labor force in construction
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Table 6.3 (continued)
Independent variable
% of labor force in trade
% of labor force in finance























See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definition.
The last step in this phase of the work was to include the interaction 
variable in regressions that use the size of strikes (average number of 
workers involved per strike) and average duration of strikes as depen 
dent variables. Although we had no hypothesis on strike size, given 
our theoretical framework and the strike frequency results, we anticipated 
a positive relationship between the interaction and strike duration. But 
that is not what we found. In models using strike size as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on the interaction variable was usually negative 
but not. statistically significant. In models using strike duration as the 
dependent variable, however, the coefficient on the interaction variable 
was usually both negative and statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Thus, it appears that states with a high maximum unemploy 
ment benefit and either an innocent bystander or work-stoppage rule 
had shorter strikes than other states. Once again, this result contradicted 
our expectations.
Thus, our results at the end of the second phase of the research were 
rather confusing. We had found a statistically significant relationship 
between strike frequency and an interaction variable, and that relation 
ship was insensitive to changes in model specification. Although the 
positive sign accorded with our theoretical framework and hypotheses, 
the result was suspect for two reasons. First, the interaction variable
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took an opposite sign in the strike duration model—a result that did not 
accord with our theory. That was a surprise, but perhaps not indicative 
of a serious problem; it could simply mean, for example, that our 
theoretical framework was wrong. Moreover, as developed below, there 
was reason to believe the duration regression suffered a selection bias 
and that, in consequence, the model provided an inadequate test of the 
theoretical hypotheses. Second, and perhaps more important, the in 
teraction result was based on 1970 data, and we had already tested 
numerous models with these data. The more models one tests on a given 
data set, the greater the probability of finding a statistically significant 
coefficient. We thus had good reason to suspect that the interaction result 
would not hold in a different data set. That possibility led to the third 
phase of the work, in which we used data from different years to test 
the models developed in the first two phases of our testing procedures.
Replicating the Results
Accordingly, in the third phase we sought to replicate the frequency 
and duration results using cross-section data from different years. As 
indicated in tables 6.4 and 6.5, we took the table 6.2, column 4 model 
and applied it to 1960, 1966, and 1974 data. 7 The results were an un 
qualified surprise. In table 6.4, the relationship between the interac 
tion variable and strike frequency is thoroughly robust across the dif 
ferent samples. 8 These results led us to believe that the 1970 frequency 
result was not a statistical artifact. States that have a high maximum 
unemployment benefit and either the innocent bystander or work- 
stoppage rule consistently have significantly more strikes than other 
states. On the other hand, the results shown in table 6.5, where strike 
duration is used as the dependent variable, are not nearly so impressive. 
They show that the coefficients for the interaction variable are negative 
but statistically insignificant in all years except 1970. Thus it appears 
that the negative relation between the interaction variable and strike dura 
tion in 1970 is merely a statistical artifact.
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Table 6.4
Strike Frequency Regressions for Different Years 
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or





% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force













































































































See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.
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Table 6.5
Strike Duration Regressions for Different Years 
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 2 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 = 1 or





% of labor force in unions
% females in labor force
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See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.
Although the table 6.4 results are more persuasive than those for 1970 
alone, there are still legitimate reasons to question them. In particular, 
one could argue that there exist unobserved determinants of strike fre 
quency in different states and that these unobserved variables are cor 
related with the interaction variable. The argument implies that the table 
6.4 results do not address the issue of whether the unemployment
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insurance system actually leads to more strikes; the results may simply 
reveal that the interaction variable is correlated with some unobserved 
state-specific determinant of strike frequency that persists over time.
In order to examine this possibility, we ran a fixed-effects version 
of the model. 9 In essence we pooled together 15 years of data on the 
51 jurisdictions and estimated the table 6.2, column 4 model with a 
separate intercept for each jurisdiction. 10 Since separate intercepts control 
for time-invariant (fixed) unobserved state characteristics, the fixed- 
effects model allows us to test whether the interaction result in table 
6.4 is due to state-specific fixed effects that have nothing to do with 
the unemployment insurance system.
Before discussing our results, two data issues should be noted. First, 
state-specific time-invariant observed variables must be excluded from 
a fixed-effects model. For this reason the New York and Rhode Island 
dummy variable (UI Rule 2) was excluded from the model. The variable 
equals "1" in New York and Rhode Island and zero in all other states 
for the entire 15-year sample period. As such, it is perfectly correlated 
with the state-specific intercepts and must be excluded to avoid col- 
linearity. The second data issue concerns the measurement of the in 
dependent variables. Although we had data on strike frequency and dura 
tion for all states and all years, that was not the case for the indepen 
dent variables. For example, data on UI Rules 1 and 3 are not available 
for 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1969. In such cases we used interpolation 
to impute the missing data. 11
As indicated in table 6.6, the fixed-effect results were quite similar 
to the tables 6.4 and 6.5 cross-section results. The interaction variable 
([Either UI Rule 1 or 3 = 1] x max. UI benefit) is positive and statistically 
significant in the frequency model and negative and not statistically 
significant in the duration model. These findings imply that the results 
for the interaction variable are not attributable to unobserved state- 
specific fixed effects. Moreover, since we only tested one model with 
this pooled data set, the table 6.6 results are statistically meaningful 
in the sense that they are not a consequence of testing numerous models 
in the same data set. 12
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Table 6.6 
Fixed-Effects Regressions on the Frequency and Duration
of Strikes, 1960-1974 
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Independent variable
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 or UI Rule
3 = 1] x max. UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishments with 100+ employees
% labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force





















































See bottom of table 6.1 for variable definitions.
In summary, all three phases of the empirical work point to the same 
conclusion: the interaction variable is positively associated with strike 
frequency. That result is robust to changes in control variables and data 
sets. Moreover, it holds in a fixed-effects model. Given these findings, 
there remains a question that our statistical tools cannot answer direct 
ly: why does this association exist? In our best judgment, the most plausi 
ble explanation is causation running from the unemployment insurance
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system to strike frequency. The empirical results are thoroughly con 
sistent with the hypothesis that a more generous unemployment insurance 
system causes a higher strike frequency in states that use the "stoppage- 
of-work" and "innocent bystander" labor dispute disqualification rules. 
Moreover, the hypothesis flows logically from a plausible theory of 
strike behavior, i.e., in states with these disqualification rules, a more 
generous unemployment insurance system leads to less comprehensive 
protocols and thereby to greater strike frequency.
This interpretation raises two additional questions that need to be ad 
dressed. First, even if certain features of the unemployment insurance 
system cause higher strike frequencies, are the effects so small as to 
be of little social relevance? Second, if a theory of protocols is applicable, 
why is the interaction variable not positively related to strike duration?
With regard to the first question, the coefficient of .010 on the in 
teraction variable in table 6.6 implies that a $10 increase in the max 
imum unemployment benefit (measured in 1967 dollars) is associated 
with a 10 percent increase in strike frequency in states with either UI 
Rule 1 or 3. Since the sample mean for the maximum benefit was $50, 
that implies an elasticity of .5, i.e., a 1 percent increase in the max 
imum benefit in states with either rule was associated with about a .5 
percent increase in strike frequency. Alternatively stated, an increase 
in the maximum unemployment benefit from $50 to $55 (measured in 
1967 dollars) is associated with an increase in strike frequency from 
6.8 strikes per 100,000 labor force participants (the sample mean) to 
7.5 strikes per 100,000 labor force participants (6.8 x 1.1 =7.5). This 
sentence could, however, be seriously misinterpreted if an important 
caveat is not noted. The maximum benefit is being used as a proxy for 
program generosity. It is not the maximum per se but the level of 
generosity proxied by the maximum that has this effect. The point re 
mains, however, that the coefficient hi table 6.6 implies that the 
unemployment insurance system can have rather large effects on strike 
frequency.
With regard to the second question, throughout this work we found 
a negative and in most cases statistically insignificant relationship be 
tween the interaction variable and strike duration. Such findings may
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cause one to question whether the relationship between the unemploy 
ment insurance system and strike frequency can be explained with a 
protocol theory. After all, the protocol theory predicts that the interac 
tion variable will not only be positively related to strike frequency but 
also to strike duration.
The inconsistent results obtained for strike duration may, however, 
simply reflect a data problem. The coefficients in our duration models 
probably suffer from a selection bias. This is because our data on dura 
tion come from a sample of bargaining units that actually experienced 
a strike. Since strikes are not generated by a random process, this is 
not a random sample. 13 As a consequence, coefficients estimated in this 
sample may be biased. Moreover, since our data are aggregate data, 
standard "Heckit" techniques for solving the problem are not ap 
plicable. u Our duration models, therefore, do not provide a meaningful 
test of the protocol theory. They neither confirm nor contradict the strike 
frequency result.
Figure 6.1
Before benefit increase, average duration = 10 days. 






10 12 Days duration
Figure 6.1 helps to illustrate this point. Consider a sample of three 
bargaining units denoted as A, B, and C. Whereas units A and B reach 
settlements without a strike, unit C has a strike of 10 days. This initial 
position is denoted as Al, Bl, and Cl in the diagram. Since we only
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measure strike duration when a strike occurs, our measure of average 
strike duration in this sample would be 10 days. Now suppose that the 
state government increases unemployment insurance payments to 
strikers, and that the strike duration for unit C increases from 10 days 
to 12 days, the strike duration for unit B increases from 0 to 2 days, 
and unit A again settles without a strike. This new position is denoted 
as Al, B2, and C2 on the diagram. Since we only measure strike dura 
tion when a strike occurs, our measure of strike duration in this new 
position would be 6 days ([10 + 2]/2). Thus, although no unit experienc 
ed a decrease in strike duration (indeed, B and C experienced an in 
crease), our measure indicates that average duration dropped from 10 
days to 6 days. The problem is that our measure of strike duration does 
not include bargaining units that do not go to strike and that thereby 
have durations of zero. Only by including those in the sample (or by 
adjusting for the statistical effect of their exclusion) can one obtain a 
meaningful test of the strike duration effects predicted by protocol theory.
The Effect of the AFDC, Food Stamp,
and General Assistance Programs on Strike Behavior
As noted in chapter 5, although a theory of protocols predicts a rela 
tionship between welfare benefits for strikers and strike behavior, we 
did not expect to find one. This is because strikers rarely meet the in 
come and asset eligibility criteria of welfare programs. Although an 
effect may exist, we thought it unlikely that our statistical methods would 
be sensitive enough to discern it.
Our strategy for assessing whether welfare programs affect strike 
behavior was, however, identical to that used with the unemployment 
insurance program. In the first phase, we tested whether the availabili 
ty of AFDC, general assistance, and food stamp benefits for strikers 
was related to strike behavior in 1970. Several combinations of control 
variables were tested during this phase of the work. In the second phase, 
we tested whether an interaction between availability of benefits and 
benefit levels was related to strike behavior in 1970. Finally, in the 
third phase we estimated cross-sectional models for different years as 
well as fixed-effects models.
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Table 6.7
Fixed-Effects Regressions on the Frequency and Duration
of Strikes, 1960-1974, with Welfare Variables Included
(l-statistics hi parentheses)
Independent variable
[AFDCAID = 1] x max. UI benefit
Food stamp coverage
UI Rule 1 = 1
UI Rule 3 = 1
[Either UI Rule 1 or UI Rule 3 = 1]
x max. UI benefit
Unemployment rate
% establishments with 100+ employees
% labor force in unions
% females in labor force
% urban in labor force






























































AFDCAID = 1 if the state has an AFDC Unemployed Father Program and that program per 
mits strikers to collect benefits.
Food stamp coverage measures the percent of the poor in the state who reside in counties that 
participate in the food stamp program.
Other variable definitions are at the bottom of table 6.1.
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In no case did we find a consistently significant relationship between 
a measure of welfare aid to strikers and strike behavior. Although the 
estimated coefficients often took a positive sign, in most cases they were 
not statistically significant. Nor did we obtain consistent results when 
we attempted to replicate the results for 1970 in other years. Table 6.7 
illustrates this point. This table adds two welfare variables to the fixed- 
effects specification in table 6.6. The first variable is the real level of 
AFDC benefits in the state multiplied by AFDCADD. As noted in chapter 
5, table 5.6, AFDC AID is a binary (0,1) variable indicating that the 
state allows strikers to receive AFDC-U benefits. The second variable 
is the percent of poor people in the state that reside in counties that 
provide food stamp benefits. The table reveals that neither variable is 
significantly related to either strike frequency or strike duration. We 
conclude that either there is no relationship between AFDC, general 
assistance, food stamps and strike behavior, or the relationship exists 
but is too subtle for our statistical tools to reveal.
Conclusion
This chapter establishes a link between the unemployment insurance 
system and strike behavior. A more generous unemployment insurance 
program is related to a higher strike frequency in states that use "inno 
cent bystander" or "stoppage-of-work" disqualification rules. This rela 
tionship is evidently not a minor one. The regressions indicate that for 
such states a 1 percent increase in the maximum unemployment benefit 
is associated with a .5 percent increase in strike frequency, ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, in our best judgment, the most plausible explana 
tion for the association is causality, i.e., certain characteristics of the 
unemployment insurance system affect strike frequency.
In stating this conclusion, it is important to emphasize what was not 
found. We did not find evidence of a link between the provision of 
AFDC, food stamps, or general assistance to strikers and strike behavior. 
Moreover, our evidence on unemployment compensation is restricted 
to strike frequency; no conclusions are possible on whether the 
unemployment insurance program affects either strike duration or 
number of workers involved. Finally, no conclusions are possible on
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whether the New York- Rhode Island disqualification rule affects strike 
behavior. Either these relationships are nonexistent or our methods are 
insufficiently precise to discern them.
NOTES
1. We also tested the effect of the "lockout" rule and the "interim employment" rule on strike 
activity. In all of our experiments with 1970 data, these two rules appeared to have no discernible 
effect on any measure of strike activity. Consequently, in this chapter we concentrate on the ef 
fects of the three rules mentioned here.
2. We used the natural logarithm of the dependent variables because residual plots revealed prob 
lems of skew and outliers with the untransformed variables.
3. In a study that used bargaining unit data, Cynthia L. Gramm found that the size of the bargain 
ing unit was positively and significantly related to several measures of strike activity. Similarly, 
she found that the percent of unionized workers in the bargaining unit's industry who were male 
had a positive and significant effect on the probability of a strike. See, Cynthia L. Gramm, "The 
Determinants of Strike Incidence and Severity: A Micro-Level Study,'' Industrial and Labor Rela 
tions Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1986), pp. 361-76. In a study that used a pooled time series 
cross-sectional sample of bargaining units in Canada, Swidinsky and Vandercamp also found that 
the propensity to strike increased with the size of the bargaining unit. See, Robert Swidinsky 
and John Vandercamp, "A Micro-Econometric Analysis of Strike Activity in Canada," Journal 
of Labor Research, Vol. ffl, No. 4. (Fall, 1982), pp. 455-71. In the United States in the 1970s, 
the mean duration of all strikes was about 23 days; in bargaining units with 1,000 or more workers, 
however, the mean duration of strikes was 51 days. (Calculations for all strikes based on our 
own data; for the mean duration of strikes in large bargaining units, see Gramm.)
4. The coefficients on the interaction between program generosity and the UI Rule 2 dummy variable 
would be the equivalent of a regression line fitted to two points. The residuals on New York 
and Rhode Island would be forced to zero, implying an implausible model that perfectly explains 
strike frequency in New York and Rhode Island.
5. We also tested a model that was identical to the one in column 3 except that the maximum 
UI benefit was included as a regressor. The coefficient on this additional variable was negative 
and statistically insignificant. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that in states with neither 
UI Rule 1 nor UI Rule 3, a more generous UI program does not influence strike behavior.
6. The construction industry is known to be a particularly strike-prone industry. Since the end 
of World War n, the construction workforce has constituted about 5 percent of the nonagricultural 
labor force; but about 20 percent of the nation's strike activity has been in the industry. See, 
David B. Lipsky and Henry S. Farber, "The Composition of Strike Activity in the Construction 
Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 388-404.
7. We chose 1960 because the 1960 Census provided demographic data that were not available 
for other years. We chose 1974 because that was the last year in which we had good strike data. 
We chose 1966 because we did not have data on the labor dispute disqualification rules for 1965. 
In each of these years some variables had to be interpolated. Interpolation of the data is dealt 
with below in the discussion of the fixed-effects models.
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8. Note that the coefficient on the interaction variables tends to decline over time. This is in part 
because the models were run with the maximum benefit measured in nominal dollars. When the 
maximums were deflated by a price index, these differences nearly disappeared Of course, signs 
and r-statistics would not be affected by a price index.
9. A good reference on fixed effect models is Yair Mundlak, "On the Pooling of Time Series 
and Cross Section Data," Econometrica, Vol. 40, No. 1, (January 1978), pp. 69-86 and the cita 
tions therein.
10. The regressions were run on 763 observations rather than 765 because data on the unemploy 
ment rate were missing and could not be interpolated for Oregon in 1970 and 1971.
11. For example, if UI Rule 1 = 1 in 1960 and UI Rule 1 = 0 in 1962, we set UI Rule 1 equal 
to 1/2 in 1961. Variables such as the percent female or percent urban in the labor force had to 
be interpolated from 1960 and 1970 census data. Other variables, such as the percent of 
establishments with 100+ employees, were missing for only a few years and could be interpolated 
in the same way as the UI Rules.
12. The table 6.6 results led us to wonder whether the same would be found in umvanate plots. 
That is, suppose one looks at a state that changed rule 1 during the 1960-1974 period. Would 
one observe a discrete change in strike frequency at precisely that point in time when the rule 
changes? The plots were disappointing. There is no evidence of a discrete jump. Our result is 
then a multivariate result. A number of factors affect strike frequency, one of which is the unemploy 
ment insurance program. Only by holding other factors constant can one observe the effect of 
the UI program.
13. More concretely, the evidence on strike frequency indicates that an increase in the interac 
tion variable induces some bargaining units to go on strike. If those bargaining units have unobserved 
characteristics associated with short strike durations, then an increase in the interaction variable 
would cause a change in sample composition that precipitates a decline in average strike dura- 
don. Thus, even if, with sample composition held constant, an increase in the interaction variable 
increases strike duration, we may not observe that increase because when the interaction variable 
changes sample composition changes. We obtained some evidence consistent with this line of 
argument. We estimated the table 6.6 fixed-effects model using the following three dependent 
variables:
FDUR30 = % of all strikes in the state that exceed 30 days 
FDUR56 = % of all strikes in the state that exceed 56 days 
FDUR80 = % of all stnkes in the state that exceed 80 days
The coefficients on the interaction variable for these dependent variables were as follows: 
Dependent Coefficient on
variable interaction variable /-statistic 
FDUR30 .00003 .043 
FDUR56 -.00057 .445 
FDUR80 -.00068 1.503 
Thus, roughly speaking, it appears that an increase in the interaction variable changes sample 
composition by increasing the share of all strikes that are short strikes and reducing the share 
of very long strikes.
14. To see this, let YJJ represent strike duration for firm i. We seek to estimate parameters in 
a model of the form,
(1) YH = XhB! + U H, 
where X j: is a 1 x K vector of exogenous regressors, Bj is K x 1 vector of parameters, and
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U i| is an error term with mean zero and finite variance. Suppose that the probability that strikes 
occur is of the form,
(2) Prob of strike = Pr(Y2i £ 0),
(3) Y2j = ^2i®2 + ^2i> w^ere ^2i' ®2' anc' ^2i are defined in a manner analogous to Xjj, 
Bj, and U^
Now, we only observe duration when strikes occur. Letting YJJ, represent observed duration 
we have
YH = 0 iff Y2i < 0
Following Heckman, the expected value of Y^ in our data is
(4) E(YH | XH, Y2i 2: 0) = X^ + E(UH | U2i 2r- *2i 83).
In Heckman' s words, "Regression estimators of the parameters of equation (1) fit on the selected 
sample omit the final term of equation (4) as a regressor, so that the bias that results from using 
nonrandomly selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships is seen to arise from the or 
dinary problem of omitted variables." (James Heckman, "Sample Bias as a Specification Er 
ror," Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1, [January 1979], pp. 153-162).
Heckman goes on to present techniques for obtaining consistent parameter estimates. Those 
cannot be used in our data because we are estimating models with aggregate data. In essence 
we estimate
L N S 1 N S 1 N s
(5) N S Y ll<5 = r: £ XijoB,-!-— £ u,-eNS j = l JJS Ns j = 1 IjS 1 NS £ i u ljS
Where Ng is the number of observations in state S. 
The analogue to (4) in this case is
, N S , N S i N S
<6> NS jl, **& = NS jf, X.JS". + NS =„ Wljs I U2i ^ -x2jB2,
There is no simple transform of Mills' ratio that acts as a proxy for the last term.
What is the Proper Policy?
When is it appropriate to provide government transfer payments to 
workers who are involved in a labor dispute? One could claim that it 
is never appropriate; the transfer payments favor one of the disputants 
and thereby violate a doctrine of governmental neutrality. Others might 
counter that a fundamental function of government is assisting the needy. 
When a family is in dire straights because its breadwinner is engaged 
in a strike (an eminently legal activity), then it is appropriate for the 
state to assist that family. Clearly, the question raises difficult issues. 
At its heart is a philosophical question about the proper role of the modern 
state in what are usually distinct spheres: government transfers and in 
dustrial relations. To the extent that people differ in their perceptions 
of the appropriate goals of public policy in these two spheres, their 
answers to the question differ.
In consequence, this chapter begins with a discussion of goals. The 
first section discusses goals underlying current government policy in 
the two spheres. With regard to transfer policy the key goals are 
alleviating hardship and compensating workers for earnings lost due 
to involuntary unemployment. In industrial relations the key goals are 
promotion of industrial peace and governmental neutrality in labor 
disputes. Clearly, it is difficult to formulate policies that simultaneous 
ly attain all of these goals. Policy must strike a balance between them. 
Given that, the second section examines tradeoffs between the goals 
as well as policies implicit in the tradeoffs. For example, if the society 
wishes to emphasize industrial peace and deemphasize alleviation of 
hardship, what kinds or policies are appropriate? What form should 
transfer programs take? Finally, we present our position including our 
judgments about the proper role of the state, and a proposed package 
of policies consistent with those judgments.
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Goals for Public Policy
It is not always easy to discern the goals of either transfer or industrial 
relations policy. Policy may be motivated by an array of goals, some 
manifest and some latent. Here we focus on manifest goals that have 
unambiguously motivated past policy and around which there appears 
to be a broad consensus.
Goals for Transfer Programs
Government transfer programs are usually divided into two categories: 
public assistance and social insurance. Different goals underlie each 
category. Public assistance programs are the oldest form of govern 
ment transfer program. Their goal is to alleviate hardship to provide 
a floor of protection so that people do not have to starve or beg. Children 
are of particular importance for such programs. Since they are not 
responsible for their poverty, and since poverty may affect their future 
development, children are viewed as particularly deserving of govern 
ment aid. The food stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) programs are examples of public assistance programs. The latter 
program is restricted to families with children. Both programs are only 
available to families that can pass a "means test" and thereby 
demonstrate material hardship.
Social insurance programs seek to compensate workers for an adverse 
event such as disability, old age, on-the-job injury, or involuntary 
unemployment. In comparison to public assistance, these are new pro 
grams. In the United States they gained prominence after passage of 
the 1935 Social Security Act. For purposes of the present study it is 
sufficient to focus on the goals of one of the social insurances, unemploy 
ment insurance.
The primary goal of unemployment insurance is to compensate workers 
for income lost due to involuntary unemployment. For example, a laid- 
off worker is usually considered involuntarily unemployed and thus eligi 
ble for benefits. In general, benefits are a fraction of previous wages 
up to a maximum. They are usually not adjusted for family size. 1 It 
is important to recognize that unlike a public assistance program, 
unemployment insurance does not simply assist people in dire need. In
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1970, more than 40 percent of the payments went to people with an 
nual family incomes greater than the median. Only 11 percent of the 
payments went to families living in official poverty. 2
Of course, the two goals of transfer programs have implications for 
strike-related transfers. Single-minded pursuit of the goal of alleviating 
hardship implies payment of government transfers to workers involv 
ed in a labor dispute whenever the workers suffer severe material hard 
ship. Special emphasis would be placed on providing benefits to families 
with children. Single-minded pursuit of the goal of compensating in 
come lost as a result of involuntary unemployment implies government 
transfers to workers involved in a labor dispute whenever the workers 
are involuntarily unemployed. Therein lies the vexing issue of whether 
strikers are ever involuntarily unemployed. We address that in the Policy 
Options section.
Goals for Industrial Relations
Government policy regarding collective bargaining has undergone a 
significant evolution in the last century, moving from outright prohibi 
tion of unions and strikes to explicit guarantees for both. Two goals 
appear basic to today's policy: promotion of industrial peace, and govern 
mental neutrality in labor disputes.
Industrial peace has been a goal of public policy since the industrial 
revolution. Unions and strikes were banned in the nineteenth century 
because they interfered with the free flow of commerce. Later, in the 
debate over the 1935 Wagner Act, it was argued that only by assuring 
the presence of trade unions and prohibiting unfair labor practices by 
employers could the nation minimize disruptive industrial strife. In a 
sense, over the course of a century the goal of promoting industrial peace 
remained fixed, while the strategy for attaining that goal shifted 
dramatically. Of course, history is more complex than that. Not only 
strategies but also perceptions have changed. At one point strikes were 
viewed as criminal acts and at another as institutionalized (legal) ac 
tions. The point is, however, that throughout history the government 
sought to minimize strike-related disruptions of commerce. 3
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The nation's present strategy would seem to be one of minimizing 
strike activity by encouraging collective bargaining. While strikes are 
a necessary and legal mechanism through which workers express disaf 
fection with employers, the government encourages both workers and 
employers to find less disruptive avenues for voicing and resolving 
differences.
The second goal—governmental neutrality in labor disputes—is more 
difficult to document. The goal was articulated in the debate over the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. It was claimed that the federal government 
had gone too far with the 1935 Wagner Act, and that a more even-handed 
approach was requisite. The idea was for the government to act like 
a referee in a boxing match. It should enforce the rules (no unfair prac 
tices), and stop the fight if the situation gets out of hand. As with any 
good referee, the government should not favor either party.
The two goals of industrial relations policy have implications for strike- 
related transfers. Single-minded pursuit of the goal of industrial peace 
implies that strike-related transfers are only appropriate to the extent 
that they do not disrupt industrial peace. Single-minded pursuit of the 
goal of governmental neutrality implies limiting strike-related transfers 
to those cases where they either do not favor one of the disputants, or 
where they counterbalance some other policy of the government.
Policy Options
While a discussion of goals is useful for establishing a context, there 
remains the original question of the conditions under which strike-related 
transfers are appropriate. At the outset, it is important to recognize that 
a single-minded pursuit of one of the above goals is unlikely. A more 
realistic view would be that we seek to attain two, three, or even all 
four goals simultaneously. That raises the problem of tradeoffs. It may 
be quite difficult to satisfy the goal of alleviating hardship while at the 
same time maintaining state neutrality in labor disputes. A tradeoff may 
exist whereby an emphasis on one goal means deemphasis of another. 
That implies a somewhat more focused question: in light of the soci 
ety's desire to attain more than one of the goals, when are strike-related 
transfers appropriate?
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This section addresses that question. It examines the range of feasi 
ble policy options that strike a balance between the goals. To keep the 
exposition manageable, we deal with pairs of goals. The section begins 
with a discussion of policies designed to strike a balance between the 
goal of promoting industrial peace and the goal of compensating in 
come lost due to involuntary unemployment. Next we discuss policies 
that balance the goals of promoting industrial peace and alleviating hard 
ship. The section closes with a discussion of policies that balance the 
goal of governmental neutrality against the twin goals of transfer pro 
grams. Clearly, each discussion is related to the other. In consequence, 
the first examines issues in some detail, while the subsequent discus 
sions build on that and are briefer as a result.
Balancing the Goal of Promoting Industrial Peace 
Against the Goal of Compensating Involuntary Unemployment
At the outset, it is useful to be concrete about the kinds of transfer 
policies that are compatible with the goal of compensating strike related 
involuntary unemployment. Chapter 2 introduced a number of policies 
that may be justified in these terms, i.e., unemployment insurance pro 
visions regarding innocent bystanders, work stoppages, lockouts, in 
terim employment and extended waiting periods (the New York-Rhode 
Island rule). Clearly, some of these provisions come closer to compen 
sating involuntary unemployment than others. The unemployment of 
innocent bystanders would seem unambiguously involuntary. Innocent 
bystanders do not vote on and are not participating in the strike. The 
employer has laid them off; they did not choose to withdraw their labor 
services. Similarly, the lockout provision could be justified in terms 
of involuntary unemployment, since lockouts are initiated by the 
employer. Of course, there may be ambiguities here. A lockout may 
be a response to union tactics.
More difficult to justify are provisions regarding work stoppages, in 
terim employment, and extended waiting periods. In a sense workers 
who receive benefits under these provisions are voluntarily unemployed 
because they choose to go on strike. In another sense, however, the 
unemployment is involuntary. In each case an employer has in some way
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contributed to the unemployment. Moreover, the unemployment is part 
of a collective action. To see how this complicates the issue, suppose 
a worker votes against a strike, but the majority of union members vote 
for it. Even though he would prefer to continue working, he participates 
in the strike because the collective has chosen to do so. Is that volun 
tary unemployment? In such cases the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary is fraught with ambiguities.
The larger point is that one can conceive of transfer policies that are 
arguably consistent with the goal of compensating strike-related involun 
tary unemployment. Given that, there remains the question of whether 
there exists a tradeoff between the goal of promoting industrial peace 
and the goal of compensating such unemployment. In our view, the 
answer depends upon how the transfer payments are financed.
If the cost of the transfer payments are fully borne by the disputing 
parties, then in accordance with our interpretation of Reder and Neumann 
(see chapter 5), there need be no tradeoff. When the striking parties 
bear the full cost of the payments, the payments should not affect either 
strike frequency or duration. In consequence, if the costs are fully borne 
by the parties, the society can both compensate income lost due to strike- 
related involuntary unemployment and promote industrial peace. In this 
case it is appropriate to provide government transfer payments to 
workers who are involved in a labor dispute. Financing is the key. There 
are at least four policy options for insuring that the parties bear all of 
the costs:
(1) Perfect Experience Rating. Under this provision the employer 
would bear the full cost of the transfers payments. The option is clearly 
feasible. It would simply require refinement of the current financ 
ing system. At present the principal reasons for imperfect experience 
rating are minimum and maximum tax rates on employers. The main 
route to perfect experience rating is elimination of these minimums 
and maximums. 4
(2) Worker Repayment of Benefits Received. Under this provision 
workers who receive strike-related benefits would repay the benefits 
to the government. In a sense, this would put the government in the
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business of making loans to workers during a strike and collecting 
repayments afterwards. Administrative feasibility may be a problem 
here. It is not clear precisely how the government would collect money 
from the workers after the strike. For example, if the government 
used a payroll tax, that tax would have to be targeted on the strikers 
and not levied on new workers or workers who did not participate 
in the strike.
(3) Union Repayment of Benefits Received. Here the striking union 
would repay the benefits. While perhaps easier to enforce than worker 
repayment, if the union represents other workers, some of the costs 
could be shifted to workers outside of the bargaining unit.
(4) Income Taxation of Unemployment Insurance Benefits. Policy has 
already moved in this direction. As of 1987 unemployment insurance 
benefits are fully taxable under the federal income tax. All four 
policies insure that the parties to the dispute bear the cost of the transfer 
benefits.
Suppose, however, it is deemed appropriate for the larger society to 
share in the cost of strike-related transfer payments. This is the status 
quo. At present, when workers receive compensation for involuntary 
unemployment associated with a labor dispute, the payments are financed 
out of imperfectly experience rated taxes on the employer. That means 
the larger society shares in the cost. In this case our theory predicts 
a tradeoff between the two goals: greater compensation for involun 
tary unemployment associated with a labor dispute leads to increased 
strike activity and less industrial peace.
The evidence in chapter 6 is consistent with this theoretical proposi 
tion. We find that in states with a work-stoppage and/or innocent 
bystander provision, more generous unemployment insurance benefits 
are associated with an increase in strike frequency. Of course, still 
stronger empirical evidence is conceivable. It would be particularly im 
pressive if it could be shown that more perfect experience rating at 
tenuates the tradeoff between program generosity and strike activity. 5 
Although more evidence is always better, there are good reasons for 
claiming that if the parties to the dispute do not bear the full cost of 
strike activity, then the goal of compensating involuntary unemploy 
ment comes in conflict with the goal of industrial peace.
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In this case, one is forced to choose between the goal of compen 
sating workers for strike-related involuntary unemployment and the goal 
of promoting industrial peace. If, on the one hand, it is believed that 
the society should do more in terms of promoting industrial peace, then 
several policy options appear viable. Certainly one option is to eliminate 
some or all provisions under which workers involved in labor disputes 
receive benefits. An alternative would be to reduce the level of unemploy 
ment insurance benefits paid to such workers. This could be done in 
many ways;
(1) Use a different, lower benefit schedule or maximum for such 
workers.
(2) Extend the waiting period. This is essentially what is done in New 
York and Rhode Island. Workers involved in labor disputes can on 
ly receive benefits after an eight-week waiting period. Note also that 
several states use the strategy of an extended waiting period for 
workers who are unemployed due to a quit.
(3) Reduce the duration of benefits. For example, workers involved 
in a labor dispute might receive 12 rather than 26 weeks of unemploy 
ment insurance benefits.
If, on the other hand, it is believed that society should do more in terms 
of compensating strike-related involuntary unemployment, then policy 
would move in the other direction. States might consider additional pro 
visions for compensating workers involved in labor disputes (e.g., pro 
visions dealing with lockouts, interim employment, and innocent 
bystanders). An alternative would be to increase the level of benefits 
paid to such workers. For example, workers involved in labor disputes 
could have a higher maximum benefit or be guaranteed 40 rather than 
26 weeks of unemployment insurance benefits. The appropriate policy 
in this case depends upon value judgments about the relative impor 
tance of promoting industrial peace versus compensating workers for 
strike-related involuntary unemployment.
Balancing the Goal of Promoting Industrial Peace 
Against the Goal of Alleviating Hardship
Our assessment of policy options designed to strike a balance be 
tween the goals of promoting industrial peace and alleviating hardship 
is similar to the above in both form and substance.
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To be concrete about possible policies, note that the goal of alleviating 
hardship is usually associated with public assistance programs. It follows 
that one way to alleviate the hardship of workers involved in labor 
disputes is to grant them eligibility for public assistance benefits. The 
workers and their families might, for example, receive food stamps, 
AFDC-U, general assistance or benefits from some new program, e.g., 
a negative income tax. In keeping with the goal of alleviating hardship, 
only those who can demonstrate hardship would be eligible for benefits. 
Like any recipient of public assistance, the families have to pass a means 
test.
Is there a tradeoff between the goals of alleviating hardship and pro 
moting industrial peace? Our answer is much as before. Financing is 
the key. If the cost of the transfer payments are folly borne by the par 
ties to the dispute, then there need not be a conflict between the goals. 
If, however, it is deemed appropriate for the larger society to share 
in the cost of such transfers, then there may be a tradeoff. In the latter 
case, greater payments to alleviate strike-related hardship can lead to 
increased strike activity and less industrial peace.
The government has several options for insuring that the parties to 
the dispute bear the full cost of the transfer payments. The options are 
parallel to those in the previous section. The workers, the union, or 
the employer could repay the government for the cost of such payments. 
Moreover, the payments could be subject to the federal income tax. 
This would obviously go against tradition. Public assistance benefits 
have historically been financed out of general revenues and not subject 
to the income tax. There is no precedent for levies on employers or 
repayment by recipients. In the case of strike related transfers, however, 
a reassessment of that tradition may be in order.
If the tradition is maintained and the larger society shares in the cost 
of alleviating hardship associated with strikes, then increased govern 
ment transfers may lead to more strike activity. In this case, one is forced 
to choose between the goal of alleviating strike-related hardship and 
the goal of promoting industrial peace. The policy options are similar 
to those discussed above. If it is believed that the society should do 
more in terms of promoting industrial peace, then workers involved
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in labor disputes could either be prohibited from receiving public 
assistance benefits or could be paid reduced benefits (perhaps as a result 
of a waiting period). In contrast, if it is believed that the society should 
do more in terms of alleviating strike-related hardship, then policy would 
move in the opposite direction. For example, workers involved in labor 
disputes could (if they passed the means test) receive food stamps and 
AFDC-U; eligibility requirements for AFDC-U could be loosened; and 
states could be encouraged to use their general assistance programs to 
aid workers involved in labor disputes.
It should be emphasized that we have no hard empirical evidence in 
dicating a tradeoff between strike activity and public assistance transfers. 
Although we tested for a relationship, we did not obtain statistically 
significant results. That may mean that the tradeoff is minuscule (or 
even nonexistent) and that society could provide public assistance to 
workers involved in labor disputes without experiencing a noticeable 
increase in strike activity. Alternatively, our results may simply indicate 
that our statistical methods are not precise enough to discern the effect 
of existing policy; a more generous policy of alleviating strike-related 
hardship could conceivably lead to a substantial change in strike activi 
ty. The point is that our empirical results can not guide policy in this 
case. We do not know the magnitude of the tradeoff.
Balancing the Goal of State Neutrality in Labor Disputes 
Against the Goals of Transfer Programs
As before, we would argue that there is a form of tradeoff between 
these goals. Policies that compensate strike-related involuntary 
unemployment or that alleviate strike-related hardship favor workers 
and thereby affect neutrality. To see this, consider the problem of the 
government remaining neutral in labor disputes while at the same time 
compensating workers for strike-related involuntary unemployment. 
More concretely, suppose the government introduces a provision 
whereby workers obtain unemployment insurance in the event of a 
lockout. While arguably consistent with the goal of compensating in 
voluntary unemployment, this provision will surely strengthen the hand 
of workers. This is true even if the benefits are not financed out of taxes 
on the employer. If the government were neutral in labor disputes before 
introduction of this provision, then the provision would violate neutrality.
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Only if the government favored employers before introduction of the 
provision, could this policy be consistent with the goal of governmen 
tal neutrality. For example, one might argue that employers can rely 
upon the police powers of the state to constrain strikers from closing 
plants. Moreover, when an employer loses profits during a strike, his 
corporate profits tax liability is reduced, implying a form of govern 
ment subsidy to the employer. From this perspective the government 
favors employers, and introduction of the lockout provision helps to 
restore neutrality.
A parallel argument applies to alleviating hardship. Suppose the 
government introduces a provision whereby striking workers obtain 
AFDC-U benefits. Once again, since this provision can strengthen the 
hand of the workers, it is only neutral if it serves to counterbalance 
some other policy that favors employers.
What about the innocent bystander provision in unemployment in 
surance? Is there a tradeoff here? Since the benefits do not flow to the 
strikers, why would this provision affect neutrality? As argued in chapter 
5, if in the absence of this provision the employer would have compen 
sated the innocent bystanders anyway, the employer benefits from the 
provision. This is because of imperfect experience rating. Without the 
provision he pays the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders out 
of his own funds. With the provision part of that cost is shifted to the 
larger society. 6
There is then a form of tradeoff between the goals of state neutrality 
in labor disputes and the transfer program goals of compensating in 
voluntary unemployment and alleviating hardship. If we assume that 
at present the government is neutral in labor disputes, then any new 
policy that either increases or decreases strike-related transfer payments 
will move the society away from neutrality. An increase in transfer 
payments strengthens the hand of workers while a decrease weakens 
it. Similarly, any policy that increases or decreases the taxes that finance 
transfer payments will alter neutrality. Of course, the conclusion changes 
if one assumes that at present the government favors one side. In that 
case increases or decreases in transfers or taxes can be an appropriate 
palliative for unbalanced policy. In a sense, this reveals the weakness
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of the concept of neutrality. There is a troubling "anything goes" aspect 
to it. Any government decision could be justified in terms of maintain 
ing or restoring neutrality.
A Proposal
The previous section partially answers the original question of when 
strike-related transfers are appropriate. It indicates that if the society 
chooses to pursue specific goals, then certain types of strike-related 
transfers are called for. There remains, of course, the question of which 
goals the society should pursue. That is a question of value judgments, 
and the social sciences have little to say about such questions. Ultimately, 
it is a question that each person must answer for himself or herself. 
Having devoted a great deal of thought and effort to this project, the 
authors have developed their own views of what goals the society should 
pursue and what policies are appropriate. We would be remiss to not 
state those views.
In our opinion the goals that deserve greatest emphasis are allevia 
tion of hardship and promotion of industrial peace. With regard to the 
first goal, in a modern industrial state it is a fundamental responsibility 
of government to provide a minimum level of income support such that 
people do not have to starve or beg. This responsibility extends to strikers 
and nonstrikers alike, and is of particular importance for families with 
children. When people can demonstrate material hardship by passing 
a means test, they deserve assistance irrespective of the reason for that 
hardship. Although compensation of income lost due to involuntary 
unemployment is important, we place a higher priority on alleviating 
hardship.
With regard to the second goal, the modern state is properly con 
cerned about promotion of industrial peace. Strikes imply a costly loss 
of output and should be minimized. Of course, that does not mean that 
they should be eliminated. Some level of strikes may be necessary to 
resolve conflicts and to enhance the effectiveness of other conflict resolu 
tion mechanisms. However, to the extent that there are feasible alter 
natives to strikes—alternatives that are consistent with worker rights 
and democratic institutions—the government should promote those alter-
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natives. We place a higher priority on attaining this goal than on some 
nebulous notion of neutrality. 
These goals lead us to the following proposals.
(1) Public assistance (AFDC, food stamps, and general assistance) 
should be available to families suffering financial hardship irrespec 
tive of their involvement in a labor dispute.
(2) Unemployment insurance benefits should be paid to innocent 
bystanders.
(3) All strike-related transfers should be financed out of taxes on the
employer.
This policy addresses the problem of hardship suffered by strikers 
and their families by providing public assistance to workers involved 
in labor disputes. It promotes industrial peace by placing the cost of 
strike activity squarely upon the parties involved. Finally, the proposal 
includes payment of unemployment insurance to innocent bystanders. 
Their unemployment is unambiguously involuntary and thus worthy of 
compensation.
We would like to see the benefits financed out of taxes on the struck 
employer. This is a simpler administrative mechanism than worker 
repayment. Moreover, the workers who receive benefits under our plan 
would be quite poor, and would probably find it difficult to repay the 
government for the benefits. Asking impoverished workers to repay 
government benefits seems inconsistent with the goal of alleviating hard 
ship. In our view, however, how the costs are divided between the 
disputing parties is not as important as making certain that the larger 
society does not share in that cost.
Our proposal is silent on other strike-related provisions of the 
unemployment insurance program, i.e., lockout, work stoppage, etc. 
Even if the parties bear the full cost of strikes, we find little advantage 
to such provisions. They are administratively cumbersome, e.g., the 
lockout rule, and they are difficult to justify in terms of either compen 
sating involuntary unemployment or alleviating material hardship, e.g., 
the work-stoppage rule. In our opinion, the most desirable of these pro 
visions is the New York-Rhode Island rule whereby strikers receive 
benefits if the strike lasts eight weeks. This provision has the twin
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virtues of being simple to administer and of providing aid to people 
who are almost certainly experiencing material hardship. If it is decid 
ed that workers involved in labor disputes should continue to receive 
unemployment insurance, then we would propose extending the above 
proposal as follows.
(4) Provide unemployment insurance benefits to workers who satisfy 
the New York-Rhode Island rule.
(5) Eliminate other provisions that provide unemployment insurance 
benefits to workers involved in labor disputes (except for the inno 
cent bystander rule).
(6) Finance these strike-related benefits through taxes on the disputing 
parties. Consideration should also be given to having the workers 
or their union share in the cost of these unemployment insurance 
benefits.
Once again, these proposals would move government policy toward 
the goals of alleviating hardship and promoting industrial peace. Whether 
the reader agrees or disagrees with our proposals, we hope this work 
leads to a public discussion of the merits of the present system of strike- 
related transfer payments. In our view, that system is flawed. It does 
not make sense to provide unemployment insurance to workers when 
the involuntary nature of their unemployment is so fraught with am 
biguity. It does not make sense to have the larger society share in the 
cost of strike-related benefits and thereby effectively subsidize strike 
activity. It does not make sense to deny public assistance benefits to 
the child of a law-abiding striker, and yet provide benefits to the child 
of a jailed felon. In our view the present system is difficult to justify 
and in need of reform.
NOTES
1. Eleven states make small adjustments for family size through dependents' allowances.
2. Ronald Ehrenberg, Robert Hutchens and Robert Smith, "The Distribution of Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits and Costs," U.S. Department of Labor, Technical Analysis Paper No. 58, 1978.
3. For a discussion of the goal of industrial peace in general and the Wagner Act in particular, 
see Douglas V. Brown and Charles A. Myers, "Historical Evolution," in Joseph Shister, Ben 
jamin Aaron, and Clyde W. Summers, eds., Public Policy and Collective Bargaining (New York
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and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962); Charles O. Gregory and Harold A. Katz, Labor and the 
Law, 3rd edition (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979); Benjamin J. Taylor and 
Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 
Thomas A. Kochan and Harry C. Katz, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, 2nd edi 
tion (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1988).
4. For a discussion of this see Daniel Hamermesh, Jobless Pay and the Economy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press), 1977.
5. As indicated in chapter 6, we looked into this. Due to problems with collinearity, we failed 
to obtain meaningful results. Moreover, our measures of the extent of experience rating were 
less than ideal.
6. If experience rating were perfect, then the provision would simply codify the status quo. The 
employer would continue to bear the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders (who would 
have been compensated in the absence of the provision). In this case the provision would be con 
sistent with governmental neutrality. It would also be without teeth.
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Sources of Variables Measuring Characteristics of Transfer Programs
Variable 
UI RULE 1
UI RULE 2 =
UI RULE 3 =
UI RULE 4 =








1 if strikers receive benefits when employer continues to
operate; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
1 if New York and Rhode Island; else = 0 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
1 if "innocent bystanders" receive benefits; else = 0 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
1 if strikers laid off from "interim employment" job
receive benefits; else = 0
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
1 if workers receive benefits during a lockout; else = 0 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
maximum weekly UI benefit in state 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
benefits as a percent of weekly covered earnings for 
benefits below the maximum in state 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
UIMETH1* AHEMAN (see table 5.7 for AHEMAN) 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
taxable wage base for employers in state 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
UITAX/(AHEMAN*2000)
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
maximum UI tax rate in state 













minimum UI tax rate in state 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
Experience Rating Index from Becker 
Joseph Becker, Experience Rating in Unemployment In 
surance: Competitive Socialism, John Hopkins Press, 
1972
percent of workers in state covered by state UI laws 
calculated from data in Comparison of State Unemploy 
ment Laws
maximum number of weeks of benefits in state 
Comparison of State Unemployment Laws
percent of poverty population in state participating in Food 
Stamp Program
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Ser 
vice, March 31, 1975. Memorandum indicating when 
U.S. counties initiated Food Stamp Program 
1970 U.S. Census data on County poverty populations
1 if state allows strikers to receive AFDC-U payments; 
else = 0
Office of Family Assistance, Social Security Administra 
tion, HHS
1 if state has an AFDC-U program; else = 0 
U.S. Bureau of Family Services. Characteristics of State 
Public Assistance Plans Under the Social Security Act, 
General Provisions (Eligibility Assistance Administration) 
National Center for Social Statistics. Public Assistance 
Statistics. 1971
AFDC maximum weekly payment for a family of four
in state
Public Assistance Programs; Standards for Basic Needs
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AFDCBEN = AFDCMAX*AFDCAID
Office of Family Assistance, Social Security Administra 
tion, HHS
National Center for Social Statistics, Public Assistance 
Statistics
GEN AID = 1 if state provides general assistance to strikers; else = 0 
U.S. Bureau of Family Services, Characteristics of State 
Public Assistance Plans Under the Social Security Act, 
General Provisions (Eligibility Assistance Administration) 
1962




# of union members/LFTOT
Directory of National and International Labor Unions in
the United States, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968
Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations,
1971, 1973, 1975, 1977




# of workers in mining/LFTOT
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
1976
Employment and Earnings
ft of workers in construction/LFTOT 
Same as MINELAB
MANULAB = # of workers in manufacturing/LFTOT 
Same as MINELAB
TRANLAB = # of workers in transportation/LFTOT 
Same as MINELAB













# of workers in fmance/LFTOT 
Same as MINELAB
# of workers in services/LFTOT 
Same as MINELAB
LFTOT in urban areas/LFTOT
1960, 1970 Census of Population
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment
males between age 25 and 55/LFTOT
1960, 1970 Census of Population
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment
# females in labor force/LFTOT
1960, 1970 Census of Population
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment
# AFL-CIO members/LFTOT
Directory of National and International Labor Union in
the United States, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968
Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations,
1971, 1973, 1975, 1977
Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
1976
net civilian migration 1960-1970/civilian resident popula 
tion 1970 
Current Population Reports
1 if state is in South Census Division; else = 0 
Current Population Reports
1 if state has right to work law; else = 0 
State Right To Work Laws With Annotations
value added by manufacturing/total - of employees in
manufacturing
1977 Census of Manufacturers;
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 1975-76;
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 1966
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ESIZE100 = # establishments with 100 4- employees/# establishments 
County Business Patterns
ESIZE20 = establishments with 20+ employees/^ establishments 
County Business Patterns
AVESIZE = # employees in state/# establishments 
Employment and Earnings; 
County Business Patterns
AHEMAN = average hourly earnings of production workers on 
manufacturing
WCH6970 = percent change in AHEMAN between 1969 and 1970 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978
WCH6870 = percent change in AHEMAN between 1968 and 1970 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1978
MEDINC = median income of families in state in 1969 
Employment and Earnings
POVRTY = percent of families with money income below poverty line 
in state 
City and County Data Book, 1972
URAT = unemployment rate in state
Manpower Report/Employment and Training Report
LFTOT = number of people in state's labor force
IN D U S T = State Industrialization Index
AFFLUENC = Affluence Index
Source of INDUST and AFFLUENC is David R. Morgan and William Lyons, "Industrialization 
and Affluence Revisited: A Note on Socioeconomic Dimensions to the American States, 1970," 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 2 (May 1975), pp. 270-271.

References
Abowd, John and Orley Ashenfelter, "Anticipated Unemployment, Temporary
Layoffs and Compensating Wage Differentials," in Sherwin Rosen, ed.,
Studies in Labor Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981),
pp. 141-170 
Ahrens, Richard A., "Labor Dispute Disqualification: The Function of 'Grade
or Class' Provisions in State Unemployment Compensation Statutes,"
St. Louis University Law Journal 18, 4 (Summer 1974), pp. 629-640. 
Arnold, James A., HI, "Unemployment Compensation: Denial of Benefits
for Participation in a Labor Dispute," Arkansas Law Review 30 (Winter
1977), pp. 551-556. 
Ashenfelter, Orley and George Johnson, "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions,
and Industrial Conflict," American Economic Review 59, 1 (March
1969), pp. 35-49. 
Becker, Joseph M., Experience Rating in Unemployment Insurance: Virtue
or Vice (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1972), pp. 22-23. 
Bernstein, Irving, Turbulent Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 158. 
Bloch, Frank S., "Cooperative Federalism and the Role of Litigation in the
Development of Federal AFDC Eligibility Policy," Wisconsin Law
Review 1979, 1 (1979), pp. 48- 50. 
Britt, David and Omer Galle, "Industrial Conflict and Unionization," American
Sociological Review 37 (February 1972), pp. 46-57. 
Britt, David and Omer Galle, "Structural Antecedents of the Shape of Strikes:
A Comparative Analysis," American Sociological Review 39 (October
1974), pp. 642-651. 
Letter from Norman J. Brooks, Commissioner, Washington State Employment
Security Department, to the authors, December 14, 1981. 
Buck, Andrew, "A Reexamination of British Strike Activity," Atlantic
Economic Journal 10 (September 1982), pp. 38-39. 
Carney, James T., "The Forgotten Man on the Welfare Roll: A Study of
Public Subsidies for Strikers," Washington University Law Quarterly
3 (Summer 1973). 
Chamberlain, Neil W. and James W. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining, 2nd ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 
Chaplin, Josephine and J. Brown, Public Relief: 1929-39 (New York: Henry
Holt, 1940). 
Coase, Ronald H., "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and
Economics 3 (October 1960), pp. 1-44.
211
212
Comment, "Strikers' Eligibility for Public Assistance: The Standard Based on
Need," Journal of Urban Law 52, 1 (1974), p. 125. 
Confer, David R. "Pennsylvania's Lockout Exception to the Labor Dispute
Disqualification from Unemployment Compensation Benefits: Federal
Challenges and Issues," Dickinson Law Review 80 (1975), p. 72. 
Cooler, Robert, "The Cost of Coase," Journal of Legal Studies 11 (January
1982), p. 15. 
Cutler, Michael E. "Balancing in Labor Law Preemption Cases: New York
Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor," Stanford Law
Review 32 (April 1980), pp. 827-844. 
Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, Handbook of Public
Income Transfer Programs: 1975, Paper No. 20, Studies in Public
Welfare, 1974. 
Daniel, Cletus, Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers 1870-1941
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
Edwards, P.K. Strikes in the United States, 1881-1974 (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1981).
Edwards, P.K., "The Strike-Proneness of British Manufacturing Establish 
ments," British Journal of Industrial Relations 19 (July 1981), pp.
135-148. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald, Robert Hutchens, and Robert Smith, "The Distribution
of Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Costs," U.S. Department of
Labor, Technical Analysis Paper No. 58, 1978. 
Eisenberg, Stephen G., "Policy Considerations Underlying the Payment of
Unemployment Insurance to Strikers," New York State Bar Journal 56,
5 (July 1984). 
Letter from Henry Eschwege, Director, GAO, to Senators Helms and Thur-
mond and Congressmen Coleman and Dickinson, March 26, 1981, p. 1. 
Fierst, Herbert A. and Marjorie Specter, "Unemployment Compensation in
Labor Disputes," The Yale Law Journal 49, 3 (January 1940), pp.
483-486. 
Flaherty, Scan, "Contract Status and the Economic Determinants of Strike
Activity," Industrial Relations 22 (Winter 1983), pp. 20-33. 
Gartner, Manfred, "Strikes and the Real Wage-Employment Nexus: A Hick-
sian Analysis of Industrial Disputes and Pay," Journal of Labor Research
6 (Fall 1985), pp. 323-336.
Gennard, John, Financing Strikers (New York: John Wiley, 1977). 
Interview with Roger Gerby, New York State Department of Labor, Division
of Research and Statistics, October, 1981.
213
Gramm, Cynthia, "The Determinants of Strike Incidence and Severity: A 
Micro-Level Study,'' Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39, 3 (April 
1986), pp. 361-376.
Griffith, Larry J., Michael E. Wallace and Beth A. Rubin, "Capitalist 
Resistance to the Organization of Labor Before and After the New Deal: 
Why? How? Success?" American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986), 
pp. 147-167.
Gross, Thomas Brian, "A Possible Cure for a Case of Mistaken Identity: Un 
employment Benefits for Nonstriking Workers Who Have Failed to Cross 
a Picket Line," University of Pittsburgh Law Review 42 (Fall 1980), 
pp. 94-99.
Haber, William and Merrill G. Murray, Unemployment Insurance in the 
American Economy (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), pp. 76-89
Hamermesh, Daniel, Jobless Pay and the Economy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977).
Heckman, James, "Sample Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica 47, 1 
(January 1979), pp. 153-162.
Hetherington, W. Joseph, "Federal Preemption of State Welfare and 
Unemployment Benefits for Strikers," Harvard Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Law Review 12, 2 (1977).
Hicks, John R., The Theory of Wages (London: MacMillan, 1932), pp. 
136-158.
Hutchens, Robert M., "Layoffs and Labor Supply," International Economic 
Review 24 (February 1983), pp. 37-55.
Joe, Tom and Cheryl Rogers, By the Few, for the Few: The Reagan Welfare 
Legacy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 33-57, 50-57.
Kaufman, Bruce, "The Determinants of Strikes in the United States, 
1900-1977," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 35 (July 1982), pp. 
473-490.
Kaufman, Bruce, "Interindustry Trends in Strike Activity," Industrial 
Relations 22 (January 1983), pp. 45-57
Kennan, John,' 'The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Strike Duration,'' 
Unemployment Compensation: Studies and Research 2, National Com 
mission on Unemployment Compensation, July 1980, pp. 467-486.
Kerr, Clark and Abraham Seigel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike: 
An International Comparison," in Arthur Kornhouser, Robert Dubin, 
and Arthur Ross, ed., Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1954), pp. 189-212.
Kochan, Thomas A., Lee Dyer, and David B. Lipsky, The Effectiveness of 
Union-Management Safety and Health Committees (Kalamazoo, MI: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1977).
214
Kretzschmar, Lisa, "New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Depart 
ment of Labor: Limiting the Doctrine of Implied Labor Law Pre-
Emption," Brooklyn Law Review 46 (Winter 1980), pp. 297-320. 
Interview with Robert Langlais, Rhode Island Department of Employment
Security, February 21, 1985. 
Learner, Edward A. "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics," American
Economic Review 73 (March 1983), pp. 31-43. 
Leigh, J. Paul, "Risk Preference and the Interindustry Propensity to Strike,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36, 2 (January 1983), pp. 271-285. 
Lesser, Leonard, "Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation," Yale
Law Journal 55, 1 (1945), pp. 172-176. 
Levitan, Sar A., Garth L. Mangum and Ray Marshall, Human Resources and
Labor Markets, 3rd Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harper and Row, 1973). 
Lewis, Willard A., "The Concept of 'Labor Dispute' in State Unemployment
Insurance Laws,'' Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review
8, 1 (Fall 1966), pp. 29-54. 
Lewis, Willard A., "The 'Lockout as Corollary of Strike' Controversy
Reexamined," Labor Law Journal 23, 11 (November 1972), pp.
659-670. 
Lewis, Willard A., "The Law of Unemployment Compensation in Labor
Disputes," Labor Law Journal 113, 2 (February 1962). 
Lewis, Willard A., "The 'Stoppage of Work' Concept in Labor Dispute
Disqualification During Industrial Disputes,'' Monthly Labor Review 51,
6 (December 1940), pp. 1380-1382 
Lipsky, David B. and Henry S. Farber, "The Composition of Strike Activity
in the Construction Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review
29, 3 (April 1976), pp. 388-404. 
"Loopholes Give Extra Aid to Strikers," Business Week, September 9, 1972
p. 26. 
MacDonald, Maurice, Food, Stamps, and Income Maintenance (New York:
Academic Press, 1977). 
Letter from Cecil L. Malone, Director, Unemployment Insurance, Arkansas
Employment Security Division, to the authors, December 2, 1981. 
Mauro, Martin J., "Strikes as a Result of Imperfect Information," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 35, 4 (July 1982), pp. 522-538. 
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology 82 (May
1977), pp. 1212-1242.
215
Michaud, George A., Chief Hearing Officer for the Alaska Employment
Security Division, in telephone interviews and correspondence in
December 1984 and January 1985. 
Letter from Agaliece W. Miller, Employment Security Administrator, Illinois
Bureau of Employment Security, to the authors, December 11, 1981. 
Moore, William and Douglas Pearce, "Comparative Analysis of Strike Models
During Periods of Rapid Inflation, 1967-1977," Journal of Labor
Research 3 (Winter 1982), pp. 39-53. 
Mundlak, Yair, "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data,"
Econometrica 40, 1 (January 1978), pp. 69-86. 
Myers, Robert J., Social Insurance and Allied Government Programs
(Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pp. 20-22. 
"How Your Tax Dollars Support Strikes," Nation's Business, March 1973,
p. 25. 
New York State Department of Labor, The Industrial Controversy Provision of
the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law, 1935-1975, Labor
Research Report No. 1, April 1976, p. 2. 
Northrup, Herbert R., "The Rise and Demise of PATCO," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 37, 2 (January 1984), p. 178. 
Paldum, M. and P.J. Pederson, "The Macro-Economic Strike Model: A Study
of Seventeen Countries, 1948-1975," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 35, 4 (July 1982). 
Letter from Wendel K. Pass, Acting Executive Director, Office of Employment
Security, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, to the authors,
December 17, 1981. 
Perry, Charles R., Andrew M. Dramer, and Thomas J. Schneider, Operating
During Strikes (Philadelphia, PA: Industrial Relations Unit of the Whar-
ton School, University of Pennsylvania, J982). 
Letter from Eldon E. Peterson, Unemployment Insurance Director, Division of
Employment, Nebraska State Department of Labor, to the authors,
November 25, 1981. 
Ray, Robert David, "Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes:
Qualifying the 'Direct Interest' Disqualification," Missouri Law Review
46 (Summer 1981), pp. 694-707 
Reder, Melvin and George R. Neumann. "Conflict and Contract: The Case
of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy 88 (October 1980), pp.
867-886. 
Rejda, George E., Social Security and Economic Security, 2nd Edition
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984). 
"Review of Food Program Developments in 1981," Clearinghouse Review
(January 1982), p. 776.
216
Ringer, James M. "Effect of Participation in a Labor Dispute Upon Contin 
uation of Unemployment Benefits," Cornell Law Quarterly 52 (Spring 
1967), pp. 738-752.
Ross, Arthur, Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1948).
Royback, Joseph G., A History of American Labor (New York: The Free 
Press, 1966), pp. 351.
Sapsford, David, "The Theory of Bargaining and Strike Activity," Inter 
national Journal of Social Economics 9 (February 1982).
Shadur, Milton I., "Unemployment Benefits and the 'Labor Dispute' Dis 
qualification," The University of Chicago Law Review 17, 2 (Winter 
1950).
Siebert, Stanley, Phillip Bertrand and John Addison, "The Political Model of 
Strikes: A New Twist," Southern Economic Journal 52 (Summer 1985), 
pp. 23-33.
Singh, Davinder, Glyn Williams, and Ronald Wilder, "Wage Determination in 
U.S. Manufacturing 1958-1976: A Collective Bargaining Approach," 
Journal of Labor Research 3 (Spring 1982),pp. 223-337.
Skeels, Jack, "The Economic and Organizational Basis of Early United States 
Strikes, 1900-1948," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 35 (July 
1982), pp. 491-503.
"Social Welfare—Effect of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation on 
AFDC Benefits," West Virginia Law Review 78, 2 (February 1976), 
pp. 268-277.
Steiner, Gilbert Y., The State of Welfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1971), 
pp. 198-213.
Stern, Robert N., "Intermetropolitan Patterns of Strike Activity," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 29, 2 (January 1976), pp. 218-235.
Swidinsky, Robert and John Vandercamp, "A Micro-econometric Analysis of 
Strike Activity in Canada," Journal of Labor Research 3, 4 (Fall, 1982).
Taylor, Benjamin J. and Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law, 4th ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983).
Thieblot, Armand J. and Ronald M. Cowin, Welfare and Strikes: The Use of 
Public Funds to Support Strikes (Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn 
sylvania Press, 1972).
Thomas, Marc E., "Strikers' Eligibility for Public Assistance: The Standard 
Based on Need," Journal of Urban Law 52, 1 (1974).
Tilly, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison- 
Wesley, 1978).
217
UAW Washington Report 20, 36, September 26, 1980, p. 1.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, Public Assistance Statistics, January 1980 (September 1980).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, Public Assistance Statistics, November 1980 (September 1981).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, Public Assistance Statistics, December 1980 (November 1981).
U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, Characteristics of State Plans for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, 1982 Edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of 
fice, 1982).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administra 
tion, Characteristics of State Plans for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, 1984 Edition.
U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C, 
1983).
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Compar 
ison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, Washington, D.C., 1984.
U.S. Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensa 
tion of Pooled Funds and Employer Reserve Account Types, Washington, 
D.C., 1936.
U.S. Social Security Board, "Issues Involved in Decisions on Disputed Claims 
for Unemployment Benefits," Social Security Yearbook, 1940, 
Washington, D.C., June 1941.
Walsh, Kenneth, Strikes in Europe and the United States (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1983).
Whitehead, Brian R., "Unemployment Benefits, Laid-Off Workers, and Labor 
Disputes: The Unemployment Benefit Conflict," Willamette Law Review 
19 (Fall 1983), pp. 737-756.
Witte, Edwin E., "Development of Unemployment Compensation," Yale Law 
Journal 55, 1 (December 1945).
Yost, William, the Hearing Officer in the case, in a telephone interview, 
December 10, 1984.
Letter from A.G. Zillig, Director of the Alaska Division of Employment 






Addison, John, 162nn.l6, 25
AFDC. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
AFDC-U. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U)
Ahrens, Richard A., 57-58, 74n.74, 75nn.75-79, 86
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC): before 1961, 8; analysis of effect on strike 
behavior of availability of, 181-83; eligibility requirement changes under, 81-84
Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U): court cases related to 
state neutrality in labor disputes, 86, 89-94; court cases related to state options to grant benefits 
for strikers, 86-89; estimated aid to strikers under, 2, 100; program to assist unemployed 
parents and strikers, 84-85, regulation concerning unemployed striker's eligibility, 88; state- 
federal administration, 86; statutory implications for payment of strikers' benefits, 86, 94-100
Air traffic controllers strike, 2, 59, 62, 66-68
Aragon decision effect, 63
Arnold, James A., Ill, 74n.65
Ashenfelter, Orley, 135, 136, 161n.2, 162n.ll, 163n.38
Becker, Joseph, 154, 163n.40
Bernstein, Irvmg, 79, 121nn.ll, 12, 14-17, 26
Bertrand, Phillip, 162nn.l6, 25
Bituminous Coal Operators Association strike, 2
Bloch, Frank S., 123n.51, 53, 126-27n.ll4
Brennan, William, 74n.73
British Unemployment Insurance Act of 1911, 18, 26, 41-42
Bntt, David, 162nn.l9, 22
Brooks, Norman, 75n.85
Brown, Josephine C., 121nn.l6, 18
Buck, Andrew, 162n.l8
Carney, James T., 35n.44, 36n.46, 37nn.64, 66,69, 73, 48, 72nn.33, 34,77,94, 105, 121nn.l, 3, 
5, 6, 13, 15-17, 122n.27, 31, 36, 41, 124n.84, 129nn.l38-40, 131n.l59
Chamberlain, Neil W., 82, 122n.28
CIO. See Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
Clark, Robert W , HI, 125n.97
Coase, Ronald, 140-41, 162n.35
Coase Theorem, 140-42, 146
Coleman, E. Thomas, 108
Collective bargaining: government policy for, 189-90; neutral framework in Taft-Hartley Act 
for, 90
Community Services Program of CIO, 83
Confer, David R., 36nn.52, 56




Cowin, Ronald M., 127nll5, 2, 10, 82, 88, 100-101, 109, 121nn.4, 15-18, 121-22nn.24-27,
122nn.30, 32, 33, 123-24n.66, 127n.ll5, 129n.l40, 130nn.l57-58, 131n.l59 
Creel, George, 78-79 
Cutler, Michael E., 73n.50
Daniel, Cletus, 78-79, 121nn.7-ll
Data for analysis, 11-12, 147-59, 177
Dickinson, William L., 108
Disqualification for benefits: by grade or class, 57-59, under innocent bystander provision, 51-57;
willful misconduct as condition for, 62, 66-68 
Dow Chemical Company strike, 1 
Dramer, Andrew M., 42, 71nn.8-10 
Dyer, Lee, 36n.61
Edwards, P. K., 137, 161nn.l, 3, 162n.23
Ehrenberg, Ronald, 132n.l85, 200n.2
Eisenberg, Stephen G., 39, 70n.l
Employee replacements, permanent, 42
Employment, interim or temporary, 31-33
Eschwege, Henry, 130nn. 152-54
Establishment: differing definitions at state level of term, 23-24; See also Functional integration test
FAA. See Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Farber, Henry, 184n.6
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): air traffic controllers strike against, 2; role in air traffic
controllers strike, 59, 62
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) relief policy, 77-80 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 21
FERA. See Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) 
Fierst, Herbert A., 27, 36nn.45, 48, 49, 70n.3, 123n.62 
Flaherty, Scan, 135, 162n.l2 
Food Stamp Act of 1964: attempts to limit recipients through amendment, 105-7; establishment and
development of program for, 104-5; test of constitutionality of 1981 amendment, 110-12 
Food stamp program: court interpretation of legality of exclusion of strikers from, 109-12; effect of
availability of benefits on strike behavior, 181-83; eligibility rules for, 102-4; estimated aid
to strikers under, question of eligibility of strikers for, 8-9, 104-7; strikers limited in access
through OBRA legislation, 107 
Functional integration test, 23-24
GA. See General assistance (GA)
Galle, Omer, 162nn.l9, 22
Gartner, Manfred, 134, 162n.lO
General assistance (GA): analysis of effect on strike behavior, 181-83; diversity of programs and
eligibility rules for, 113; eligibility of strikers for, 9; provisions and administration of, 112;
welfare assistance to strikers at state level, 82 
Gennard, John, 10 
Gerby, Roger, 76n.l01 
Good cause condition, 97-98 
Grade or class of worker, 57-59
221
Gramm, Cynthia, 161n.5, 184n.3
Gregory, Charles, 200-201n.3
Griffith, Larry, 138, 162n 29
Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 9





Helms, Jesse, 3, 108
Hethenngton, W. Joseph, 18, 34nn.4, 7, 36n.60, 41, 43-44, 70n.3, 71nn 7, 12, 72n.33
Hicks, John R., 134, 136, 161n.7
Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 52-53, 56
Hopkins, Harry, 77-78, 80
Hutchens, Robert, 132n.l85, 163n.38, 200n.2
Income maintenance programs, Social Security Administration, 80-81
Industrial conflict models. See Strike behavior models
Industrial peace: as goal of government collective bargaining policy, 189-90; and involuntary
unemployment, 191-92; and society's responsibility for, 194 
Industrial relations, 187, 189 
Information, imperfect, 134 
Innocent bystander: conditions for unemployment eligibility benefits, 6, 7, 17, 53-54, definition
of, 51-52; failing to cross picket lines, 54-55; in &2Hodory&l case, 52-53; inehgibility under
Ohio law of, 52; under New York state law, 47; under Rhode Island state law, 48, See also
Grade or class of worker 
Interim or temporary employment. See Employment, interim or temporary
Javits, Jacob, 90
Joe, Tom, 13n.8, 122n.38, 127n.l23
Johnson, George, 135, 136, 161n.2, 162n.ll
Joint-choice model, 11, 138-42, 157-59, 161; See also Coase Theorem; Industrial conflict models
Katz, Harold A., 200-201n.3
Katz, Harry C., 200-201n.3
Kaufman, Bruce, 135, 137, 162nn.l3, 19-20
Kennan, John, 10, 162n.36
Kennedy, John F., 104
Kerr, Clark, 138, 161n.3
Kochan, Thomas, 200-201n.3
Kochan, Thomas A., 36n.61
Kretzschmar, Lisa, 73n.50
Kuhn, James W., 82, 122n.28
Labor dispute: analysis of effect of disqualification policies, 165-68; analysis of effect of 
unemployment insurance generosity on, 169-74; conditions for unemployment benefits in, 
5-7; differing interpretations of term, 21-23; states paying unemployment benefits in employer- 
caused, 30; See also Lockout by employer
222
Langlais, Robert, 72n.32
Learner, Edward, 159, 163n.43




Levitan, Sar, 121n.22, 122nn.35, 37
Lewis, Willard A., 22, 26, 30, 34nn.l2, 13, 21,35nn.27-29, 33,42-43, 36n.59, 70n.3, 74-75n.74,
75nn.75, 86
Lipsky, David, 36n.61, 184n.6 
Lockout by employer: as condition for unemployment benefit eligibility, 6, 7, 17; conditions for
legality of defensive and offensive, 25-26; court determination in Sunstar, 28-29; effect of
state lockout exceptions rule, 27-28; states paying unemployment benefits when, 26-30, under
Taft-Hartley Act, 24; See also National Labor Relations Board 
Long, Russell, 90
McCarthy, John, 162n.26
MacDonald, Maurice, 128nn.l25, 128, 129nn. 132-35, 137
McGlew, Charles, 76n.94
Malek, Thomas S., 37nn.67-68
Malone, Cecil, 75n.91
Mangum, Garth, 121n.22, 122nn.35, 37
Marshall, Ray, 121n.22, 122nn.35, 37
Mauro, Martini., 134, 161n.8
Meany, George, 4
Michaud, George A., 71n.l6, 17
Michigan: definition of establishment, 34-35n 25; temporary job conditions for benefits, 31-33
Minnesota: interpretation of lockout rule, 28-29; lockout rule in, 27-28
Models of industrial conflict. See Industrial conflict models
Models of strike behavior. See Strike behavior models
Moore, William, 135, 162n.l5
Mundlak, Yair, 185n.9
Murray, Merrill G., 33n.l
Myers, Charles, 200n.3
Myers, Robert J., 122n.34
National Labor Relations Act, 21-22
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 24-25
Neiman, Kenneth, 132n.l84
Neumann, George, 11, 138-42, 157-59, 161, 162nn.31-34, 163n.42, 192
Neutrality, government: as goal of government policy, 189-90, 196-98; at state level, 89-94, 120
New York state: conditions for paying unemployment benefits, 68-69; unemployment benefits for
strikers, 5, 6, 17, 39-40, 47-48; unemployment compensation law of, 46-48 
New York Telephone case, 20, 51, 56 
NLRB. See National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 21 
Northrup, Herbert, 75nn.87, 88
223
OBRA. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
Ohio: definition of establishment, 34-35n.25; innocent bystanders under law in, 52-53
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), 7, 85, 102; amendment limiting striker access to
food stamps and AFDC-U, 107-8, 112; changes in eligibility test for food stamps, 1981, 103-4;
legal challenges to, 7; See also Reagan administration
Paldum, M., 161n.4
Pass, Wendel K., 36nn.53, 57
PATCO. See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO)
Pattern bargaining, 139
Pearce, Douglas, 135, 162n.l5
Pennsylvania: interpretation of lockout rule, 29-30
Perl, Lewis, 13n.l7
Perlis, Leo, 83
Perry, Charles R., 42, 71nn.8-10
Peterson, P.J., 161n.4
Policy options, 194, 198-200
Priban, K., 70n.4
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), 59
Protocol theory: function and purpose of, 138-40, 159; predictions of, 180, 181
Public aid: for strikers, 82-83; to strikers, 2-3; to strikers under FERA policy, 77-80, 82
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 1
Ray, David, 74n.65
Rayback, Joseph G., 121n.26
Reagan administration: policy to change AFDC expenditures, 7, 101-2; role in air traffic
controllers strike, 59
Reder, Melvin, 11, 138-42, 157-59, 161, 162nn.31-34, 163n.42, 192 
Reder-Neumann model. See Joint-choice model 
Rejda, George, 121n.l9 
Rhode Island: question of unemployment benefits for strikers in Gnnnell, 9; unemployment benefits
for strikers, 5, 6, 17, 39-40, 48-49 
Ringer, James, 74n.65 
Rogers, Cheryl, 13n.8, 122n.38, 127n.l23 
Rolph, James, 78 
Rubin, Beth, 162n.29
Sapaford, David, 162n.l7
Schlesinger, Arthur M., 77, 121nn.2-3
Schneider, Thomas J., 42, 71nn.8-10
Shadur, Milton I., 23, 34n.4, 34n.23, 35n.26, 70n.5
Shister, Joseph, 200n.3
Sieber, Joseph, 75n.90
Siebert, Stanley, 137, 162nn.l6, 25
Siegel, Abraham, 138, 161n.3
Singh, Davinder, 134, 161n.9
Skeels, Kack, 162n.21
Smith, Robert, 132n 185, 200n.2
224
Social Security Act of 1935, 5, 18, 80-82; AFDC amendment in 1961, 84-85; AFDC-U amendment 
in 1968, 87; amendment to prohibit AFDC-U benefits to strikers, 102, state-administered 
unemployment compensation systems, 18
Social Security Board Draft Bill, 18-19, 26, 57
Society's goals, 194, 195-96
Spector, Marjorie, 27, 36nn.45, 48, 49, 70n.3, 123n.62
State employment security agencies, 15
States: administration of food stamp program, 102; autonomy in setting conditions for unemployment 
benefits, 68; development of policies for unemployment compensation, 17; differing provi 
sions for strikers' unemployment benefits, 5-6, 62, 66-68; discretion in AFDC programs, 
81; laws for unemployment compensation, 15; legality of option to decide ADFC-U payments 
for strikers, 86-89; neutrality in labor disputes, 89-94, 120; sole administrators of general 
assistance, 86; with stoppage-of-work, lockout, and innocent bystander provisions, 69; as unit 
of analysis for strike behavior, 133, 147, 149
Steiner, Gilbert Y., 129nn.l34, 137
Stern, Robert, 161n.6
Stevens, John Paul, 51, 56-57
Stockman, David, 101
Stoppage-of-work provisions: effect on level of strike activity of, 40-41, 43-44; as exception to 
nonpayment of striker benefits, 39; generosity of state, 69; implications of and rationale for, 
40-42; in Rhode Island state law, 48; and unemployment benefits, 5-7, 15, 69
Strike: distinct from lockout, 27; and unemployment benefits, 41
Strike behavior: factors affecting, 12; link to unemployment insurance of, 12; state as unit of 
analysis for, 133
Strike behavior model, state analysis, data for, 147-59, 165; hypotheses for, 143-46, 153, 161
Strike behavior models, 134, 157; analysis of political, social and organizational elements in, 135-36; 
bargaining-power theory of strikes, 136; explanation of strike school of, 134-35; joint-choice 
model of, 138-41
Strikers: effect of implied prohibition to obtain public aid on, 94-102; eligibility eliminated for 
some programs, 7; eligibility for benefits under General Assistance (GA), 112-14; eligibility 
under AFDC-U program, 85; eligibility under current government transfer programs, 1; legal 
questions of eligibility for ADFC-U and GA, 86-100, under New York state law, 47-48; question 
of eligibility under food stamp programs, 104-7; question of unemployment benefits under 
AFDC-U, 87; as recipients of food stamps, 105, 109; under Rhode Island state law, 48-49; 
welfare assistance in 1940s and 50s, 82; See also Aid to Families with Dependent Children- 
Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U); General assistance (GA); Unemployment insurance
Summers, Clyde, 200n.3
Supreme Court: interpretation of state stoppage-of-work provisions, 45; position on involuntary 
nature of unemployment in labor dispute, 55-57; significance of ruling in New York Telephone, 
49-51
Surplus commodity programs, 104
Swidmsky, Robert, 184n.3
Taft, Robert A., 90
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 90; goal to ensure government neutrality, 190; Section 7, 24
Taylor, Benjamin J., 35nn.27-28, 30, 32, 200-201n.3
Temporary employment. See Employment, interim or temporary
225
Texas: innocent bystander provision, 54
Thieblot, Armand J., 2, 10, 82, 88, 100-101, 109, 121nn.4, 15-18, 121-22nn.24-27, 122nn.30,
32-33, 123-24n.66, 127n.ll5, 129n.l40, 130nn. 157-58, 131n.l59 
Thomas, Marc E., 13n.l4, 39, 70n.l 
Thurmond, Strom, 107, 108 
Tilly, Charles, 162n.27 
Transfer payments: effects on strikes of, 141-42; financing of, 142-43; policy options for costs
of, 192-93 
Transfer programs, government: goals for public assistance and social insurance as, 188; public
assistance and social insurance, 188; role of state in policy for, 187; striker eligibility under
current, 1
Unemployment benefits: conditions for payment with interim job, 31; payment in employer lockout, 
24-30; state financing of, 154; at state level, 5; state provisions for, 5-7; See also New York; 
Rhode Island; States
Unemployment (definition), 87
Unemployment insurance laws, state: court cases related to disqualification for benefits under, 
87-89; interpretation of lockout rules in, 24-30; lockout exception rule, 27, provisions related 
to benefits for strikers of, 15-17; stoppage-of-work provisions, 5-6, 40
Unemployment insurance system: goals of government policy for, 188-89; link to strike activity 
of, 12, 178-79, 183; state authority for rules of, 5; and strike activity, 12
United Mine Workers strike, 2, 52
United Steel Workers strike, 2, 52
USX strike, 2, 6
Vandercamp, John, 184n.3
Wage determination model (Hicks), 134
Wagner Act of 1935, 189, 190
Wallace, Michael, 162n.29
Walsh, Kenneth, 161n.4
Welfare programs, government: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC and AFDC-U), 
80-102; effect of liberalization on sinkers' benefits, 3; food stamps, 102-12; and strike ac 
tivity, 12; See also Public aid; Transfer programs, government
White, Byron, 112
Whitehead, Brian R., 34n.l4
Wilder, Ronald, 161n.9
Williams, Glyn, 161n.9
Witney, Fred, 35nn.27-28, 30, 32
Witte, Edwin E., 18, 33nn.l, 3, 6
Work Stoppage Historical File, 147-48, 150, 159
Work-stoppage provisions. See Stoppage-of-work provisions
Yost, William, 75n.92
Zald, Mayer, 162n.26 
Zillig, A.G., 71n.l6, 17

INDEX OF CASES
Abbott v. Employment Security Department, 27 Wash. App.619, P.2d 734 (1980), 58, 75n.84
Abuie v. Ford Motor Co., 194 N.E. 2d 136 (1963), 23, 34n.22
Adamski v. BUC, 161 N.E. 2d 907 (Ohio 1959), 24, 34-35n.25
Aero Design & Engineering Co. v. Board of Review, 356 P.2d 344 (Okla.1960), 44, 71n.l4
Ahne v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, 53 Hawaii 185, P.2d 1397 (1971), 23,
34n.22, 41, 70n.4 
Albuquerque-Phoenix Express, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission, 544 P.2d 1161
(N.M.1975), 44, 71n.l5 
American Shipbuilding Company v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), 25, 26, 35n.33
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 106 Sup.Ct. 3129 (1986), 18, 33n.l, 55-56, 65, 74nn.66-73 
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), 87, 89, 118, 121nn.21, 23, 122n.43, 123nn.56-61 
Bethea v. Mason, 384 F.Supp.1274 (D.Md.1974), 88, 123n.55 
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Board of Review (In re Rusynko), 402 Pa. 202, 166 A.2d 871 (1961),
58, 75n.81
Belts Cadillac-Olds,Inc., 96NLRB 268 (1951), 25, 35n.31 
Birkenwald, Inc., 282 NLRB 130 (1987), 26, 35n.40
Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 141 p.2d 69 (Okla.1943), 44, 71n.l4 
Borchman Sons v. Carpenter&l, 166 Neb. 322, 89 N.W. 2D 123 (1958), 58, 75n.83 
Brechner v. Ind. Comm'n., 148So.2d 567 (1%3), 31, 37n.64 
Bruly v. Ind. Com., 100 So.2d 22 (Fla.1958), 31, 37n.63 
Bsaker v. General Motors Corp., 106 s Ct 3129 (1986), 33nn.l, 2 
Burgoon v. Board of Review, 100 N.J. Super. 569, 242 A.2d 847 (1968), 58, 75n.8 
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), 81, 121n.21
Carleson v. Remillard, 46 U.S. 598 (1972), 89, 123n.61
Charbonnet v. Gerace, 457 So.2d 676 (La. 1984), 67, 76n.99
Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich.438, 298 N.W. 2d 87 (1941), 24, 34n.25
City of Spring Valley v. County of Bureau, 115 Dl.App. 545 (1904), 113, 132n.l83
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Labor Appeals, 582 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1978), 44, 71n.l5
Conway v. Federal Aviation Administration, appeal docketed Mien. Employment Security Board
of Review, No. UCF81-89419-R01-94173 through UCF81-89630-R01-94343, Fe. 15,1985,
66, 75-76n.93
Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343, 43 S.E.2d 382 (1947), 75n.82 
Cruz v. Department of Employment Security, 22 Utah 393, 453 P.2d 894 (1969), 31, 37n.64
Darling & Co., 171 NLRB 801 (1968), 26, 35n.37
Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration v. Iowa Department of Job Services,
341 N.W.2d 752 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1983), 66, 75n.92 
Dienes v. Holland, 78 I11.2d 8, 397 N.E.2d 1358 (1979), 31, 37n.62 
Douglas v. Brown, 189, 200n.3
Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 57F.R.D.105 (1972), 32-33, 37nn.72, 73 
Dravo Corp. v. Bd. of Rev., 187 Pa.Super. 246, 144 A.2d 670 (1958), 58, 75n.83
Eaton v. Lyng, 669 F.Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1987), 111, 118, 131nn.l71-74 
Employment Sec. Adm'n v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 438 A.2dl356 (Md.1982), 44, 71n.l5
227
228
Evans v. Ind. Com., 361 S.W.2d 332, (Mo.1962), 31, 37n.64
Ex pane McCleney, 286 Ala. 288, 239 So.2d,311 (1970), 55, 74n.64
Federal Aviation Administration v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation, 494 A.2d 564
(Conn. 1985), 67, 76n.95 
Federal Aviation Admin, v. Montana State Dept. of Labor and Industry, 685 P.2d 365 (Mont. 1984),
67, 76n.96
Francis v. Davidson, 379 F.Supp. 78 (D.Md.1974) [Francis II], 88-89, 118, 122n.43, 123n.54 
Francis v. Davidson, 340 F.Supp. 351 (1972) [Francis I\, 87-89, 118, 122n.43
Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 381 Mich. 249, 161
N.W.2d 14 (1968), 31-32, 37n.65 
Grinnell v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449; cert, denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973), 9, 13n. 12, 48, 64, 72n.31
Haley v. Board of Review, 106 N.J. Super. 420, 256 A.2d 71 (1969), 58, 75n.81
Barter Equipment, 280 NLRB 130 (1987), 26, 35nn.38, 39
Hawaii Telephone Co. v. Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relationsl, 405 F. Supp. 275,
90 LRRM 2854 (1975), 41, 70nn.5, 6 
Messier v. American Television & Radio Co., 258 Minn. 541, 104 N.W. 2d 876 (1980), 28,
36n.50 
Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 408 F. Supp. 1016 (1976), 52, 64, 74nn.52-55,
112 
Holland Motor Expresss, Inc. v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 42 Mich.App. 19,
201 N.W. 2d 308 (1972), 27, 36n.47
Inland Trucking Company v. NLRB 1,440 F.2d 562 (1971), 35n.36 
In re Curatala, 10 N.W.2d 10, 173 N.E. 2d 1397 (1971), 23, 34n.22 
In re Ferrara, 217 N.Y. 2d 11, 176 N.E. 2d 43 (1961), 23, 34n.22 
In re Hatch, 130 Vt.218, 290A.2dl80 (1972), 31, 37n.64 
In re Kennecott Copper Corp., 13 Utah 262, 372 P.2d 987 (1962), 58, 75n.83 
Iron Workers' Union v. Ind. Comm'n, 194 Utah 242, 139 P.2d208 (1943), 58, 75n.82 
ITTLampDiv. of Int. Tel.& Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 439 F.2d 989 (1970), 93, 124n.82 
ITTLamp Division v. Minter, 318 F.Supp. 364(1970), 10, 13n.l3,93, 97-100, 117, 120, 125nn.95, 
103-5, 126n.lll, 127n.l21
Jaramillo v. County of Santa Clara, 91 LRRM 2755 (1976), 109-110, 118, 131nn. 160-63 
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 223 NLRB 189 (1976), 25, 35n.34
Kimbell, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission, 429 U.S. 804 (1976), 44, 64, 71n.l3 
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), 89, 123n.61
Labinsky \.Ind. Com., 167 So.2d 620 (Fla.1964), 31, 37n.63
Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (1969), 26, 35n.37
Lascaris v. Wyman, 340 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1972) [Lascaris II], 93-94, 96, 99, 118, 124n.74,125nn.93,
94, 126n.llO 
Lascaris v. Wyman, 305 N.Y.S.2d 212(N.Y. S.Q. 1969) [Lascaris I\, 92, 95-96,99, 117, 124n.72,
125n.90 
Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commisswion, 308 Mich. 198,
113 N.W.2d 260 (1944), 41, 70n.5 
Ledesma v. Block, 825 F.2d (6th Cir. 1987)1046, 111, 118, 131nn. 175-76
229
Lee National Corp. v. Board of Review, 187 Pa. Super. 96, 211 A.2d 124 1(1965), 29, 36n.54 
Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Review Board, 480 A.2d 1000 (1984), 36n.55 
Lyng v. UAW, 108 Sup.Ct. 1184 (1988), 7, 13n.lO, 111-12, 118, 131nn.l77-81
McAllister\. Board of Rev., 197 Pa.Super. 552, 179 A.2d 121 (1962), 31, 37n.64 
McAnallen v. ESC, 26 Mich.App. 621, 182 N.W. 2d 753 (1970), 24, 35n.25 
Mackintosh-Hemphill Div., E. W.Bliss Co. v. Board of Review,, 205 Pa. Suoer. 9, 106 A.2d 23
(1965), 29, 36n.54
Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2N.W. 2d 689 (1942), 41, 70n.6
MarkHopkins, Inc. v. Employment Comm'n.,, 24Cal.2d744, 151 P.2d229 (1944), 31, 37n.64 
Matter of Burger, 277 App. Div.234 (Third Dept.), aff d. 303 N.Y. 654 (1950), 47, 72n.24 
Matter of Heitzenrater, 19 N.Y.2d 1 (1966), 47, 72nn.24, 27 
Meadow Court Dairies v. Wiig, 50 Hawaii 225, 437 P.2d 317 (1968), 41, 71n.6
Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235 (1967), 22, 34n.20, 63
Nestle v. Johnson, 68 ffl App.3d 17, 385 N.E.2d 793 (1979), 54, 74n.58
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 566 F. 2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977),
50, 73nn.44-50 
New York Telephone Co v. New York State Department of Labor, 434 F. Supp.810, 95 LRRM
2487 (1977), 73nn.36-43 
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 100 LRRM
2896 (1979), 30, 32, 34n.ll, 36n.62, 37nn.70, 71, 46, 49, 53, 65, 71nn.21-30, 73n.35 
NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), 90, 123n.64 
NLRB v. Brown, et al dlblal Brown Food Store et al, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), 25, 35n.35 
NLRB v. McKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), 26, 35n.41 
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No, 449 (Buffalo Linen Supply Co.), 353 U.S.85 (1959),
25, 35n.32 
Northwest Airlines v. App. Bd., 378 Mich. 119, 142 N.W. 2d 649 (1966), 23, 34n.22
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), 53, 74n.56
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Employment Security Division, 659 P.2d
583 (Alaska 1983), 44-45, 71nn. 15-20
Operating Engineers LocalNo.3 v. Ind. Comm'n, 7 Utah 2d 48, 318 P.2d 336 (1957), 58, 75n.83 
Outboard Marine & Manufacturing Co. v. Gordon, 403 m. 523, 87 N.E. 2d 610 (1949), 58, 75n.80
Park v. ESC, 353 Mich. 613, 94 N.W. 2d 407 (1959), 24, 35n.25
Penn Manufacturing Corp. v. Board of Review, 215 Pa. Super.310, 264 A.2d 126 (1969), 29,
36n.54 
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.A. 707 (1975), 100, 126n.ll4
Ramone v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 474 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1984), 68,
76n.99 
Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (1971), 111, 117, 124n.83, 131n.l65
San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), 51, 73n.50
Scott v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n., 141 Mont.230, 376 P.2d 733 (1962), 37n.64
Shell Oil Co. v. Brooks, 567 P.2d 1132 (Wash. 1977), 44, 71n.l5
Spielman v. Industrial Comm'n., 236 Wis. 240N.W. 1 (1940), 23, 34n.24
230
State of Montana v. Department of Public Welfare, 136 Mont. 283 (1959), 99, 126n.l09 
Strat-O-Seal Manufacturing Co. v. Scott, 72 Hl.App.2d 480 (1966), 91, 95, 99, 117, 124nn.67-71 
Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania v. Unemployment Compensation Review Board, 440 U.S. 977, 100
LRRM 3055 (1979), 29-30, 36n.55, 65
Sunstar Foods, Inc. v. Uhlendorf, 310 N.W. 2d 80 (1981), 36n.51 
Super Tire Engineering v. McCorkle, 412 F.Supp. 192 (1976), 99, 125-26n.l08 
Swiecicki \.Dept. of Employmenmt Security, 667 P.2d 28 (Utah 1983), 68, 76n.99
Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), 90, 123n.64 
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), 89, 123n.61
UAW\. Lyng, 648 F.Supp. 1234 (D.D.C. 1986), 7, 13n.9, 100, 110-11, 118, 131nn.l66-70,
126n.ll2 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. G. C. Murphy Co., 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 572,
339 A.2d 167 (1975), 55, 74n.63 
Unemployment Compensation Commission v Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 91L Ed 136 (1946), 21-22,
34nn. 15-19, 63
U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 102, 127n.l26 
United Steel Workers of America v. Meierhenry, 608 F. supp. 201 (1985), 51, 73n.50
Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960), 29, 36n.54
Warner Press, Inc. v. Review Board, Ind.App., 413N.E.2d 1003 (Ind.1980), 44, 71n.l5 
Wilson v. Employment Security Commission, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963), 58, 75n.81 
Wolf\. FAA, 461 N.Y.S.2D 573 (n.y. 1983), 68, 76n.99

l-6Z,0-66088-0
HlfllllSNI l(| NHOfcIHlM
